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INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, the United States took important but divergent
steps to fundamentally reshape its relationship with Native Nations and its
management of federal public lands.1
On July 8, 1970, President Nixon delivered a Special Message to
the Congress on Indian Affairs.2 The President’s message marked the
culmination of a years-long and major shift in federal Indian policy and
the longstanding federal trust obligations toward tribes. For the first time,
President Nixon’s message formally and expressly rejected the United
States’ prior approach of forced termination of those obligations in favor
1.
Throughout this report, the terms “Native Nations,” “Indian tribes,”
“Indians,” “Native Americans,” and “indigenous” are used interchangeably to refer to
the groups and individuals described by federal law as “Indian tribes” and “Indians”
respectively. We recognize the potential for confusion around these varying terms but
have incorporated their use to expand upon the limited and sometimes disrespectful
connotations of the use of “Indian” as a legal term of art.
2.
President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (July 8, 1970), https://www.epa.gov/tribal/president-nixon
-special-message-indian-affairs-july-8-1970.
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of tribally-defined priorities, including the promotion of tribal sovereignty.
As the President’s Special Message noted, this about-face was justified by
the “special relationship between Indians and the Federal government” and
the “solemn obligations” and “specific commitments” made to the Indian
people through treaties and other agreements. For their part, said the
President’s message, the “Indians have often surrendered claims to vast
tracts of land,” which helps explain why these agreements continue “to
carry immense moral and legal force.”
Just a month before President Nixon’s message, the Public Land
Law Review Commission issued its comprehensive report on the nation’s
public lands.3 The Commission was charged by Congress to review the
then-extant laws applicable to the public lands estate and recommend
revisions.4 The Commission’s influential work laid the groundwork for
much of the modern legal framework applicable to public lands and the
federal agencies that manage them. Tellingly, however, neither the
Commission’s report nor any of its recommendations considered the
rights, interests, and role of Indian tribes in the management of federal
public lands or even included any reference to the federal government’s
trust obligations to those tribes as relevant to such management.5
Although those reforms ushered in a new era of federal policy
recognizing tribal sovereignty and a more comprehensive and effective
scheme for the federal government’s management of public lands, they
were mostly distinct undertakings that remained rooted in and continued
the historical exclusion of tribes and their interests from public lands.
Thus, despite significant advances in tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination over the last fifty years, the nation’s obligations to Indian
tribes and its approach to managing the public domain remain largely
separate endeavors. While various statutory, regulatory, and policy
avenues now provide bases from which Indian tribes can seek to influence
the federal agencies responsible for the management of public lands, none
of those avenues allow—much less encourage—consistent, effective, and
broad-based federal-tribal co-management partnerships.
3.
PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S
LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW
REVIEW COMMISSION 158 (1970), https://perma.cc/7R83-JWLF.
4.
Act of Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–606, 78 Stat. 982.
5.
The Commission’s rationale draws a stark line between federal
Indian law and public lands law and is provided in a short footnote: “The United States
holds legal title to Indian reservation lands for the benefit of the Indians. A body of
law has developed for these lands wholly separate from those commonly termed
public land laws. For these reasons, Indian reservations were specifically excluded
from the Commission’s study by the Act establishing the Commission.” Pub. Land
Law Review Comm’n, supra note 3, at 158 n.5.
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A half-century after President Nixon’s transformative statement
and the Public Land Law Review Commission’s influential report, the
time has come to once again rethink public land law and meaningfully
connect it to the federal government’s treaty-based and long-standing trust
responsibility to uphold and promote the sovereign and cultural interests
of Native Nations.
The history, law, and policy of the United States’ relationships
with both Indian tribes and the public lands are intimately intertwined and
historically co-dependent. But for the removal and exclusion of tribes from
large swaths of their traditional territories, there would be no public lands.
While the federal policies ushered in by the momentous events of 1970
largely treat these policy arenas as separate, the future of public lands
management will be defined by the law’s ability to justly recognize and
reconcile the historical and legal context of indigenous dispossession
through a new era of reform that thoughtfully and meaningfully restores
tribal management to federal public lands.
This Report intends to support and catalyze that next era of federal
policy.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Deep ancestral and traditional connections tie many Native
Nations to the federal government’s public lands. The removal of these
lands from indigenous control, their acquisition by the federal
government, and the federal government’s approach to their management
are largely premised upon the erasure or marginalization of those
connections. Both physically and legally, Indian tribes have been removed
from the landscapes they occupied since time immemorial. Rather than
centering, honoring, and using those connections, the current discussion
of tribal co-management of federal public lands is mostly bereft of this full
legal and historical context.
Compounding these limitations is the considerable discretion
enabled by the applicable legal framework and exercised by public land
management agencies. This discretion is most often used in ways that
place Indian tribes in a reactive and defensive position. Furthermore, in
exercising that discretion, federal public land management agencies
regularly disassociate their land management activities from their
interactions with tribes, viewing the former as a priority and the latter as
an additional burden or only ancillary to their mission. In order to
reconnect the management of public lands to the broader legal and
historical context, these agencies must be compelled—through statute or
Executive action—to work with tribes on a co-management basis, in the
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same manner as they are compelled to fulfill their other obligations and
priorities in managing and protecting the lands for which they are
responsible.
Furthermore, federal public land law generally provides to state
governments and private interests broad powers and authorities not yet
extended to Indian tribes. The intergovernmental dimensions of federal
public lands management must more fully recognize the federal
government’s fiduciary obligations to Indian tribes and include sovereign
tribal governments. The common tools used in “cooperative federalism”
can help inform the design of tribal co-management legislation and/or
rulemaking.
A. Tribal Co-Management
•
•

•

•

The first and foundational principles of federal Indian law and the
historical development of federal public lands provide a strong and
unique legal basis for tribal co-management.
The term “co-management” is subject to inconsistent interpretations,
applications, and politics. It is thus important to carefully scrutinize
conceptions of co-management and pay more attention to how it is
operationalized.
Though definitions are important, especially for the purpose of
creating mutual understanding and common expectations, what
matters most are the core principles or attributes of a co-management
approach. These include:
(1)

Recognition of tribes as sovereign governments,

(2)

Incorporation of the federal government’s trust
responsibilities to tribes,

(3)

Legitimation structures for tribal involvement,

(4)

Meaningful integration of tribes early and often in the
decision-making process,

(5)

Recognition and incorporation of tribal expertise, and

(6)

Dispute resolution mechanisms.

These core principles can be configured into creative and accountable
ways of governing that fit unique historical and legal contexts,
political realities, and landscapes.
There is no bright line that clearly distinguishes between
congressional and executive powers to authorize, compel, or
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encourage tribal co-management. The actions that can be taken by the
President and Congress are also not mutually exclusive.
The President has considerable powers and precedent to affirm tribal
sovereignty and effectuate the federal government’s treaty and trust
obligations through innovations in tribal co-management and shared
governance.
Tribal co-management arrangements can be designed to ensure
political accountability and legal enforcement while establishing
positive precedents that all parties want replicated and modified to fit
unique situations and particular places. Co-management takes place in
a larger statutory and regulatory context that sets forth the purposes
and constraints of federal lands management.
The “sub-delegation” doctrine limits the ability of executive agencies
to delegate their final decision-making authorities to other actors. The
legal limits imposed by this doctrine do not preclude the executive
branch from using its powers to institutionalize variations of tribal comanagement. Co-management is not defined by a complete and
unqualified delegation of authority to tribes nor is it a call for tribal
unilateralism. “To share authority and responsibility” is the most
common denominator in definitions and applications of comanagement.
The Office of Solicitor in the Department of Interior should clarify
how the subdelegation doctrine and “inherently governmental/
federal” limitation applies more specifically to Native Nations as
contrasted to state and private actors operating on federal public lands.
The intermixing of federal and tribal powers is best conceived as a
lawful “sovereignty-affirming subdelegation.”
The Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture should issue a Joint Order
on Tribal Co-Management on Federal Public Lands. The Order will
pick up where 2016 Secretarial Order No. 3342—on “Identifying
Opportunities for Cooperative and Collaborative Partnerships with
Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in the Management of Federal
Lands and Resources”—left off. Based on first principles of federal
Indian law, the Order will draw from a more complete accounting of
existing authorities and more recent cases of innovation to prioritize
and reward tribal co-management and other forms of cooperation and
collaboration on federal lands.
Tribal co-management on federal lands can also be enabled through
congressional lawmaking, which could happen through two potential
pathways: (1) place-based legislation, and (2) system-wide legislation.
Each option should be premised on the same vision: to shift the
reactionary tribal consultation paradigm to a more pro-active and
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sovereignty-affirming model in which Indian tribes envision their own
approach and plans for managing their rights and interests on federal
lands.
B. Bridges to Tribal Co-Management
•

•

The following findings and recommendations will help clarify and
strengthen the bridges that could be taken to tribal co-management. In
those cases where tribal co-management is not the objective, these
recommendations will improve existing processes and programs and
methods of engagement more generally.
Existing legal authorities and processes—such as tribal consultation,
contracting and compacting, the National Historic Preservation Act,
and public lands planning—can be strategically used and serve as a
bridge to variations of tribal co-management.
C. Tribal Consultation

•
•

•

•

•

The federal government’s obligations to consult with Indian tribes on
matters that may affect their interest are rooted in the United States’
trust obligations to and treaties with those Native Nations.
Notwithstanding those firm legal bases, only in the last few decades
has the duty to consult become a recognized priority of the federal
government, largely implemented through executive actions aimed at
improving agency consultation standards.
Despite these developments, the practice, implementation, and
effectiveness of tribal consultation varies widely across the federal
government and leave many tribes and tribal leaders frustrated and
disappointed.
Consultation must evolve from the unenforceable, discretionary, and
variable practice widely criticized by tribes into a meaningful,
compatible, and continuing conversation between appropriate tribal
and federal officials.
Effective consultation can be facilitated through executive, legislative,
or judicial mandates requiring federal agencies to incorporate tribes
into ongoing policy discussion, development, and decision-making, as
well as day-to-day management, and bridge the procedural nature of
consultation to more substantive results.
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D. Contracting and Compacting
•
•
•

•

•

•
•

•

The ability of Indian tribes to contract with the federal government to
assume previously federal programs, functions, services, and activities
is a core aspect of the current policy era of tribal self-determination.
These contracts, originally referred to as “638 contracts” after the
public law that authorized them, have spurred a renaissance in tribal
governance and technical capacity.
To overcome the reluctance and recalcitrance of federal agencies in
contracting away their duties, Congress adopted various amendments
and evolved the 638 contracting model into broader tribal authorities,
including self-governance compacts that offer much more flexibility
for tribes when considering whether and how to manage previously
federal programs.
Some of these reforms have been expanded into public land
management agencies, with amendments in the Tribal Forest
Protection Act and the 2018 Farm Bill including reference to selfgovernance authorities for tribes seeking to assume some authorities
from the United States Forest Service.
Although 638 contracts, self-governance compacting, and similar
authorities have opened new avenues for tribes to take on greater (and
previously federal) responsibilities, these avenues are mostly limited
to existing tribal lands and resources and further hamstrung by a lack
of federal funding, continuing agency recalcitrance, and the
uncertainty around and inability of tribes to assume so-called
“inherently federal functions.” The combination of these last two
factors has particular impact in public lands management, where
federal agencies often view their responsibility for management
activities as central to their federal responsibility and, therefore,
largely unavailable for tribal assumption.
Finally, the existing framework of federal contracting necessarily
limits tribal flexibility and sovereignty in carrying out those programs,
services, functions, and activities.
Clarity and consistency around the ability of federal agencies to
contract with tribes for tribes to take on broader and meaningful
management programs, functions, services, and activities across all
public land management agencies could help invigorate important
steps toward broader tribal co-management.
Like the success of self-determination contracting and selfgovernance compacting across nearly every other aspect of federal
Indian policy, these practices could be an important pathway to more
extensive tribal involvement in public lands management.
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E. The National Historic Preservation Act and Native American
Traditional Cultural Properties, Districts and Landscapes
•

•

•

The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) is a procedural statute
affording federal agencies considerable discretion in how rigorously it
is applied to the protection of sacred places and cultural resources on
public lands.
But the designation of traditional cultural properties, districts, and
landscapes pursuant to the NHPA provides an important procedural
framework that can be strategically leveraged to secure more
substantive protections of these places. Federal public lands planning
provides one possible way to bridge the procedural nature of the
NHPA to more substantive protection of traditional cultural
properties, districts, and landscapes.
There are several features of the law—including the structured and
statutorily-based version of tribal consultation, the principle of
concurrence in resolving disputes, the important role of Tribal Historic
Preservation Offices in the administration of the Act, and the external
role played by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation that
serve as a check on agency discretion—that could be replicated or
modified in future place-based or system-wide legislation focused on
tribal co-management.
F. Federal Public Lands Planning

•

•

•

Federal public lands planning needs to be based on a more accurate
inventory and accounting of cultural resources and the related
programs within federal land agencies need to be adequately funded
and prioritized.
The executive branch should ensure that federal land planning
regulations and agency-specific manuals, handbooks, and policies
related to cultural resources and tribal relations comport with the first
principles of federal Indian law and the core principles of tribal comanagement.
The revision of land use plans provides an important opportunity to
adequately account for tribal rights and interests on public lands, to
better integrate the purposes and processes of the National Historic
Preservation Act, and to engage with Indian tribes on a governmentto-government basis.
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G. Bridges to a New Era
•

•

•

The time has come for a more holistic and inclusive approach to public
lands management. The legal framework for federal public lands must
no longer be divorced from and exclude tribes and tribal interests;
instead, within this statutory space there exists sufficient room to work
more creatively and substantively with Native Nations and to
incorporate the core principles of tribal co-management into the next
chapter of public lands management.
Prominent cases referenced in this Report, such as the Badger-Two
Medicine and Bears Ears, among others, are collectively shaping a
new, more collaborative way to better protect places that are valued
by Indians and non-Indians alike. They are innovative and
constructive efforts at harmonizing sometimes divergent values and
interests and more effectively draw upon the long-standing tribal
connections to, and knowledge of, those places.
Ultimately, enhancing opportunities for tribal co-management of
federal public lands is about justice, reconciliation, healing, and
sharing. While the direct benefits that would flow from an expanded
tribal role would serve our shared interests by better protecting our
public lands, tribal co-management also offers a path to a more
equitable future that promotes and sustains those core values for all
Americans. After a history of division between tribes and public lands,
the time has come to build the bridges that connect to that path and to
a new and brighter future.
REPORT OVERVIEW

This Report comes in five parts. Part I presents an overview of the
central and foundational principles of federal Indian law. This historical
and legal context has mostly been isolated within that field and left out of
federal public lands law and policy. As demonstrated in this opening Part,
however, critical legal standards related to the United States’ treaties with
Indian tribes and the federal trust obligations recognized by the United
States Supreme Court since the earliest days of the republic are necessary
for understanding the interconnectedness of tribal sovereignty and federal
public lands. In addition, this initial Part relies on examples and casestudies to illustrate how those foundational legal principles can find
expression through effective modern mechanisms for tribal comanagement.
Part II reviews some of the most common approaches to tribal
engagement on federal public lands, including tribal consultation
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provisions, compacting and contracting authorities, land designations and
processes pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and
federal land use planning. In isolation, none of these traditional methods
of engagement go far enough to provide tribes a more substantive and predecisional role in federal public lands management. Most provide
considerable discretion to federal land agencies and are most often used in
ways that place tribes in a reactive and defensive position. But there is an
opportunity to do much more and each section of this Part concludes by
demonstrating how these methods of engagement can be strategically
linked and leveraged in order to build bridges to variations of tribal comanagement.
The history, law, and politics of tribal co-management is the focus
of Part III. This Part demystifies the term and describes its use being
authorized and compelled by judicial decree, statute, treaty, and executive
action. Though Congress may enable tribal co-management on federal
public lands through legislation, the Executive is best positioned to quickly
implement the recommendations made in this Report. The Executive is
best positioned to quickly implement the precedent and authority to affirm
tribal sovereignty and effectuate the federal government’s treaty and trust
obligations through shared governance and variations of tribal comanagement. Because the term co-management is conceived of and
defined so differently in varied legal and managerial contexts, this Part
focuses instead on the core principles and attributes of tribal comanagement. These principles can be configured into creative and
accountable ways of governing that fit unique historical and legal contexts,
political realities, and landscapes.
Part IV situates tribal co-management in the context of federalism
and intergovernmental relations. Rarely is co-management examined in
this context and this Part helps reframe the debate to show how existing
principles and tools of cooperative federalism applicable in the federalstate context should be extended to Indian tribes. Most laws fail to
adequately recognize tribal rights and interests on federal public lands. But
this Part concludes by showing how this history of marginalization and the
vacuum left by Congress can be filled with executive rule and
policymaking.
The Report’s concluding Part V provides primary
recommendations and a strategic playbook to be considered by Indian
tribes, their conservation groups and other partners and allies, as well as
the President and Congress. This Part begins by explaining the rare
opportunity provided to the President to more strategically use existing
authorities and processes as a bridge to tribal co-management and
variations thereof. Improving existing methods of tribal engagement on
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public lands will help restore trust regardless of whether co-management
is the outcome. The Part concludes by charting two potential pathways for
tribal co-management legislation: place-based and system-wide. Each
would shift the reactionary tribal consultation paradigm to a more
proactive and sovereignty-affirming model wherein tribes can creatively
re-envision management of treaty rights, sacred places, and cultural
resources on public lands.
PROJECT BACKGROUND
This project began as an initial conversation and inquiry with
Natalie Dawson of Audubon Alaska in spring 2020, who requested from
us a research prospectus focused on tribal co-management as it applies to
federal public lands and the legal context of Alaska. We were then asked
to be part of additional conversations about tribal co-management
organized by the Center for American Progress. A survey was sent to those
participating individuals and organizations that identified important goals,
related work in progress, and most urgent needs and questions related to
tribal co-management.6 We incorporated this feedback into part of our
initial scope of work and further refined points of emphasis following
multiple discussions with tribal and conservation representatives.
This Report concludes phase I of the project and was expedited to
ensure that there was sufficient historical context and legal background on
tribal co-management and specific recommendations that can be
considered as priorities are established for the next Congress and future
Presidential administrations. Phase I of the project was administered as a
grant agreement between National Audubon Society, Inc. and the
University of Montana Foundation (the Bolle Center for People and
Forests and the Margery Hunter Brown Indian Law Clinic at the
University of Montana). The Agreement requested from us the political
and legal context of tribal co-management in the United States with
selected cases and examples, a review of existing processes and authorities
relevant to tribal co-management, and identification of potential
legislative and executive actions. We were provided autonomy within this
6.
Initial participation included representatives from the Bears Ears
Inter-Tribal Coalition, Conservation Colorado, Conservation Lands Foundation,
Earthjustice, Montana Wilderness Association, Native American Rights Fund,
National Audubon Society, National Congress of American Indians, National Parks
Conservation Association, Natural Resources Defenses Council, National Wildlife
Federation, Pew Charitable Trusts, Resources Legacy Fund, Sustainable Northwest,
The Wilderness Society, and the Yurok Tribe.
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framework and the analysis and conclusions are ours alone, though we
benefitted greatly from the multiple discussions we had with those
working in the areas and places discussed herein.
Phase II of the project is set for 2021 and will focus more on the
complexities of tribal co-management in Alaska. Though it helped inform
the shape of this Report, we believe the international context of tribal comanagement, especially the innovation going on with First Nations in
Canada, will be particularly instructive in the Alaska phase of research.
This will also be the point to provide more in-depth coverage of the
intersection between tribal co-management and the National Wildlife
Refuge System.
Not included in this phase of research is the issue of restoring
federal public lands to tribal trust ownership. Tribal land restoration
efforts—past, present and future—are uniquely suited to address distinct
histories, circumstances, and facts related to the tribal rights and interests
on particular pieces of public lands. The issue deserves its own discrete
analysis with a review of individual cases, such as the restoration of the
National Bison Range in Montana. Also not reviewed in the Report are
proposals of shared management and governance taking place on Indian
lands managed in trust by the United States, such as options for managing
the South Unit of Badlands National Park. Instead, the Report focuses on
federal public lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management, U.S.
Forest Service, National Park Service, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
Several cases of tribal co-management are reviewed to varying
degrees in this Report. We use them for illustration, but our objective was
to stay mostly focused on the more technical legal and policy dimensions
in order to provide a common foundation and framework. Graduate and
law students enrolled in the Bolle Center and Indian Law Clinics are
scheduled to provide deeper investigations into these and other cases over
academic year 2020–21. We hope that more detailed case histories, shared
lessons, and strategic playbooks can be presented by tribal representatives
and their conservation partners in subsequent phases of the project and
made available on a website. The website would ideally become a rich
online repository of technical information to facilitate learning across
cases and places. In addition to the stories of particular places and
collaborative successes, this resource would offer important assistance,
with anything from statutes and consultation regulations and policies to
638 contracts, assistance agreements, template MOUs, best practices in
public lands planning, and frequently asked questions pertaining to tribal
co-management and the tools used in the approach.
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FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

Understanding the import, scope, and dimensions of tribal comanagement on federal public lands demands an understanding of the
history of Indian tribes, their connections to the lands that have become
federal public lands, and the ways in which that history contributed to the
long-standing legal principles underpinning tribal rights to engage in comanagement. The history of federal Indian law and policy is intimately
intertwined with the founding and establishment of America but, for
reasons explained below, public land law has largely marginalized or
erased tribes,7 leaving the current discussion of tribal co-management of
federal public lands bereft of the full legal and historical context. This
section aims to remedy that divergence by developing a fuller context for
considering tribal claims to co-management, including the historical
expropriation of tribal lands, the relationship between those lands and
today’s federal public lands, and the critical foundations of federal Indian
law developed during that process, which remain relevant when
considering modern assertions of tribal authority. Beyond simply a
recitation of history, however, this section offers a different legal
perspective and framework from which to consider tribal co-management.
And, in view of the deep connections between tribes and the many federal
public lands on which their ancestors existed for millennia, this history
also provides important substantive benefits to applying that framework to
support tribal involvement in managing those resources.
A. Sovereign Since Time Immemorial
While population estimates vary (and have been much debated),8
North America has most certainly been populated by millions of
indigenous people for millennia.9 These groups developed and maintain
complex cultural and trade structures,10 including widespread land use and
7.
See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Public Lands, Conservation, and the
Possibility of Justice, 53 HARV C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 213 (2018).
8.
See Charles Mann, 1491, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2002),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/03/1491/302445/.
9.
See, e.g., Alexander Koch, et al., Earth System Impacts of the
European Arrival and Great Dying in the Americas after 1492, 207 QUATERNARY SCI.
REVS. 13, 17–18 (Mar. 2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quascirev.2018.12.004
(estimating a total of 60.5 million people living in the Americas as of 1492, including
between 2.8–5.7 million in North America) [hereinafter Koch, et al., Earth System
Impacts].
10.
ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC
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resource management regimes.11 Although impossible to generalize about
such a diverse range of cultures, languages, societies, and civilizations,
many of these tribal groups, bands, clans, or families were intimately
connected with the places on which they lived and across which they
roamed. These long-standing, generational connections dating back to
time immemorial remain core aspects of many modern tribal cultures and
support the interests and commitments of many tribes to engage in the
ongoing management and protection of the lands to which they trace their
own histories and traditions.
Recent efforts to map or delineate these traditional areas help
illustrate the ubiquity and diversity of indigenous presence in what is now
the United States. For example, Native Land Digital, a Canadian nonprofit organization, has produced an interactive internet resource showing
approximate traditional territories of indigenous cultural and linguistic
groups across the continent.12
These efforts show the breadth and scope of traditional indigenous
presence on the continent, with a range of cultures, governments, and
societies inhabiting, traversing across, and relying upon nearly every part
of what would become the United States.13 Importantly, that presence did
not merely ground indigenous spirituality, cultural values, and lifeways; it
also rooted tribal assertions of governmental power—sovereignty—in the
lands upon which that power was exercised.14 Recognizing the depth and
meaning of this presence is therefore critical to a complete understanding
of modern tribal co-management.

DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2012).
11.
See, e.g., Koch, et al., supra note 9, at 19–20.
12.
Native Land, NATIVE LAND DIGITAL, https://www.Native-Land.ca,
(last visited June 12, 2020); see also Tribal Connections, U.S. FOREST SERVICE,
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=fe311f69cb1d43558227
d73bc34f3a32 (last visited June 12, 2020) (documenting tribal lands and land
cessions).
13.
These boundaries are necessarily approximate, imprecise, and
historically fluid but the presence of a variety of indigenous peoples across the
continent is undeniable.
14.
See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict between the ‘Public Trust’
and ‘Indian Trust’ Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Indian Nations, 39
TULSA L. REV. 271 (2013) (“Native people have legal, moral, political, and cultural
interests in their ancestral homelands, and these multiple and complex interests should
not be described as purely ‘religious’ in nature.”).
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B. Sovereignty and Treaties: European Legal Foundations
and Federal Indian Law
Understanding the fundamental principles of federal Indian law
relevant to tribal co-management also demands historical context,
although those principles often ignore the indigenous presence on the land
since time immemorial and begin with the arrival of European colonists to
the so-called “New World.”15
The evolution of principles within the American context revolved
around the legal standing of indigenous people and, due to the arrival of
Europeans interested in claiming new territories, their rights to land.16 The
natural rights of native people, most conclusively elaborated by Francisco
de Vitoria in 1532, supported their fair treatment as co-equal sovereigns
and the acquisition of their lands only with their consent.17 But those
principles were disputed by competing theories of indigenous inferiority,
on which European settlers could rely to freely confiscate land and
overrun, if not exterminate, its original inhabitants.18
Although those philosophical debates would continue (and come
to parallel uncertainty and debate over the rights of the federal government
to reserve public lands),19 the realpolitik of the colonial era demanded that
European nations seek durable alliances with the powerful and numerous
tribes of the continent. Therefore, in animating Vitoria’s principles of the
natural rights of indigenous people, European countries negotiated
agreements with tribes; an approach that necessarily “implied recognition
of tribes as self-governing peoples.”20 Through these tools of international
law, Europe’s sovereigns could ensure their colonizing interests and
citizens would be protected and, more practically, secure actual claims to
lands that had been claimed only in theory by colonial charters.21 More
importantly, however, the use of treaties became a central part of relations
with tribes that would persist well after America’s founding and, though
15.
See DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER & KRISTEN A. CARPENTER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47, 47–71 (7th ed. 2017).
16.
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02[1] (Nell
Jessup Newton ed. 2012) [hereinafter Cohen’s Handbook].
17.
Id.
18.
See id. (summarizing conflicts between Vitoria’s theories and
“[a]rguments that Indians possessed neither rights to property nor governmental
status”).
19.
See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 631 (2018) (summarizing debates over federal property rights and claims).
20.
Getches et al., supra note 15, at 85.
21.
Id.
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not always adhering to the principles of respect in which those
government-to-government bonds implied, the reliance by non-Indian
governments on treaties ensured important tribal status and rights.22
The international and European legal traditions that supported
treaty-making mandated the sovereign-to-sovereign nature of those bonds;
however, with colonial sovereigns well removed from their colonizing
subjects, conflicts over sovereign promises were numerous. Land hungry
British settlers pouring into tribal territories ultimately prompted King
George III to restrict such migration via the Royal Proclamation of 1763.23
Among other provocations, that action largely motivated the colonial
resistance to ongoing British authority and sparked the Revolutionary
War.24
The founding of America brought a host of new challenges and
legal traditions imposed upon Indian people; however, the recognition of
tribes as sovereign governments, rooted in the treaty practices begun by
European nations, endured. American law would soon embrace treaties
and the inherent and pre-extant nature of tribal sovereignty, both of which
would inform the establishment of the defining relationship between the
federal government and Indian tribes.
C. The Trust Relationship: America’s Founding, Tribes, and States
Having played a central role in catalyzing the American
Revolution, the status of and relationship to Indian tribes would continue
to animate the development of the young nation’s legal traditions. The
very presence of tribes—sovereign powers outside of the American
system—within the boundaries of the original colonies posed challenging
questions to the nature and extent of both federal and state power. The
federal-state conflict over authority to manage tribal relations was a
remnant of the “divided legacy” from colonial times and echoed the
founders’ complaints about the distant edicts of King George.25 The
Articles of Confederation plainly illustrated the conflict; reserving to
Congress the “sole and exclusive right and power” over Indian affairs but
only so long as such power did not infringe or violate “the legislative right
of any State within its own limits.”26 The continuing use of treaties,
negotiated by representatives of the Continental Congress, further
22.
See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 1.02.
23.
Royal Proclamation, Oct. 7, 1763, reprinted in 3 THE AMERICAN INDIAN
AND THE UNITED STATES 2135–39 (Wilcomb Washburn, ed., Greenwood Press 1973).
24.
Getches et al., supra note 15, at 67–69.
25.
Gregory Ablavsky, Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1011 (2014).
26.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 4.
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exacerbated the divide. In Georgia, for example, the 1785 Treaty of
Hopewell with the Cherokee Nation guaranteed peace to the Cherokee and
protection by the United States.27 But the State of Georgia refused to
acknowledge this undue nationalist interference in matters that Georgia
viewed as integral to state sovereignty.28
In addition to treaty-making with the Cherokee and other tribes,29
the early American government also sought to assume primary
responsibility for protecting tribes and their properties from incursion by
states through other means. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, for
example, provided for both protection and respect for tribal lands as well
as limits on state authority to interfere with federal power to sell or secure
title in acquired lands.30 That pre-constitutional enactment highlighted
federal efforts to assert preeminence in both Indian affairs and the control
of property, both of which would become central to the eventual
establishment of federal public lands.31
These conflicts informed, if not motivated, the framing of the U.S.
Constitution, which, according to Professor Gregory Ablavsky,
represented a federal guarantee to reticent states to remove Indians from
state boundaries.32 The Constitution cemented the prominence of federal
authority and resolved the uncertainty and confusion created by the
Articles of Confederation by expressly reserving to the Congress the
exclusive authority to regulate “commerce . . . with the Indians” while
also confirming the supremacy of treaties made by and between the United
States and the tribes to state laws.33 But the details of that prominence
remained to be fleshed out.
In exercise of its constitutional authority to regulate commerce
with tribes, many of the early actions taken by Congress sought to provide
a framework for dealing with the trade of tribal lands. These trade and
intercourse laws echoed the formerly reviled Proclamation of 1763 by
limiting the validity of purchases of tribal lands to transactions

27.
Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 1.02[3]; Treaty with the
Cherokees, 1785, pmbl., 7 Stat. 18.
28.
See, e.g., Ablavsky, supra note 25, at 1029–30 (describing Georgia’s
reaction to the treaty negotiations at Hopewell).
29.
See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 1.02[3].
30.
32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 334, 340–41 (1787).
31.
See, e.g., John D. Leshy, Are U.S. Federal Public Lands
Unconstitutional?, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 505 (2019) (describing the Northwest
Ordinance’s role in “the beginning of the nation’s public lands”).
32.
Ablavsky, supra note 25, at 1072 (explaining federal promises to
provide military support and “eradicate the Indian threat”).
33.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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consummated or ratified by the federal government.34 Conceivably, in
conjunction with treaty-making committed to respecting tribes as co-equal
sovereigns, these provisions would ensure federal protection for tribes and
their territories, to be forfeited only upon negotiation of an acceptable
treaty. But, with the changing political dynamics, the implicit guarantees
of federal deference to state interests, and the growing pressure on tribes
and their territories, this arrangement quickly became significantly
unilateral, with the United States acquiring vast swaths of tribal territory
for little or nothing in return.35
These practical acts of conquest were soon legitimized by the
United States Supreme Court, which, in its 1823 decision in Johnson v.
M’Intosh,36 established an overriding and supreme federal authority over
tribal lands. Relying on his view of history, Chief Justice John Marshall,
who would go on to write two more foundational federal Indian law
decisions,37 determined that, in acceding to Britain’s colonial claims, the
United States acquired the “absolute ultimate title . . . , subject only to the
Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the
exclusive right of acquiring.”38 This splitting of title between the United
States and tribes put the federal government in charge of acquiring,
managing, and overseeing tribal territories, a relationship that would
inform the establishment of the government’s trust duties to tribes and
remains in place across present-day Indian reservations, which include
“trust lands” held by the United States for the benefit of resident tribes.39
Ongoing conflicts between the State of Georgia and the Cherokee
Nation would offer additional opportunities for Chief Justice Marshall and
the Supreme Court to further define the nature of that trust relationship.
Georgia, like other states seeking to establish their sovereignty and claims
to greater territory, ignored federal treaty promises to the Cherokee and,
instead, simply sought to extend its powers over Cherokee territory.40 In
34.
See, e.g., Act of July 22, 1790, § 4, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Cohen’s
Handbook, supra note 16, § 1.03[2] (reviewing similar acts).
35.
See, e.g., Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, §1.03[3] (describing
treaty strategies of the Jefferson administration following the Louisiana Purchase of
1803).
36.
21 U.S. 543 (1823).
37.
See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
38.
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592.
39.
See Joseph William Singer, Original Acquisition of Property: From
Conquest & Possession to Democracy & Equal Opportunity, 86 IND. L.J. 763, 767
(2011) (noting the continuation of “conquest” represented by the “co-ownership”
created by the Johnson decision).
40.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 11; see also CLAUDIO SAUNT,
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considering the Cherokee’s claims to protection, Chief Justice Marshall
described the tribe as a “domestic, dependent nation,”41 which remains a
descriptor of tribal status.42 With regard to the federal-tribal relationship,
Marshall analyzed the United States’ role in agreeing to treaties like the
Treaty of Hopewell to determine that the Cherokee were to be protected
by the United States; like a “ward to [the United States as] guardian.”43
The next year, in Worcester v. Georgia,44 Marshall again relied on
treaties in upholding the exclusive federal nature of this role.45 In doing
so, the Supreme Court excluded Georgia law from applying within the
Cherokee’s territory as it would interfere with the treaties, which were
recognized by the Constitution as the supreme law of the land.46 Worcester
ultimately insulated the Cherokee Nation from Georgia’s laws and
explicitly protected the tribe’s “distinct community,”47 thereby reinforcing
and protecting the tribe’s sovereignty in addition to emphasizing the
importance of treaties and securing the federal-tribal trust relationship.
Notwithstanding these important precedents, the Cherokee and
other tribes of the southeast were forcibly removed from their homelands
pursuant to a federal law authorizing exchange of tribal lands in the
southeast for lands farther west.48 The political divide over the legislation
highlighted the conflict between honoring the legal principles announced
by Chief Justice Marshall, including the importance of the United States’
treaty guarantees, and the land hungry desires of largely slave-owning
capitalists interested in expanding their commerce.49 In a foreshadowing
of the remaining decades of the nineteenth century, the political power of
the latter won the day and tribal concerns were ignored in service of
broader national (non-Indian) interests.
Nonetheless, the three foundational legal concepts forged during
this pivotal era: tribal sovereignty, the trust relationship, and treaties,
became the basis for understanding federal Indian law. Their evolution and
UNWORTHY REPUBLIC: THE DISPOSSESSION OF NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE ROAD TO
INDIAN TERRITORY, 27–49 (2020) (discussing Georgia’s incalcitrance toward federal
authority and tribal presence in the lead up to the 1830 Removal Act).
41.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
42.
See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 587 U.S. 782,
788 (2014) (“Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations.’”).
43.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
44.
31 U.S. 515 (1832).
45.
Id. at 561 (“whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation, is by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States”).
46.
Id. at 559–60.
47.
Id. at 561.
48.
Indian Removal Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.
49.
See Saunt, supra note 40, at 53–83.
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treatment by Congress, the courts, and policymakers have defined the
rights and obligations of Indian tribes ever since. In addition, like the
connection between federal, tribal, and state interests in lands covered by
the Northwest Ordinance or seized by Georgia citizens as the Cherokee
were removed from their lands, treaties, the trust relationship, and tribal
sovereignty have been central to the acquisition and establishment of the
nation’s public lands and, therefore, provide an important framework for
analyzing tribal co-management of those resources.
D. Indian Tribes and Public Lands
Each year, the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
publishes a report documenting public land statistics.50 In these reports,
the BLM aims to document the current state of public lands that it manages
but also provides a brief history of the acquisition of that estate and its
evolution over time. In each of its reports issued in the new millennium,
however, the agency neglects to mention Indian tribes, their historical
presence, or any role that federal Indian law and the federal government’s
continuing subjugation of those tribes played in acquiring the nearly 250
million surface acres now managed by the BLM.51 Instead, the most recent
Public Land Statistics publication, like its predecessors, explains the
federal government’s acquisition of lands ceded by states (like those
covered by the Northwest Ordinance), purchases of territory from foreign
countries, like the Louisiana Purchase, and other means, like the
annexation of Texas.52 In doing so, the report provides an orderly historical
explanation of the growth of federal ownership, amounting to a total of 1.8
billion acres in lands acquired as public domain lands, and, following the
disposition of 1.3 billion of those acres by the federal government, the
continuing management of those public lands by the BLM (and other
agencies) “so that they are used in a manner that will best meet the present
and future needs of the nation.”53
This report’s erasure of any tribal interest or role in the creation of
America’s public lands mirrors the manner in which the federal government
wielded its plenary authority over Indian affairs to largely erase tribes and
50.
See Public Land Statistics, UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, https://www.blm.gov/about/data/public-land-statistics (last visited
June 12, 2020).
51.
See, e.g., Public Land Statistics 2018, UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT 1, 4 (Aug. 2019), https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/PublicLand
Statistics2018.pdf.
52.
Id.
53.
Id. at 1.
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tribal people from the landscapes that they had occupied since time
immemorial. Although the trust relationship originally articulated by Chief
Justice Marshall in the Cherokee cases envisioned a strong federal
government stepping in to protect tribes, honor treaty promises, and
insulate their sovereignty from state or other interference, that
interpretation evolved to enable the federal government to pursue other
priorities like extinguishing Indian title to enable settlement and
development regardless of tribal interests. In doing so, the federal
government relied on its time-honored practice of treaty-making, at least
until 1871, when, in a fit of political discord over the role of the U.S.
Senate in ratifying treaties, Congress passed an act prohibiting further
treaties.54 Thereafter, the federal government still negotiated agreements
with tribes and further relied on Presidential orders to establish Indian
reservations, thereby limiting tribes to smaller and smaller territories while
unifying the United States’ title to lands those tribes were induced,
coerced, or forced to cede.
By the late 1800s, even those much smaller reservations were not
immune from disintegration, as federal policy swung toward further
breaking up tribal land bases and opening up those lands to settlement,
acquisition, and ownership by non-Indians as well as the state and federal
governments. Spurred on by decisions of the Supreme Court authorizing
boundless plenary power to largely do as it pleased with regard to Indian
affairs,55 Congress passed the Allotment Act of 1887, a law designed to
destroy the integrity of many remaining tribal lands, which it did to great
effect.56 Ultimately, the Supreme Court even went so far as to bless
Congressional abrogation of treaty promises, ruling that, where Congress
decides it appropriate, the promises of the United States to tribes may be
rendered meaningless.57
54.
Act of March 3, 1871, § 1, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
55.
See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886)
(upholding Congress’ extension of federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country
because Congress’ “power . . . over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak
and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of
those among whom they dwell [and such power] must exist in th[e federal]
Government, because it never has existed anywhere else; because the theater of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States; because it has never
been denied; and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes”).
56.
See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 1.04 (noting the loss of over
90 million acres—one-third of the tribal land base—during the Allotment Era, from
1887 to 1934).
57.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (“[I]t was never
doubted that the power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that, in a contingency,
such power might be availed of from considerations of governmental policy,
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By twisting or setting aside the foundational principles of federal
Indian law and wielding its growing military, economic, and population
advantages, the United States removed Indian tribes from lands it had
acquired through other means and unified its title by extinguishing tribal
occupancy and possession. Those lands would become 30 of the nation’s
50 states and, particularly in the western United States and Alaska, would
remain in federal ownership to be managed as public lands.58
The examples of these interconnections are numerous. In what
would become southern Oregon and northern California, for example, the
Klamath people existed for generation upon generation. In 1864, the
Klamath ceded claims to nearly 12 million acres and reserved a much
smaller reservation in what would soon be the State of Oregon.59 The Tribe
also reserved continuing rights to hunt and fish through that treaty. Less
than a century later, after the allotment of the reservation in the late 1800s,
which resulted in a significant loss of land, the federal government came
calling again when, in 1954, Congress passed the Klamath Termination
Act, dissolving the tribe’s status and effectively ending the federal
government’s trust obligations to the tribe.60 As part of that Act, the federal
government offered to pay tribal members for their interests in the tribes
lands and ultimately condemned other former reservation lands.61 The
result was that 70% of the former reservation ended up in federal
ownership to be managed as a refuge under the authority of the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) or national forest lands
administered and managed by the United States Forest Service (USFS).62
Although the Tribe retains important rights across its former reservation
lands,63 the ownership and management of those lands lies within federal
auspices and is governed by federal laws, regulations, practices, and
policies in which the Tribe has little say or influence.
While important, the foundations of federal Indian law are not
solely relevant for illustrating this dark history of tribal dispossession and
the creation of federal public lands. Although often manipulated to serve
other interests, those legal principles have endured and, in the modern era
of federal policies focused on promoting tribal self-determination, treaties,
particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians.”).
58.
See Public Land Statistics, supra note 50, at 1.
59.
See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1983).
60.
Act of Aug. 13, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-587, § 1, 68 Stat. 718; Adair,
723 F.2d at 1398.
61.
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1398.
62.
Id.
63.
See id. at 1412–13 (holding that reserved water rights associated with
the Tribe’s treaty survived the termination act).
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the trust responsibility, and tribal sovereignty all ground important tribal
rights to their traditional territories and require accommodation by the
federal agencies managing public lands.
E. Legacies of History, Law, and Context
Throughout this report, we rely on case studies and particular
examples to help illustrate the myriad means of tribal co-management and
its varied successes, failures, and complexities. A few examples also help
demonstrate the modern implications of treaties, tribal sovereignty, and
the federal government’s trust responsibilities to Indian tribes.
F. The Canons of Construction and Tribal Rights on Public Lands
For at least the last ten centuries, the bands of the Ute Tribes have
occupied the lands of Colorado, Utah, and the Four Corners region.64
While different bands traditionally occupied certain parts of this vast
region, collectively, the Utes’ traditional territory included most of
present-day Colorado and Utah as well as parts of New Mexico, Arizona,
and Wyoming.65 As with all tribes across the western United States,
however, the rush of non-Indian migration soon brought federal officials
seeking to negotiate treaties that would ultimately define and reduce this
vast Ute territory. But the first treaty entered by the Ute Tribes and the
United States, in 1849, paralleled other treaties of the time by establishing
an exclusive federal-tribal relationship, rooted in friendship and peace
while guaranteeing free passage across and seeking to define the
boundaries of the then-current Ute territory.66
Within two decades, however, the United States’ desire to close
the frontier and secure limited territories reserved to tribes brought a new
round of negotiators, this time as part of what would be the last round of
official treaty-making done by President Grant’s Great Peace Commission
of 1867 and 1868.67 The Ute Treaty of 1868 reduced the Tribes’ traditional
64.
PETER R. DECKER, THE UTES MUST GO! AMERICAN EXPANSION AND
THE REMOVAL OF A PEOPLE 8 (2004).
65.
Id. at 14–15.
66.
Treaty with the Utahs, Dec. 30, 1849, 9 Stat. 984, reprinted in 2
CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 585–88 (1904). The
treaty was entered only with the Muache Band of Utes though the United States
believed it to be binding on the entire Ute Tribe. Decker, supra note 65, at 26–27.
67.
An Act to Establish Peace with Certain Hostile Indian Tribes, § 1, ch.
32, 15 Stat. 17 (1867) (establishing and charging the Commission with making treaties
with tribes in order to “remove all just causes of complaint on their part” while also
“establish[ing] security for person and property along the lines of railroad . . . [which]
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territory dramatically while reserving nearly the western third of what
would become Colorado as a reservation.68 Within five years, the
discovery of gold and silver in the San Juan Mountains of the southern part
of the Ute Reservation brought a stampede of non-Indian prospectors.
Federal negotiators again reached an agreement with the Ute requiring the
Tribes to cede a large block of territory encompassing those lands.69 In
doing so, however, the Tribes reserved the “right to hunt upon said [ceded]
lands so long as the game lasts and the Indians are at peace with the white
people.”70 Though political, military, social, and legal conflicts over the
next generation would drive some Ute bands out of Colorado and onto
reservations in Utah, reducing the Tribes’ lands in Colorado to a narrow
strip of two reservations in the southwestern corner of the state, that
language and the rights reserved by it would come to ensure important
future opportunities for the Ute Tribes who remained in Colorado.71
The United States Supreme Court has long sought to ensure that
treaty promises made by the United States, like those in the so-called
Brunot Agreement with the Ute Tribes, are not rendered meaningless
simply by the passage of time. To do so, the Court has developed and relied
upon rules for interpreting treaty language that protect the bonds of the
federal-tribal relationship and help ensure balance between the nation’s
will most likely insure civilization for Indians and peace and security for the whites”).
68.
Treaty with the Ute, May 2, 1868, 15 Stat. 619.
69.
An Act to Ratify an Agreement with Certain Ute Indians in Colorado
and Make an Appropriation for Carrying out the Same, ch. 13618 Stat. 36 (1874)
(known as the “Brunot Agreement”) (Although technically not a treaty—the
agreement was made after 1871—it was ratified by Congress and has the same legal
effect.).
70.
Id. at art. II, 18 Stat. at 37.
71.
On the removal of the Utes from Colorado, see generally Decker,
supra note 65. As a result of subsequent Congressional actions and conflicting
interpretations of the tribal signatories to the Brunot Agreement, the Ute bands now
in Utah have not yet been able to exercise reserved rights in the area ceded by the
Brunot Agreement. Associated Press, Ute Tribe Wants Colorado Hunting Rights,
DESERET NEWS (May 25, 2000), https://www.deseret.com/2000/5/25/19508715/ute
-tribe-wants-colorado-hunting-rights. In addition, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe’s
reservation was eventually opened for allotment, resulting in a checkerboard pattern
of ownership, including United States Forest Service lands, within the reservation’s
boundaries. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Southern Ute Indian Tribe and Ute Mountain
Ute Tribe in Support of Petitioner, Herrera v. Wyoming, No. 17-532, filed Sept. 11,
2018, 11–13. On September 21, 2012, President Barack Obama proclaimed a portion
of these lands as Chimney Rock National Monument, which is managed in
consultation with the Southern Ute Indian Tribe. USFS, Chimney Rock National
Monument Final Management Plan, 1, 11 (Aug. 2015), http://www.fs.usda.gov/
project/?project=42952.
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constitutional structure of federalism and tribal sovereigns who exist
entirely outside of that framework.72 These Indian canons of construction
demand that courts work to understand treaty language as the Indians
would have understood it at the time it was negotiated and that the rights
reserved by tribes through treaties remain intact unless Congress clearly
and unambiguously abrogates those rights.73 The canons also help
emphasize that a “treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant
of right from them[—]a reservation of those not granted.”74
Most recently, the Court relied on the canons of construction to
uphold the rights reserved by the Crow Tribe in their 1868 Treaty with the
United States (a treaty also negotiated as part of the Great Peace
Commission’s work) to hunt in the Bighorn National Forest of
Wyoming.75 In doing so, the Court considered Wyoming’s reliance on a
Supreme Court decision from the late 1800s finding that similar treaty
rights ended upon Wyoming’s statehood.76 But, because the language of
the treaty did not mention any such termination date, nor would the Crow
have so understood the treaty, the Court rejected Wyoming’s arguments
and confirmed that the Crow’s rights to hunt in “unoccupied” areas of the
National Forest remain valid, some 150 years after they were reserved.77
Like the Court’s recent confirmation of the Crow’s treaty reserved
rights, the rights reserved by the Ute Tribes in the Brunot Agreement could
be fortified against diminution by the canons of construction; however, the
Tribes faced challenges in using those rights across the broad swath of area
they ceded in the Brunot Agreement, much of which is federal public land
managed by the USFS.78 Importantly, however, because the Tribes’ rights
were centered on hunting, the difficulties they faced arose from attempts
by the State of Colorado to prosecute tribal members for exercising those
72.
See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 2.02[2].
73.
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526
U.S. 172, 196 (1999) (hereinafter Mille Lacs) (“[W]e interpret Indian treaties to give
effect to the terms as the Indians themselves would have understood them.”); id. at
202 (“Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly express its intent
to do so.”). The Supreme Court has extended these canons of interpretations beyond
treaties as well, applying them to agreements, statutes, and other federal enactments
in order to ensure that the federal government’s unique obligations to tribes are
fulfilled. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 2.02[1].
74.
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
75.
Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019).
76.
Id. at 1694–97.
77.
Id. at 1699–1700.
78.
See Tribal Connections, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, https://www.arcgis.
com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=fe311f69cb1d43558227d73bc34f3a32 (last
visited June 12, 2020) (the Brunot cession is shown as cession 566).
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rights. In fact, as the result of one such prosecution in 1972, the Southern
Ute Indian Tribe agreed not to pursue further exercise of its reserved rights
so as to avoid the continuing threat of state prosecutions of its members.79
That fact illustrates one further complexity confronting the potential for
tribal co-management of federal lands, namely that the federal government
has traditionally deferred to state authority over wildlife management
across the public lands, rendering co-management in these situations a
potentially tripartite affair.80 So, in order to effectuate the rights that the
Tribe reserved with the federal government in the 1872 Brunot Agreement,
the Southern Ute Indian Tribe approached the State of Colorado to develop
an agreement and process through which the Tribe’s members might again
hunt in the Brunot area.
The intergovernmental agreement ultimately reached between
Colorado and the Southern Ute Indian Tribe is rooted in and based on the
unique status of the Tribe’s Brunot Agreement rights but also recognizes
and upholds the Tribe’s sovereign rights to manage wildlife and enforce
its own laws regarding that management.81 In negotiating that agreement,
the Tribe relied on the Indian canons of construction, tribal traditional
practices, and historical records, all of which supported the Tribe’s
understanding that the rights it reserved in the Brunot Agreement included
“trapping, fishing, and gathering” rights, even though the Agreement itself
only used the word “hunt.”82 Thus, the legal standing of the Tribe’s
reserved rights and the long-standing rules for interpreting treaties and
agreements between the United States and Indian tribes secured the actual
implementation of important sovereign, cultural, and traditional rights for
the Southern Ute Indian Tribe.83
In addition to the co-management of wildlife resources with the
State of Colorado, those historical understandings, the progression of
79.
See Memorandum of Understanding between the Southern Ute Indian
Tribe and the State of Colorado Concerning Wildlife Management and Enforcement
in the Brunot Area, 1 (Sept. 15, 2008) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Brunot
MOU].
80.
See, e.g., Martin Nie et al., Fish and Wildlife Management on Federal
Lands: Debunking State Supremacy, 47 ENVTL. L. 797 (2017).
81.
See Brunot MOU, supra note 80, at 3–5 (recognizing shared
principles of management, tribal authorities, and the traditional practices of the Tribe,
which included hunting species that the State may consider “non-game” as well as
gathering and fishing).
82.
Id. at 1.
83.
The neighboring Ute Mountain Ute Tribe soon secured a similar
agreement with the State of Colorado. See Joe Hanel, Ute Tribe Hunting Agreement
gets Approval, DURANGO HERALD (Jan. 11, 2013), https://durangoherald.com/
articles/49901.
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treaties, and the implementation of important traditional tribal reserved
rights all supported and were included in the USFS’s analysis of Areas of
Tribal Importance within the area’s national forests.84 That assessment will
help guide future forest planning and resource management, thereby
improving the USFS management and protection of tribal interests in the
area over prior forest plans which largely limited or excluded those rights
from consideration.85
G. Understanding Sovereignty and the Trust Responsibility
through Alaska
Like the rest of the United States, the federal government acquired
the territory that now comprises Alaska while it was already possessed and
occupied by indigenous peoples. As with the Louisiana or Gadsden
purchases, the United States’ 1867 deal with Russia gave it the right to
exclude other international sovereigns but, by the terms of that agreement,
the United States expressly recognized the presence of the region’s
original residents.86 The framework of federal Indian law had already been
sketched out and, therefore, that treaty indicated the federal government’s
intent to apply that structure to Alaska’s “uncivilized native tribes.”87
Although that language implies that members of “civilized” Tribes would
be considered American citizens, the distinction was largely ignored for
purposes of the legal status of Native Tribes in Alaska, who—with some
exceptions—were considered under the same principles of federal Indian
law throughout the final decades of the 1800s.88
This treatment vacillated through the early 1900s, particularly as
it related to the United States’ recognition of tribal lands and property
interests, a challenge that Congress eventually sought to remedy by
amending the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) to include Alaska
Natives.89 The IRA marked a distinct shift in federal Indian policy by
ending the failed allotment era and providing an avenue for tribes to
acquire trust lands, adopt tribal constitutions, and unequivocally
84.
See, e.g., Grand Mesa, Uncompahgre, and Gunnison National
Forests, Revised Draft Forest Assessments: Areas of Tribal Importance, U.S. FOREST
SERVICE (Mar. 2018), https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/
fseprd573530.pdf.
85.
Id. at 10.
86.
Treaty of March 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539, 542.
87.
Id.
88.
See DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND
AMERICAN LAWS, 55–56 (3d ed. 2012).
89.
Act of May 1, 1936, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 5119
(2018)).
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recognizing tribal sovereign authority.90 But, when it came to applying
those principles to acquire and protect tribal lands in Alaska, the United
States’ ability to do so was ultimately “relatively limited and
fragmented.”91 Thus, while treaty relationships, the reservation system,
and trust lands remain mostly foreign to the federal government’s
treatment of Alaska Native Tribes, the core of that sovereign relationship
still resolves around the inherent sovereignty of those Tribes. Therefore,
while the unique history, laws, and property status of Alaska Native Tribes
might suggest that they should be considered outside of the scope of
general principles of federal Indian law, their continuing exercise of tribal
sovereignty provides a clearer window through which to understand the
nature of tribal sovereignty, the federal government’s trust relationship,
and their relevance for comprehending the potential for tribal comanagement of public lands.
What is now Alaska was historically inhabited by a wide variety
of indigenous cultures, languages, and societies. While these tribal groups
remain in present-day Alaska and continue their cultural and governmental
traditions, their claims to the lands on which they reside have evolved quite
differently than the history of treaty-making in the American expansion
described above. For example, unlike the western continental United
States, what is now Alaska was not acquired from the various groups of
Alaska Native peoples through treaties and, in many instances, remain
unceded lands.
Instead, questions and uncertainty around the status of Alaska
Native claims to aboriginal title—the title recognized by Chief Justice
Marshall in Johnson v. M’Intosh and to which the United States acquired
the exclusive right to extinguish through treaties—dogged the first century
of the federal-tribal relationship in the state.92 While the inclusion of
Alaska Natives in the IRA signaled federal recognition of their sovereign
authority, their relative isolation in villages and legal challenges to tribal
authority over the few reservations that were recognized posed serious
questions to the “legitimacy” of such claims.93 In 1955, the United States
Supreme Court dealt a further blow to those claims, holding that, despite
the language of the 1867 treaty with Russia and various congressional
actions recognizing tribal rights, the federal government was not obligated
90.

Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101–

5144).
91.
See, e.g., Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 60–62 (noting the
subsequent practical limitations on the federal government’s ability to create and
protect reservation and trust lands in Alaska).
92.
Id.
93.
Id. at 62.
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to compensate Alaska Natives for any taking of their aboriginal lands
because the United States had not “recognized” such ownership.94 Further,
relying on the notions of discovery and conquest from Johnson v.
M’Intosh, the Court excused the United States from any compensation
even when terminating aboriginal title.95
Notwithstanding that much criticized and reviled decision,
however, subsequent efforts by the Tlingit and Haida Indians to pursue
compensation from the Indian Claims Commission, which Congress
established in 1946 to allow tribes to seek compensation for the taking of
their lands in unfair treaty deals, seemed to support the rights of Alaska
Native Tribes to compensation for the taking of their lands.96 In addition,
Alaska’s Statehood Act, like those of other western states, disclaimed any
rights to Native lands or property, like continued fishing rights, and a
subsequent Supreme Court decision suggested that, perhaps, the Act’s
preservation of the “status quo” with regard to those aboriginal claims
neither “extinguish[ed] them nor recognize[d] them as compensable.”97
The uncertainty swirling around the scope and extent of the land and
property rights of Alaska Natives ran headlong into Congress’
authorization for the state of Alaska to acquire a portion of public lands,
prompting further conflict and an eventual freezing of that process by the
Department of the Interior.98
That conflict prompted Congress to seek a comprehensive
solution that would allow the state to acquire lands and, perhaps more
importantly, enable access to the region’s oil reserves. Thus, where the
United States had for much of the prior century relied on the treaty-making
process and its own plenary power to extinguish tribal claims to the
continental states and the public lands that would be created therein, the
events and conflicting legal treatment of the claims of Alaska Natives over
the bulk of the twentieth century prompted a different approach to
resolving those claims.99 As a result, the treaty relationships that
undergirded the recognition of tribal sovereignty elsewhere were
irrelevant to Alaska; however, like their continental tribal counterparts,
94.
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278–79 (1955).
95.
Id. at 284–85.
96.
See Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 132–33.
97.
Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 65 (1962).
98.
Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 134–35, 276–77.
99.
Cases arising after Congress adopted that new solution served to
confirm that the aboriginal title claims of Alaska Natives should not be distinguished
from those of other tribes and, therefore, according to the leading treatise on Alaska
Native law and policy, “the most tenable legal conclusion is that . . . Alaska Native
title had the same legal status as original Indian title elsewhere in the United States.”
Id. at 79.
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Alaska Native Tribes continued to uphold and exercise their inherent
sovereign rights.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)100 was
Congress’ solution to the seemingly intractable quagmire that ensconced
the early years of Alaska’s statehood. As described by one treatise,
ANCSA aimed to balance four competing interests:
First were the Alaska Natives, represented by over two
hundred villages or tribes, which held the aboriginal claim
to some 365 million acres of land. Under ANCSA, Native
corporations would own about 45.7 million of these acres.
Second was the state of Alaska, with its claim to about
103 million acres under the Statehood Act. Third was the
federal government itself, which held the remaining
approximately 216 million acres. Finally, there were the
environmental interests that became increasingly
concerned about the effect of these land settlements on
wildlife, habitat, and other ecological values.101
While immensely complicated and subject to many subsequent legislative
efforts to improve its implementation,102 the core of ANCSA—like so
many historical tribal treaty cessions before it—extinguished aboriginal
title claims, including any claims to “aboriginal hunting or fishing rights,”
upon the lands in the state of Alaska.103 The law then authorized the
claiming of lands and interests therein by newly created Native villages,
regional and urban corporations, as well as the state and federal
government but, with regard to the Native lands, they would not be held
in trust or otherwise treated like tribal lands in the rest of the country.104
Importantly, ANCSA said nothing about its impact on the inherent
sovereign authority of Alaska Native Tribes.105 Nonetheless, despite the
100. Act of Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as
43 U.S.C. §§ 1601—1629h (2018)).
101. Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 278 (citations omitted); see also
Robert T. Anderson, Alaska Native Rights, Statehood, and Unfinished Business, 43
TULSA L. REV. 17, 28 (2007) (describing the events leading up to “the inevitable
collision” of Alaska’s statehood and the claims of its Native peoples).
102. See, e.g., Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA),
Act of Dec. 2, 1980, Pub. L. No. 95-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101—
3233 (2018)) (addressing the federal conservation lands intended for reservation by §
17(d)(2) of ANCSA); see also Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 278.
103. 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2018).
104. Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 280–83.
105. See Anderson, supra note 101, at 35–37.
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usually applicable Indian canon of construction dictating that tribal rights
remain unless expressly abrogated by Congress, the United States
Supreme Court soon severed any claim of Alaska Native sovereignty from
those properties, holding in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government, 106 that Congress did not intend for lands conveyed to
corporations under ANCSA to be considered Indian Country over which
the Tribes would exercise territorial authority. Thus, the continuing
existence of tribal sovereignty in Alaska was called into significant doubt
and the separation of that sovereignty from a tribal land base presented a
significant distinction between Alaska Native Tribes and those to which
the general principles of federal Indian law would otherwise apply.
But, as the result of subsequent litigation,107 various congressional
acts recognizing Alaska Native Tribes on the same bases as other tribes,108
and the inclusion of 229 Alaska Native groups in the congressionallymandated list of federally recognized Indian tribes,109 it is clear that there
remains a unique form of tribal sovereignty across Alaska. Further, while
a number of other laws ensure the rights of individual Alaska Natives to
federal services as Indians and protect their rights to continue their
traditional subsistence lifeways,110 there are growing avenues through
which this sovereignty is being exercised, particularly as the federal
government continues to recognize Alaska Native Tribes on the same basis
as other tribal sovereigns. Unlike those other sovereigns, however, given
the unique separation of Alaska Native property and sovereignty, the
exercise of that authority by Alaska Native Tribes is largely exclusive of

106. 522 U.S. 520, 534 (1998). Outside of one existing reservation, some
limited parcels of trust land remain in Alaska; see Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 111.
107. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
108. Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 426–32.
109. List of Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services from
the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 85 Fed. Reg. 5462, 5466–67 (Jan. 30,
2020); see Cabazon Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians of the Cabazon Reservation,
Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364 (Oct. 21, 1993) (explaining the initial
inclusion of these entities on the list as “expressly and unequivocally acknowledging
that the Department [of the Interior on behalf of the United States] has determined that
the villages and regional tribes [on the list] are distinctly Native communities and have
the same status as tribes in the contiguous 48 states”).
110. See, e.g., Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 242–45 (describing the
federal trust relationship and services to individual Alaska Natives), 297–300
(explaining the legal issues surrounding ANILCA’s protection for Native subsistence
practices and its compromises).
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their interests in land, although efforts have been made to allow for trust
land acquisitions in Alaska.111
Therefore, the federal government’s obligations to these Tribes
run exclusively along that sovereign-to-sovereign basis and represent a
trust obligation to fulfill and protect purely sovereign interests, largely
without regard to federal trust obligations to property. As such, like the
tribal exercise of rights guaranteed through the government-togovernment bonds established by treaties, the United States has sacred
obligations to honor and abide by the sovereignty of Alaska Native Tribes.
These foundational principles of federal Indian law and their
historical context help situate the claims and interests of tribes in pursuing
broader co-management authorities and responsibilities on federal public
lands. Rather than isolating tribal sovereignty, cultural values, and legal
standing from questions of public land management, this history and the
development of the United States’ treaty relationships and trust
responsibilities to Indian tribes demonstrate the centrality of tribes to those
questions. In addition to this important legal context, the millennia of
connection between Indigenous Americans and the landscape now largely
managed by federal land agencies provide an additional base of ecological
expertise that could be incorporated into and improve management
decisions. Unfortunately, however, public land law has ignored and often
severed the legal, historical, and cultural connections between the
management of public lands and the original inhabitants of those areas.
II.

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT
BY FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT AGENCIES

This section reviews various traditional approaches to tribal
engagement in the management and oversight of federal public lands,
including tribal consultation and cooperation in the evaluation of certain
federal actions pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), the role of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and
authority of Indian tribes to contract or compact with the federal
government to assume certain management responsibilities. While none
111. See, e.g., Akiachak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 827 F.3d
100 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (dismissing appeal regarding lawfulness of Interior’s decision to
take land into trust in Alaska); Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, Bureau of
Indian Affairs, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,888 (Dec. 23, 2014) (publishing final rule authorizing
land trust land acquisitions in Alaska; but see Department of Interior Solicitor
Memorandum M-37053 (June 29, 2018) (withdrawing prior opinion recognizing
authority to take land into trust in Alaska), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/
uploads/m-37053.pdf.
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of these approaches in isolation amount to tribal co-management, they
provide important context for understanding the complexity of those
approaches and the challenges that implementing it will present.
Subsections include examples and recommendations for how these
traditional approaches can possibly be used as a bridge to more substantive
co-management models in the future.
A. The Framework of Federal Public Lands Management
The historical exclusion of Indigenous people and Native nations
from lands that they traditionally occupied enabled the acquisition,
disposition, and management of those areas by the federal government.
The supremacy of federal authority in this regard, rooted in the
Constitution, was bolstered by the Supreme Court’s determination that the
United States retained the exclusive right to extinguish aboriginal title
across the lands purchased or seized from other non-tribal sovereigns.112
Consistent with the expansionism of the era, the federal government’s first
phase of public lands policy promoted development and economic return
through the sale of significant acreage to railroads, settlers, and other
interests.113 Soon, however, a second era of public lands policy dawned
and, contrary to the exploitative manner of the prior approach, focused on
the conservation, federal retention, and management of those lands.114 As
described by Professor Jedediah Britton-Purdy, the laws supporting the
conservation approach both “promoted utilitarian management of
resources that were thought to be vulnerable to wasteful private
extraction” and protected “certain unique and irreplaceable locations”
from any economic development activities.115 The statutory bases for
management of all federal public lands generally align with one of these
two categories and either provide that federal agencies balance the
demands of multiple uses across those lands or ensure the protection of
particular values recognized in particular areas.
112. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 592 (1823); see Leshy, supra note
32, at 517.
113. See, e.g., Jedediah Britton-Purdy, Public-Lands: Whose Lands?
Which Public? The Shape of Public Lands Law and Trump’s National Monument
Proclamations, 45 ECOLOGY L. Q. 921, 940 (2018).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 941; see also Sarah Krakoff, Not Yet America’s Best Idea: Law,
Inequality, and Grand Canyon National Park, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 559, 568–69
(2020) (“For the Native peoples of the greater Grand Canyon region, the reservation
and allotment periods coincided with two phases of public land law [disposition and
conservation], both of which depended on eliminating indigenous rights to land.”).
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The federal agencies charged with managing public lands include
the USFS, which is housed in the Department of Agriculture, and a number
of agencies residing within the Department of the Interior, including the
National Park Service (NPS), BLM, and USFWS. Generally, the USFS
and the BLM are tasked with managing the bulk of their lands under
multiple use mandates essentially requiring “landscape-scale zoning, with
very substantial agency discretion.”116
These laws—the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA),117 which provides guidance to the BLM, and the Multiple Use
Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA) and National Forest Management Act
(NFMA) for the USFS118—emphasize the role of agency discretion and
provide a general statutory framework with the practical details to be filled
in by agency regulations, land use plans, manuals, and handbooks.119
Though FLPMA at least recognizes values that might be used by tribes to
protect their rights and interests on public lands, those values are
characterized as “historical” and “archeological values” with little or no
regard for modern tribal cultural or sovereign interests.120 No such
recognition of these values or “cultural resources” whatsoever are included
in the USFS’s multiple use mandate or NFMA.121
The specially-designated areas managed by the NPS or the
USFWS have much more focused interests and purposes that those
agencies are mandated to protect.122 The designation of these areas, either

116. Britton-Purdy, supra note 113, at 942; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c)
(2020) (setting forth interests of public lands managed by the BLM); 16 U.S.C. § 528
(2020) (same for national forest management).
117. Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (Oct. 21, 1976) (codified as 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1701–1787, (2018)) [FLPMA].
118. Pub. L. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (Oct. 22, 1976) (codified as 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1600–1687 (2018)) [NFMA].
119. See, e.g., Pub. L. 94-579, Title II (Land Use Planning; Land
Acquisition and Disposition) and III (Administration) of FLPMA; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604,
1604(g) (2018) (NFMA planning provisions); 43 C.F.R. §§ 1601, et seq. (Westlaw
through March 18, 2021); 36 C.F.R. § 219 (Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2021).
120. 43 U.S.C. §1701(a)(8).
121. Contra FLPMA at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(8) and 1702(c) to MUSYA
at 16 U.S.C. § 528.
122. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2018) (National Wildlife Refuge
System Improvement Act mandating USFWS to “administer a national network of
lands and waters for the conservation, management, and where appropriate,
restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the United
States for the benefit of present and future generations of Americans.”); Act of May
11, 1910, Pub. L. No. 171, 36 Stat. 354 (codified as 16 U.S.C.A. § 161) (establishing
Glacier National Park).
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by Congress or—as authorized by laws like the Antiquities Act123—the
President, can include specific guidance to those agencies about the
manner in which the area will be managed, which could account for tribes
and tribal interests.124 Generally, however, these designations focus on
protecting the natural or scientific values inherent in the area,125 and rely
on the management agencies to develop more specific management plans
to fulfill those objectives.126
As we discuss in Part V, there are an array of additional
conservation and protected land use designations used by Congress. Most
notable is the Wilderness Act of 1964, which is the most restrictive and
ends-oriented statute governing public lands management.127 But this law,
like others before it, marginalized indigenous peoples, with early versions
of the bill treating tribal reservation lands as public lands.128 Though the
Wilderness Act is silent on tribal rights and interests, more recent
wilderness legislation at least makes reference to treaty rights and sacred
lands.129 The point here is not to diminish the value of this law, as some
tribes use it to protect treaty rights and cultural resources. Rather it is to
show how tribes are relegated in federal public lands law, cast as either
outsiders or historical artifacts, and must resort to procedural methods of
engagement that are often no match for the substantive mandates provided
in these laws.
Thus, while the statutory bases for public land management vary
depending upon the interests that the federal government seeks to serve or
protect through that management, the agencies responsible for carrying out
those mandates are tasked with balancing federal priorities arising after
and premised on the erasure of a continuing indigenous presence on those
lands.130 In fact, but for a requirement to consider existing tribal land use
123. 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2018).
124. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7394, 115 Stat. 2569, 2571 (Jan. 17,
2001) (establishing Kasha-Katuwe National Monument); Proclamation 9558, 82 Fed.
Reg. 1139, 1144 (Dec. 28, 2016) (establishing Bears Ears National Monument).
125. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 221, et seq. (establishing Grand Canyon
National Park “for the benefit and enjoyment of the people” and providing various
enhancements and enlargements to the Park originally established in 1919).
126. U.S. Forest Serv., Chimney Rock National Monument Final
Management Plan, 1 (Aug. 2015), http://www.fs.usda.gov/project/?project=42952.
127. Pub. L. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (Sept. 3, 1964) (codified as 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1131, et seq.).
128. See Martin Nie, The Use of Co-Management and Protected Land-Use
Designations to Protect Tribal Cultural Resources and Reserved Treaty Rights on
Federal Lands, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 585, 624–27 (2008).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Krakoff, supra note 115, at 562 n.7 (noting that the history
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plans on the same basis as other state and local land use plans in the course
of developing public land use plans,131 FLPMA was silent as to tribal
interests in the public lands themselves.132 NFMA and the Wilderness Act
do not mention Indian tribes or their interests in and historical connections
to public lands at all.133 Rarely have these interests been included, much
less considered, in the designation of national parks or monuments
either.134 In fact, the silence of national park designations as to tribal rights
have instead been interpreted as limitations on those interests, even where
prior treaties or legislation expressly recognized their continuation.135

and “dark side” of public land law demands recognition of the exclusion of tribal
presence and interests in what would become public lands).
131. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712(b) (“In the development and revision of land
use plans, the Secretary of Agriculture shall coordinate land use plans for lands in the
National Forest System with the land use planning and management programs of and
for Indian tribes by, among other things, considering the policies of approved tribal
land resource management programs.”); see also id. § 1712(c) (requiring coordination
in planning efforts with non-federal agencies, including Indian tribes and
consideration of “the policies of approved State and tribal land resource management
programs” and requiring the Secretary of Interior “to the extent he finds practical, keep
apprised of State, local, and tribal land use plans; assure that consideration is given to
those State, local, and tribal plans that are germane in the development of land use
plans for public lands; assist in resolving, to the extent practical, inconsistencies
between Federal and non-Federal Government plans, and shall provide for meaningful
public involvement of State and local government officials, both elected and
appointed, in the development of land use programs, land use regulations, and land
use decisions for public lands, including early public notice of proposed decisions
which may have a significant impact on non-Federal lands” (emphasis added)).
132. See Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified as 43 U.S.C. §§
1701–1787).
133. See Pub. L. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (Oct. 22, 1976); Pub. L. 88-577, 78
Stat. 890 (Sept. 3, 1964).
134. See HILLARY HOFFMANN & MONTE MILLS, A THIRD WAY:
DECOLONIZING THE LAWS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL PROTECTION, 73–81 (2020)
(reviewing designations pursuant to the Antiquities Act).
135. See, e.g., Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 510 (1896) (“And this
view of the temporary and precarious nature of the [treaty] right reserved in the
hunting districts is manifest by the act of congress creating the Yellowstone Park
reservation, for it was subsequently carved out of what constituted the hunting districts
at the time of the adoption of the treaty, and is a clear indication of the sense of
congress on the subject.”), repudiated by Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019);
United States v. Peterson, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1320 (D. Mont. 2000) (interpreting
Congressional designation of Glacier National Park as “intended to create a game
preserve in Glacier Park where the Secretary of the Interior was not authorized to
allow any hunting,” even that authorized by prior agreements between the United
States and the Blackfeet Tribe).
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The lack of any explicit statutory, public land law basis promoting
federal agency engagement with Native nations has contributed to the
continuing exclusion of tribes from public lands; albeit a formal, legal
exclusion from exercising meaningful and independent authority to
access, protect, or manage those lands rather than their historic actual,
physical exclusion. Rooted as they are in the removal of the original
inhabitants of what would become federal public lands, these traditional
approaches to public lands management continue to marginalize or
minimize tribal interests in those lands. While the assertion of tribal treaty
rights and the modern tribal sovereignty movement have begun to reshape
those approaches,136 they remain mostly centered on federal policies borne
of an era in which Native nations were erased or overlooked.137
The bottom line is that tribal engagement with the management of
federal public lands must proceed through avenues outside of traditional
public land law, many of which are necessarily reactive to the
prioritization of other federal interests already imbedded in these laws. The
remainder of this section details those approaches.
B. Tribal Consultation: Meaningfully Implementing
the Trust Responsibility . . . Maybe
Like definitions and applications of tribal co-management, “tribal
consultation” is an “unwieldy term . . . often subject to inconsistent
interpretations and applications, and of course, politics.”138 Despite the
long-standing recognition of the fiduciary nature of federal government’s
trust responsibilities to Native nations and the need to meaningfully
engage those duties,139 a series of presidential actions mandating and
seeking to implement more effective consultation procedures for federal
agencies,140 the adoption and endorsement by the United States of an
136. See, e.g., Legal Roots portion of Co-management section, infra; on
the modern sovereignty movement, see generally CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD
STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS (2005).
137. See, e.g., Krakoff, supra note 115, at 567–70 (describing the “myth
of the ‘blank space’ on the map” that supported the creation of Grand Canyon National
Park).
138. See Co-management section infra.
139. See, e.g., First Principles of Federal Indian Law section supra;
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 295–98 (1942) (recognizing the
fiduciary nature of the trust responsibility).
140. Exec. Order 12875, ENHANCING THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PARTNERSHIP, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,093 (Oct. 26, 1993); Exec. Order 13084,
CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION WITH INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS, 63 Fed.
Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998); Exec. Order 13175, CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION
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influential United Nations declaration discussing consultation
principles,141 and the development of numerous executive agency policies
seeking to effectively define and operationalize consultation,142 there
remain as many variations and understandings of tribal consultation as
there are meetings convened to engage in that relationship.143 Therefore,
while tribal consultation plays a central role in the engagement of Native
nations and their interests in the management of public lands, the
numerous and often inconsistent ways in which such consultation is
proposed, used, engaged in, and relied upon regularly result in confusion,
disappointment, and contempt for its effectiveness on the part of both
tribal and federal participants.
C. Background: A Product of the Self-Determination Era
Although the federal government’s historical interactions with
Native nations, like treaty-making, could be considered early forms of
tribal consultation, the term itself gained formal status only in the most
recent era of federal Indian policy. This era, though originating in the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations,144 was formally ushered in by
President Nixon’s 1970 special message to Congress, in which he called
on the federal government to promote tribal self-determination and
WITH INDIAN

TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); President
George W. Bush, Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relationship with
Tribal Governments, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Bush
Memorandum]; President Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Obama
Memorandum].
141. Art. 19, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, G.A. Res. 295, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (2007)
(“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free,
prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or
administrative measures that may affect them.”) [hereinafter UNDRIP]. After initially
voting against the UNDRIP, the United States announced its support on January 12,
2011. See U.S. State Dep’t, Announcement of U.S. Support for United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Jan. 12, 2011), https://2009-2017.
state.gov/s/srgia/154553.htm.
142. See, e.g. GOVT. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-22, Tribal
Consultation: Additional Federal Actions Needed for Federal Infrastructure Projects,
82–86 (Mar. 2019), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-22 [hereinafter GAO
Report].
143. See, e.g., id. at 87–92 (documenting the wide variety of definitions
and coverage of tribal consultation across a multitude of federal agency policies).
144. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 1.07.
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sovereignty without the threat of termination.145 The Secretary of the
Interior at the time, Walter J. Hickel, emphasized the need for the federal
government to seek tribal input, saying “[i]t is a time we listen to what the
Indians have been telling us.”146
The first statutory consultation requirements appeared in the
landmark Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, which
Congress passed in 1975.147 That law, the Self-Determination Act, sought
to invigorate Nixon’s policy goals by encouraging federal agencies to
contract with Indian tribes—through so-called 638 contracts—to assume
responsibility for carrying out federal programs, services, functions, and
activities on their own.148 The Self-Determination Act included a
requirement that, “to the extent practicable,” responsible federal agencies
must consult with tribal organizations on the development of regulations
to implement the law.149 This requirement, combined with further
legislative actions related to education, focused the early statutory
consultation obligations of the federal government on services provided to
tribes but, eventually, the federal government’s duty to consult expanded
to include decisions related to certain actions that might affect tribal lands,
natural or cultural resources.150
Of these laws, and discussed in more detail below, the 1992
amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) provided
the most relevant and potentially powerful consultation requirements,
which, through NHPA’s Section 106 process, require federal consultation
145. See President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (July 8, 1970), https://www.epa.gov/tribal/president
-nixon-special-message-indian-affairs-july-8-1970.
146. Statement by Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel on President
Nixon’s Special Message to Congress on Indians, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, July 8,
1970, https://www.indianaffairs.gov/as-ia/opa/online-press-release/statement-secretary
-interior-walter-j-hickel-president-nixons-special.
147. Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 5301–5423 (2018)). For a detailed review of the history of tribal
consultation, see Colette Routel & Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation
in the 21st Century, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417 (2013).
148. See, e.g., id. § 102, 88 Stat. at 2206; 25 U.S.C. § 5321; see
Contracting Section infra for a detailed review of the role of 638 contracts in tribal
engagement with public land management.
149. Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. at 2212.
150. See Routel & Holth, supra note 147, at 439–41 (describing the
consultation requirements of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) in
1979, Pub. L. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (1979); the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), Pub. L. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990); and the 1992
amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), Pub. L. 102-575, 106
Stat. 4600 (1992)).
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with tribes to identify the potential effects of any federal undertaking on
culturally significant properties and mitigation of those effects where
feasible.151 The Section 106 consultation process remains the most broadly
applicable consultation requirement across all federal land management
agencies and, outside of other laws more narrowly focused on particular
archaeological artifacts or Native American human remains and associated
objects, is the only statutorily-mandated consultation process specific to
Indian tribes.152
Notwithstanding the narrow statutory footing for tribal
consultation, its reach has been expanded through a series of executive
actions and corresponding agency policies, the push for which was
initiated by President William Clinton.153 Following a 1994 presidential
memorandum requiring agencies to consult with tribal governments before
taking actions that would affect them,154 President Clinton issued the most
sweeping endorsement of tribal consultation in two Executive Orders,
issued in 1998 and 2000, each of which sought to implement the
requirements announced in the earlier memorandum.155 To do so,
151. 54 U.S.C. § 306108 (2018); see NHPA Section infra.
152. As described in more detail infra, the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (Jan. 1, 1970) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§
4321–4347 (2018)), requires public participation in the assessment and analysis of
certain potential federal actions but does not mention tribes at all, much less the federal
government’s unique relationship with them. The regulations implementing NEPA
require that federal agencies consult early in the NEPA process “with appropriate state
and local agencies and Indian tribes and with interested private persons and
organizations,” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2(d)(2) (2019), and that tribes be involved, along
with other interested parties, in the NEPA scoping process, 40 C.F.R. § 1507(a)(1),
but those requirements also do not take into account the unique status of the federaltribal relationship and, instead, put tribes on par with any other group interested in the
proposed federal action. As noted in a 2017 report issued by three federal departments,
“[t]his coordination should not be confused with a Federal agency’s responsibility to
engage in government-to-government consultation with Tribes.” U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, U.S. Dep’t Of the Army, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Improving Tribal
Consultation and Tribal Involvement in Federal Infrastructure Decisions (Jan. 2017),
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/pdf/idc2-060030.pdf [hereinafter
Infrastructure Report].
153. See Routel & Holth, supra note 147, at 442.
154. Id.; Government-to-Government Relations with Native American
Tribal Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994).
155. Consultation And Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,
Exec. Order 13084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998); Consultation And
Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments, Exec. Order 13175, 65 Fed. Reg.
67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000). The latter order (13175) expressly revoked the prior (13084)
upon its issuance. Sec. 9(c), Exec. Order 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,251.
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Executive Order 13175 set forth certain fundamental principles to guide
the formulation of policies with tribal implications,156 including the federal
government’s trust responsibilities, the importance of tribal sovereignty,
the ongoing federal policy of promoting tribal self-determination.157
Beyond applying those principles, agencies were also instructed to support
tribal administration of federal laws by granting “tribal governments the
maximum administrative discretion possible” and, when developing
policies with tribal implications, agencies were encouraged to support the
development of tribal policies in those arenas, defer to those tribal
standards, and refrain from establishing federal standards until after
consulting with tribes about how and where such standards may interfere
with tribal priorities.158 The Order went on to require broader agency
consultation on any regulatory initiatives by prohibiting the promulgation
of any such rules that might have tribal implications, impose compliance
costs on tribes, or preempt tribal law unless the agency had engaged in
tribal consultation “early in the process of developing the proposed
regulation” and provided additional information about those efforts when
publishing the rule.159 Executive Order 13175 prompted agencies to
develop their own policies and procedures to implement its guidance,160
but, by its own terms, the Order did not create any enforceable legal
rights.161
Following President Clinton’s lead, presidents George W. Bush
and Barack Obama each issued their own memoranda further encouraging
and reinforcing the federal government’s obligation to strengthen its
relationship with Indian tribes.162 In fact, President Obama’s 2009
Memorandum relied on the directives of President Clinton’s earlier Order
and sought to further integrate them into the Executive Branch by
requiring each agency to develop a plan for implementing those directives
and annual progress reports on those plans thereafter.163 Like its
predecessors, the Obama Memorandum expressly disclaimed any legal
156. Policies with tribal implications include “regulations, legislative
comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have
substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the
Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.” Exec. Order
13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,249.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 67,249–50.
159. Id. at 67,250–51.
160. Routel & Holth, supra note 147, at 443–44.
161. Exec. Order 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,252.
162. See Bush Memorandum and Obama Memorandum.
163. Obama Memorandum, 74 Fed. Reg. at 57,881.
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enforceability164 and, as shown by subsequent reviews of agency
consultation policies, has had mixed results in prompting the development
and implementation of new approaches to consultation.165
Notwithstanding that criticism, the presidential prompts of the last
few decades have resulted in renewed or entirely new focus by public land
management agencies on tribal consultation. The United States
Department of Agriculture, which houses the USFS, for example, updated
its policies on consultation in 2013 through the adoption of a Departmental
Regulation,166 which the USFS supplemented with its own policy in
2016.167 Similarly, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar issued a
Secretarial Order setting forth a new consultation policy for the
Department of the Interior in 2011, and the Department integrated new
policies and procedures on consultation into the Departmental Manual in
2015.168 Both the BLM and USFWS then updated their consultation
policies in 2016.169 Only the National Park Service, whose policies date to
164. Id. at 57,882.
165. See, e.g., Nat’l Congress of Am. Indians, Consultation with Tribal
Nations: An Update on Implementation of Executive Order 13175 (Jan. 2012), http://
www.ncai.org/resources/consultations/consultation-report-2012-update (reviewing the
status of consultation plans and policies); GAO Report 19–22, supra note 142, at 82–86
(reviewing same as of July 2018); see also Routel & Holth, supra note 147, at 447–
48 (noting issues with implementing and enforcing the Obama Memorandum and
concluding that “while well intentioned, the Obama Memorandum f[ell] short of
creating any real change to the federal-tribal relationship”).
166. U.S Dep’t of Agric., Regulation 1350-002: Tribal Consultation,
Coordination, and Collaboration (Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.fs.fed.us/spf/
tribalrelations/documents/policy/consultation/Final_DR.pdf.
167. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., U.S. Forest Serv., Final Directives on American
Indian and Alaska Native Relations Forest Service Manual 1500, Chapter 1560, and
Forest Service Handbook 1509.13, Chapter 10, 81 Fed. Reg. 12,447 (Mar. 9, 2016).
168. Secretary of the Interior, Order No. 3317, Department of the Interior
Policy on Consultation with Indian Tribes (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.doi.gov/
sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/cobell/upload/FINAL-Departmental-tribal-consultation
-policy.pdf; Dep’t of the Interior, Departmental Manual, 512 DM 4, Department of
the Interior Policy on Consultation with Indian Tribes and Alaska Native
Corporations (effective Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/elips/
documents/chapter_4_department_of_the_interior_policy_on_consultation_with_ind
ian_tribes_and_alaska_native_corporations.docx; Dep’t of the Interior, Departmental
Manual, 512 DM 5, Procedures for Consultation with Indian Tribes (effective Nov.
9,
2015),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/elips/documents/chapter_5_
procedures_for_consultation_with_indian_tribes.docx.
169. See Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Manual
Transmittal Sheet: BLM Manual 1780 Tribal Relations (Dec. 15, 2016),
https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/uploads/MS%201780.pdf; Dep’t of the
Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Manual Transmittal Sheet: BLM Handbook
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2006, has not updated its consultation guidance since the Obama
Memorandum.170
Although each of these agencies have followed presidential
directives to develop and refine their approaches to tribal consultation,
those approaches and their standards and procedures—even the definition
of consultation itself—vary from agency to agency.171 These varying
commands are layered on top of the public land management
responsibilities of each agency, which, particularly in light of the statutory
basis for those missions and the more recent but less structured
development of tribal consultation measures, can present practical
limitations for tribal consultation as an effective means to engage with
tribes in the management of federal public lands.
D. Consultation in Practice: Limitations and Promises of Potential
In September 2016, three federal executive departments—
Interior, Army, and Justice—came together to consult with tribal leaders
on how to improve the federal-tribal relationship regarding the federal
government’s permitting of infrastructure projects.172 The effort came at
an intense time in the battle over the Dakota Access Pipeline, to which
Native nations from across the country had responded in opposition,173
and, although the report that resulted from those consultations focused
primarily on decisions related to infrastructure projects, the input that
tribes provided during the report’s development highlighted the range of
challenges posed by the current state of tribal consultation as a tool for
engaging tribes in public land management.174 Of particular relevance
1780-1 Improving and Sustaining BLM-Tribal Relations (Dec. 15, 2016),
https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/uploads/H-1780-1__0.pdf; U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service, Native American Policy (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.fws.gov/
nativeamerican/pdf/native-american-policy.pdf.
170. See, e.g., The National Park Service and American Indians, Alaska
Natives, and Native Hawaiians: Excerpts and Identified Sections from Management
Policies 2006, The Guide to Managing the National Park System, National Park
Service American Indian Liaison Office (Oct. 2008), https://www.nps.gov/history/
tribes/Documents/NPSManagementPolicy.pdf.
171. See, e.g. GAO Report 19–22, supra note 142, at 87–90 (providing
various departmental and agency definitions of “consultation” and “meaningful
consultation”).
172. Infrastructure Report, supra note 152, at 26.
173. See, e.g., Jack Healy, North Dakota Pipeline Battle: Who’s Fighting
and Why, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/us/northdakota-oil-pipeline-battle-whos-fighting-and-why.html.
174. That input was collected through seven consultation sessions, a
listening session, and the submission of written comments and included comments
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were tribal concerns over the inconsistent approaches to the practice of
consultation employed by various federal agencies;175 the concern that
federal agencies only sought to consult when tribal lands might be
affected, which ignores tribal relationships with larger traditional
territories;176 the timing of consultation, which many tribes viewed as
taking place only after the agency had made its decision;177 and the manner
in which tribal input provided during consultations was treated.178 In
addition, tribes provided specific input on the consultation required by the
NHPA’s Section 106 process and the ways in which their comments are
solicited and considered in the review of federal actions under the
NEPA.179 In summarizing all of these comments, the report highlighted
the deeper issues undercutting the recent efforts of various executive
branch officials to improve consultation:
Tribes further remarked that even the best-written agency
Tribal consultation policies are often poorly
implemented. Tribes noted that often agencies neither
treat Tribes as sovereigns nor afford Tribes the respect
they would any other governmental entity—let alone treat
Tribes as those to whom the United States maintains a
trust responsibility or as those who hold reserved rights
through treaties that granted the United States vast
amounts of territory. Tribes emphasized that the spirit
with which consultation is conducted is essential, Tribes
need to be consulted sooner, Federal staff need better
training prior to working with Tribes, and that
consultation should be more consistent across agencies.180
These concerns and the broadly shared tribal perspective on federal
consultation efforts highlight the fundamental challenge faced by federal
agencies seeking to engage Native nations through the existing legal
framework for consultation related to public lands management. The
management directives and structures of public land law establish agency
from 59 tribes and eight tribal organizations. See Infrastructure Report, supra note
152, at 43.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 44–45.
177. Id. at 45–46.
178. Id. at 47 (describing tribal concerns that “[f]ederal agencies often
treat consultation as a procedural ‘check-the-box’ exercise, in which Federal agencies
come to the consultation with their minds already made up and ignore tribal input”).
179. Id. at 52–61.
180. Id. at 3.
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priorities and, depending on those priorities, provide varying amounts of
discretion to each agency to carry them out.181 But those laws ignored and
continue to implicitly exclude a meaningful tribal voice in the setting of
those priorities, and their balancing and protection. Therefore, while the
self-determination era of the recent generations and its corresponding
focus on improving tribal involvement in federal decision-making have
certainly opened new avenues for those efforts, they remain cabined within
the overriding scheme of public land law and the longer standing and more
rigid institutional measures designed to fulfill that scheme.
Notwithstanding the NHPA’s consultation command, which presents its
own challenges,182 there remains no competing statutory directive that
secures the appropriate “spirit with which consultation is conducted,”183
demands accountability for agency leadership in carrying out that
directive, ensures the appropriate historical context for federal
management decision affecting traditional tribal territories,184 and
appropriately elevates tribal sovereign decisions within the balance of
competing federal and public interests.185 Those underlying conflicts often
leave tribal consultation in a reactive posture, with tribal officials
responding to federal projects or plans that have already been initiated and
for which tribal input will be considered along with and on the same basis
as that of other interested parties.186
Beyond the tribal input on infrastructure projects reported in 2017,
recent case studies further illustrate these shortcomings and conflicts. In
January 2018, officials from the State of Alaska petitioned the Secretary
of Agriculture to develop a new rule that would change the roadless status

181. Britton-Purdy, supra note 113, at 943.
182. See NHPA section, infra.
183. Infrastructure Report, supra note 152, at 3.
184. See, e.g., Krakoff, supra note 115, at 647 (“If we continue to think
about protecting the places we love without simultaneously redressing the inequities
sewn into how we have protected those places in the past, we will see increasingly
extreme versions of environmental inequality amidst overall environmental
devastation.”).
185. See, e.g., Infrastructure Report, supra note 152, at 12 (citing United
Nations, General Assembly, United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, A/61/L.67 (Sept. 13 2007), https://www.un.org/development/desa/
indigenouspeoples/wpcontent/uploads/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf., which
Tribes conistently cited for “authority for requiring Tribes’ free, prior, and informed
consent . . .” [hereinafter UNDRIP]).
186. See, e.g., Infrastructure Report, supra note 152, at 13 (“Tribes
frequently commented that Federal agency leaders and staff often treat Tribes merely as
stakeholders. Tribes repeatedly emphasized that they should be regarded as sovereign
governmental entities who are trust beneficiaries and holders of treaty rights.”).
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of the Tongass National Forest in the southeast part of the state.187
Following on a long and litigious history,188 the State sought to have the
USFS repeal the roadless rule’s application to the Tongass in “the interests
of the socioeconomic wellbeing of [Alaska’s] residents.”189 The USFS
soon initiated a rulemaking to officially move that petition forward and,
consistent with the agencies responsibilities under NEPA prepare an
environmental impact statement.190 The agency named the State of Alaska
as a cooperating agency and indicated that it had also invited interested
tribes to participate on the same basis.191 Although those invitations were
dated two months after the USFS was directed to start a rulemaking and
only a month before the agency announced the initiation of its
rulemaking,192 a number of Tribes accepted the invitation to participate as
cooperating agencies and partook in meetings leading up to the issuance
of a draft environmental impact statement (DEIS).193 Following the
issuance of the DEIS, however, the cooperating agency Tribes sent a letter
expressing extensive concerns about the USFS actions proposed in the
DEIS and their treatment as cooperating agencies.194
187. Letter from Andrew T. Mack, Commissioner, Alaska Department of
Natural Resources, to Sonny Perdue, Secretary of Agriculture, U.S. Dep’t. of Agric.
(Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834_FSPLT3
_5214387.pdf.
188. See, e.g., Organized Village of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d
956 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting an exemption of the Tongass National Forest from the
2001 roadless rule).
189. State of Alaska Petition for USDA Rulemaking, 7 (Jan 18, 2018),
available as an attachment to Letter from Andrew T. Mack, supra note 187,
http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834_FSPLT3_5214387.pdf.
190. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., U.S. Forest Serv., Roadless Area
Conservation; National Forest System Lands in Alaska, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,252 (Aug.
30, 2018); 40 U.S.C. § 4332 (2018).
191. Notice of Intent, 83 Fed. Reg. at 44,253; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6
(authorizing cooperating agencies).
192. See Letter from David E. Schmid, Acting Regional Forester, U.S.
Forest Serv., to Albert Howard, President, Angoon Community Association (July 30,
2018), http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834_FSPLT3_5136541.pdf.
193. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between Hoonah Indian
Association and United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (U.S. Forest
Serv.
2019),
http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834_FSPLT3
_5136119.pdf; Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Rulemaking for Alaska’s
Roadless Areas, 5–3 (U.S. Forest Serv. 2019), http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/
www/nepa/109834_FSPLT3_5207661.pdf (listing the six tribes serving as
cooperating agencies).
194. Letter from tribal leaders to Sonny Perdue, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t. of
Agric. (Oct. 22, 2019), http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834
_FSPLT3_5136565.pdf; Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; National Forest
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Despite that status, the Tribes uniformly felt their input and
expertise were being ignored in favor of other competing interests, and
that because they favored maintaining the roadless protections that the
State of Alaska sought to repeal, their position made them a “‘nuisance
factor’ to be ignored” in the consultation process.195 Beyond their
substantive disagreements, the participating Tribes also expressed concern
about a compressed timeframe and inability to provide meaningful input
despite their elevated status as cooperating agencies.196
Thereafter, the USFS provided a draft of the final environmental
impact statement for review and comment by tribal entities, but did so in
the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, providing only two weeks for that
process.197 In addition, despite the additional burdens on their
governments created by the national emergency, the USFS asked the
Tribes to participate in virtual consultations so that the agency’s
rulemaking could continue to move forward.198
The rulemaking process for the Tongass National Forest has
proceeded according to NEPA and although the Tribes involved secured
participation in that process as cooperating agencies, a status that
confirmed certain protections for their input and role,199 the Tribes still
believed their interests—and their knowledge of and values in the Tongass
landscape in which they’d existed for generations—were being ignored in
favor of other, competing interests.
Critically, given the amount of agency discretion enjoyed by
USFS, the procedural nature of NEPA’s requirements and the USFS’
consultation policies, as well as the nature of the consultation and the
record of tribal involvement (albeit in frustrated opposition to the process),
the Tribes are left with few legal avenues to force a different course of
government-to-government relations in this matter. As described above,
none of the presidential actions focused on consultation provide any legal
standing or claim for an aggrieved tribe to pursue,200 leaving the claimcreating provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) as the

System Lands in Alaska, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,522 (Oct. 17, 2019), http://www.fs.usda.
gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834_FSPLT3_5136119.pdf.
195. Letter from tribal leaders to Secretary Perdue, supra note 194, at 2.
196. Id. at 1–2.
197. See Ben Hohenstatt, Tribes ask feds to stop work on roadless rule
plan, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.juneauempire.com/news/tribes
-ask-feds-to-stop-work-on-roadless-rule-plan/.
198. Id.
199. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6.
200. See Consultation in Practice: Limitations and Promises of Potential
Section infra.
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only options for such a tribe.201 Under the APA, a tribe would have to
demonstrate that the agency’s consultation actions were unlawfully
withheld,202 “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law,”203 or fail to comply with required legal
procedures.204 In rare instances,205 tribes have successfully shown that
agency failures in consultation meet these requirements; however,
provided an agency reasonably fulfills its duties to engage in the process
of consultation (i.e., “checks-the-box”), there is little, if any, legal basis
for a tribe to challenge the agency’s resulting substantive determination
due to a lack of “meaningful” consultation.206
E. Consultation as a Bridge to Tribal Co-Management
Despite the challenges for consultation to serve as an effective
method for incorporating tribal perspectives and values into federal
decision-making, it remains an essential aspect of the federal-tribal
relationship when considering the possibility of tribal co-management of
federal public lands. To serve that role, however, consultation must evolve
from the unenforceable, discretionary, and variable practice widely
criticized by tribes207 into a meaningful, compatible, and continuing
conversation between appropriate tribal and federal officials. Few
201. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
202. Id. at § 706(1).
203. Id. at § 706(2)(A).
204. Id. at § 706(2)(D).
205. See, e.g., Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S.
Dep’t of Interior, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2010); Wyoming v. Dep’t of the
Interior, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1317 (D. Wyo. 2015), vacated and remanded by Wyoming
v. Sierra Club, 2016 WL 3853806 (10th Cir. 2016); but see Vanessa L. Ray-Hodge &
Sarah M. Stevenson, Examining The Legal Implications Of Government-ToGovernment Tribal Consultation And Off-Reservation Development, 4 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 11, 6–7 (2017) (reviewing cases and suggesting, “Tribal consultation is
also more than a process that must be followed, federal agencies must provide a real
opportunity for tribal views to be heard and considered. Agencies must substantively
address and respond to tribal views in their decision-making process, even where those
views are not followed or are rejected.”).
206. See, e.g., San Juan Citizens All. v. Norton, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1270,
1292–94 (D.N.M. 2008) (rejecting claims that the BLM failed to adequately consult
under NHPA in the development of a resource management plan); Routel & Holth,
supra note 147, at 464–66 (reviewing enforceability issues and concluding that
“failure to enforce the substantive components of the trust responsibility means that
even when tribal suggestions and requests are properly solicited, they can be
disregarded without the potential for any recourse”).
207. See, e.g., Infrastructure Report, supra note 152.
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examples exist of such approaches, primarily arising when federal
agencies are mandated to develop and maintain effective relationships, or
where through a long-standing course of practice, those relationships have
developed into mutually beneficial partnerships.
The necessity of effective tribal consultation can be created
through executive or legislative mandates requiring federal land
management agencies to incorporate tribal input into substantive
management decisions. President Clinton’s 2001 designation of the
Kasha-Katuwe Tent Rocks National Monument, for example, commanded
that the Monument be managed in “close cooperation” with the Pueblo.208
Although the Pueblo and the BLM had worked together prior to the
Monument’s establishment, the designation of the Monument created new
and additional demands on both of those parties, as well as the
landscape.209 Through the development of federal-tribal agreements and
an evolving relationship, the parties successfully complied with the
proclamation’s directive all while keeping consultation at the heart of that
process.210 The required and continuing role for the Pueblo of Cochiti in
the BLM’s management of the monument necessitates a workable
consultation framework to ensure that mandate can be met.211
Sustained and long-term federal-tribal relationships also help
bridge effective consultation practices into more meaningful and practical
roles for tribal partners in management. As described in more detail
below,212 the judicial recognition and protection of treaty-reserved rights
to fish and hunt across traditional territories and in particular, the
allocation of fishery resources between tribes and other interests,213

208. Establishment of the Kasha-Katuwe Tent Rocks National Monument,
Proclamation No. 7394, 115 Stat. 2569, 2571 (Jan. 17, 2001).
209. See Sandra Lee Pinel & Jacob Pecos, Generating Co-Management at
Kasha Katuwe Tent Rocks National Monument, New Mexico, 49 ENVTL. MGMT. 593,
596–97 (2012).
210. Id. at 600 (relating the view of a BLM official, whose “staff were
engaging in extensive consultation and respecting the Pueblo’s wishes wherever
possible” but retained “their federal responsibility for management of the
monument”).
211. President Obama’s proclamation of the Bears Ears National
Monument contemplated a similar mandate for the federal agencies responsible for
managing those lands and would have required the development of an effective
consultation protocol to ensure that those agencies would “carefully and fully
consider” tribal input in their management decisions. Establishment of the Bears Ears
National Monument, Proclamation 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1144 (Dec. 28, 2016).
212. See Co-management section infra.
213. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash.
1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
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demanded that states, tribes, and federal agencies develop ways to
collaboratively address and resolve those issues.214 The decades of work
to fulfill that mandate in both the Pacific Northwest and Great Lakes
regions have resulted in the establishment of meaningful, effective
relationships that rely on consultation.215 In the implementation of those
relationships, the tribes and their federal partners have agreed on the scope,
process, and terms of consultation as a means to serve the broader
management objectives defined by the nature of tribal treaty rights.216
These agreements help avoid the more general failings of consultation as
a bridge to effective co-management described above and may be
instructive when considering ways to reform those general practices to
make them more effective.
Another potential bridge between existing tribal consultation
practices and requirements and broader co-management relationships is
being proposed to the USFS by tribes across Southeast Alaska. As
described above, those tribes have been frustrated by the lack of
meaningful consultation with the USFS in the context of the State of
Alaska’s proposal to modify the Roadless Rule for the Tongass National
Forest.217 While the tribes retain the ability and may still seek to litigate
their concerns over that rulemaking process, they also have sought to
pursue a new path that could reset their relationship with the USFS and
that presents the opportunity for a new and improved foundation of
federal-tribal relations and consultation.
Relying on the APA,218 nine tribal governments across the region
recently submitted a petition to the Secretary of Agriculture requesting that
the Department commence new rulemaking “to create a traditional
homelands conservation rule for the long-term management and protection
of traditional and customary use areas in the Tongass National Forest.”219
214. See, e.g., Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 912 (D. Or. 1969);
Monte Mills, Beyond the Belloni Decision: Sohappy v. Smith and the Modern Era of
Tribal Treaty Rights, 50 ENVTL. L. REV. 387, 402–03 (2020) (discussing the
collaborative mandate of Judge Belloni’s decision in Sohappy).
215. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 214, at 394 n.41.
216. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding, Regarding Tribal-USDAForest Service Relations on National Forest Lands Within the Territories Ceded in
Treaties of 1836, 1837, and 1842, 10–11 (amendeded March 2012), https://www.
glifwc.org/Regulations/mouamd2012withappendixes.pdf.
217. See Letter from tribal leaders to Sonny Perdue, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t.
of Agric., (Oct. 22, 2019), http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834
_FSPLT3_5136565.pdf.
218. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2018) (“Each agency shall give an interested
person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”).
219. See Elizabeth Jenkins, With a Roadless Rule Decision Pending,
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Importantly, the tribes are calling upon the USFS to collaboratively
develop the rulemaking process and to “engage in a new and more robust
and legitimate government-to-government consultation process with the
Tribes on the Tongass National Forest under the principle of ‘mutual
concurrence’ to identify traditional and customary use areas and design
forest-wide conservation measures to protect them.”220 According to the
tribes, that process must “ensure culturally competent and meaningful
consultation with accessible meetings that take place in local communities
on a regular schedule, and mutually-agreed upon measurable processes for
engaging in” such consultation.221 Through that process, the tribes would
propose developing and implementing “appropriate, forest-wide
conservation measures and management direction that is based off the
principles of subsistence priority, local control, and ‘all lands, all hands’
collaborative stewardship and management in order to protect the unique
traditional and subsistence values of the Tongass, its people, and its fish
and wildlife populations,” which would be carried out in a collaborative
partnership between the USFS and the tribes.222 Although the outcome of
the tribes’ petition remains to be seen, their demands offer a new avenue
to consider how expanded and deeper consultation requirements could
enhance tribal co-management across public lands beyond the Tongass
National Forest.
F. Recommendations for Consultation Reform
Reforming the general standards for tribal consultation presents
its own challenges, particularly in light of the diversity of federal agencies,
their mandates, interests, and capacities and the range of issues, tribes, and
tribal interests with which those agencies must consult. As described
Tribal Governments Petition for New Process, ALASKA PUBLIC MEDIA (July 21,
2020),
https://www.alaskapublic.org/2020/07/21/with-a-roadless-rule-decision
-pending-tribal-governments-petition-for-new-process/; Organized Village of
Kasaan, Organized Village of Kake, Klawock Cooperative Association, Hoonah
Indian Association, Ketchikan Indian Community, Skagway Traditional Council,
Organized Village Of Saxman, Yakutat Tlingit Tribe, Central Council Tlingit And
Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska, Petition For USDA Rulemaking to Create a
Traditional Homelands Conservation Rule for the Long-Term Management and
Protection of Traditional and Customary Use Areas in the Tongass National Forest,
https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/ktoo/2020/07/FINAL-Southeast-Tribes-APA
-Petition-7-17-2020-Nine-Tribe-Signatures.pdf (last visited July 31, 2020)
[hereinafter SE AK Tribal Petition].
220. SE AK Tribal Petition, supra note 219, at 1.
221. Id. at 6.
222. Id. at 11.
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above, a “one-size-fits-all” approach rarely does so, and even well-written
and intentioned agency-specific consultation policies are a challenge to
effectively implement. Nonetheless, like the principles of co-management
discussed below, efforts to reform tribal consultation procedures and
requirements could be measured and guided by the lessons offered from
prior shortcomings and successes.
First, as recognized by each of the executive orders, actions, and
a number of existing agency policies that resulted from those directives,
consultation must be firmly rooted in the legal principles and
responsibilities of the government-to-government relationship and the
federal government’s trust responsibilities. Importantly, however, as
demonstrated by the instances of effective collaboration described above,
those responsibilities must also be incorporated into the guiding mandates
of federal land management agencies on the same basis as their other
responsibilities. Unlike the general exclusion of tribes and tribal interests
from the framework of public land law, for example, effective tribal
engagement through consultation could be incorporated on an equal basis
with the competing management objectives described by that
framework.223
Consistent with that principle, effective consultation is also
largely dependent upon the development and maintenance of a long-term
relationship, rather than a project-specific discussion. Therefore, federal
agencies interested in enhancing the effectiveness of their consultation
practices could be encouraged—through specific directives and
accountability measures, including evaluation metrics that track success—
to regularly engage in consultation about matters of general tribal concern
without regard to a pending or proposed federal action. While such
practices demand additional time and resources, both of which are in short
supply for federal and tribal officials,224 the investment of effort in
relationship-building would likely avoid additional expenditures resulting
from conflict over failed consultations on specific projects.225
223. One example of such a reform proposal suggests adopting procedural
mandate and standard for tribal consultation that could be incorporated into federal
decision-making on the same basis as environmental reviews required by NEPA.
Routel & Holth, supra note 147, at 466–74.
224. See, e.g., Infrastructure Report, supra note 152, at 23–24.
225. An example of broad-based consultation efforts can be found in the
BLM’s development of the Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan (DRECP),
which involved lengthy consultation with several tribes over a months-long process
and served to build relationships beyond a specific project. See Record of Decision for
the Land Use Plan Amendment to the California Desert Conservation Plan, Bishop
resource Management Plan, and Bakersfield Resource Management Plan, BUREAU
OF LAND MANAGEMENT, 89–93 (Sept. 2016), https://eplanning.blm.gov/public
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Finally, the consultation process must provide some guarantee of
accountability. As noted above, even where tribes may be afforded
cooperating agency status under NEPA, the broad discretion allowed to
federal agencies can excuse a disjointed or disagreeable consultation
process and result in the marginalization or exclusion of tribal input. While
the spirit of recent executive actions and the agency policies they spawned
are important, so too is the lack of any legal basis on which that spirit and
the process of consultation it envisions can be enforced. In addition to
building accountability through personnel measures like evaluations, there
are other procedural avenues for enhancing accountability around
consultation. The “mutual concurrence” model suggested by tribes in
Alaska’s Tongass National Forest would help ensure that the process of
tribal engagement adequately accounts for tribal perspectives while also
guaranteeing some substantive control for tribes.226 Short of that model,
the decision-making process set forth for the management of the original
Bears Ears National Monument required that federal land managers
provide a written explanation to interested Tribes when their management
decisions did not align with tribal comments or input gathered through
consultation.227 While leaving ultimate decision-making in the hands of
federal agencies, this model would require additional accountability for
those decisions and provide a stronger basis on which consultation and
cooperative relationships could be maintained and strengthened.
Reform to accommodate these principles could be accomplished
through further executive actions or legislative efforts. The work done by
various federal agencies in the context of infrastructure projects provide
some important first steps for executive agencies to consider;228 however,
regulatory reform efforts could also be undertaken to deepen and
strengthen the support for effective tribal consultation. The regulations
developed by the Advisory Council on Historic Properties (ACHP) in the
context of the NHPA’s statutorily mandated consultation process for
historic or cultural properties could provide a basis for implementing a
more general regulatory consultation mandate.229 Like those regulations,
the involvement of an additional entity, like the ACHP in NHPA
proceedings, could also provide an important check on or review of a
consultation process. Importantly, however, these efforts should aim to
incorporate tribal consultation as an objective on an equal basis with
_projects/lup/66459/133460/163124/DRECP_BLM_LUPA_ROD.pdf.
226. See SE AK Tribal Petition, supra note 219, at 5.
227. Establishment of the Bears Ears National Monument, Proclamation
No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1144 (Dec. 28, 2016); see infra Part III.
228. Infrastructure Report, supra note 152, at 16–25.
229. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(f) (2007).
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existing federal land management priorities in order to integrate the
process of consultation with the balancing of a multiple-use, wilderness,
refuge, or other management framework. Doing so would help overcome
the historical exclusion and separation of tribes from the legal structure of
public land management.
With regard to possible legislative initiatives, the National
Congress of American Indians (NCAI) has called upon Congress to enact
laws that would provide “uniform, effective and meaningful
consultation,”230 At least one such bill has been introduced in Congress.231
That legislation would have established more particular requirements for
agency consultation policies and practices and provided a cause of action
under the APA for tribes to seek judicial review of an agency’s failure to
comply with its terms.232 Those concepts would remain important for any
future legislative efforts to improve tribal consultation, as would
consideration of the need to integrate consultation with other federal land
management priorities.
Ultimately, reforming tribal consultation will demand additional
work beyond the formal executive or legislative actions taken to encourage
a more meaningful, effective, and enforceable federal-tribal relationship.
That process must originate from and be rooted in the foundational legal
principles described above and effectively involve tribal voices and
priorities in federal administrative and legal processes that were built
without such involvement.
G. Contracting and Compacting for the Assumption by Tribes of
Federal Programs, Services, Functions, and Activities
The modern era of federal law and policy regarding relations with
Native nations is rooted in a commitment to tribal self-determination.233
That policy represented a marked shift from the prior era of termination
and, for fifty years, has undergirded various federal legislative and
executive actions, including the series of executive actions supporting and
enhancing tribal consultation described above. Central to the development
and implementation of the self-determination policies has been the
230. Resolution #MOH-17-001 (2017), https://www.ncai.org/attachments/
Resolution_tNWJMIbVBsWNXwnaUYCgwjpsJImEmxzkuQZYPcJxjDIxJpMrqJR_
MOH-17-001.pdf.
231. See Requirements, Expectations, and Standard Procedures for
Executive Consultation with Tribes Act, H.R. 2689, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
232. Id. at § 401.
233. See President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (July 8, 1970) https://www.epa.gov/tribal/president
-nixon-special-message-indian-affairs-july-8-1970.
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enactment and evolution of the Indian Self Determination and Education
Assistance Act (ISDEAA),234 which was first enacted in 1975 and
subsequently amended multiple times.235 The ISDEAA serves as the
backbone of federal self-determination policy through its promotion of
tribal authority and the transfer of programs and services intended to
benefit tribes from overarching federal domination and control to tribal
supervision and management.236 This policy approach has been wildly
successful, with tribes across the country taking on the responsibility for
previously federal programs, receiving funding to implement them, and
carrying them out according to tribal—not federal—priorities.237
To do so, the ISDEAA encourages federal agencies to negotiate
agreements with tribes pursuant to which the tribes can then assume those
responsibilities.238 While the process for doing so and agency recalcitrance
toward the transfer of federal programs to tribes has required further
congressional attention to fulfill the goals of the program,239 that attention
has resulted in broader avenues for tribes to pursue such agreements. The
1994 enactment of the Tribal Self-Governance Act (TSGA),240 for
example, authorized self-governance compacts in addition to selfdetermination contracts and provided federal agencies and tribes greater
flexibility to negotiate and address funding, ongoing agreements, and the
potential for tribes to redesign their delivery of services and reallocate
federal funding.241 Thus, whether through a more focused self234. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975).
235. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285, repealed by Tribal SelfGovernance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711; Tribal SelfGovernance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250; see generally Geoffrey
D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of SelfGovernance under the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, 39
AM. IND. L. REV. 1 (2015).
236. See 25 U.S.C. § 5302(b) (2018).
237. See, e.g., Strommer & Osborne, supra note 235, at 48–49
(documenting the rapid growth in tribal self-governance programs from 1991 to 2013).
238. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 5321.
239. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 235, at 30 (describing
congressional “outrage” over the implementation of the ISDEAA and the 1988
amendments).
240. Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250.
241. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5368; Strommer & Osborne, supra note 235,
at 37; Mary Ann King, Co-Management or Contracting? Agreements between Native
American Tribes and the U.S. National Park Service Pursuant to the 1994 Tribal SelfGovernance Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 475, 477–78 (2007); Brian Upton,
Returning to a Tribal Self-Governance Partnership at the National Bison Range
Complex: Historical, Legal, and Global Perspectives, 35 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L.
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determination contract or a broader self-governance compact, tribes can
pursue the authority to oversee and manage aspects of the federal
bureaucracy and, in doing so, expand the scope and capacity of their own
governance.
While the bulk of the focus and activity under the ISDEAA has
been on programs and services administered by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) and Indian Health Service (IHS) directly for the benefit of
tribes and their members, the TSGA broadened the potential for tribal
assumption of federal responsibilities beyond those tribally-specific
areas.242 Rather than only assuming responsibility for on-reservation social
or health services, the TSGA authorized compacts pursuant to which tribes
could take on non-BIA “programs, services, functions, and activities, or
portions thereof, administered by the Secretary of the Interior which are of
special geographic, historical, or cultural significance to the participating
Indian tribe requesting a compact.”243 The TSGA also required that the
Secretary of the Interior review which non-BIA programs may be
available for such assumption and report on them annually.244 Additional
legislation in 2018 enabled tribes to enter similar agreements with the
Department of Agriculture to carry out “demonstration projects” involving
the administration or management of certain national forest lands pursuant
to the Tribal Forest Protection Act (TFPA),245 although this latter authority
is limited to protecting tribal lands or forest lands “bordering or adjacent
to” lands under tribal jurisdiction.246
Thus, while the ISDEAA began with the goal of transferring
federal programs within the BIA and IHS to tribal control, the evolution
of the self-determination policy has expanded the reach of that objective
to open avenues for tribes to assume the responsibility for certain programs
across the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture. These agreements
may therefore provide an important bridge to expanded tribal comanagement of public lands administered by agencies within those
departments. As demonstrated by the few such agreements shown on the
REV. 52, 85–91 (2014).
242. Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250, §§ 204, 403(c); 25 U.S.C. §
5363(b)(2).
243. 25 U.S.C. § 5363(b)(2) and (c).
244. Id. § 5365(c); see List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Funding
Agreements Negotiated with Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other than
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Fiscal Year 2020 Programmatic Targets, 85 Fed.
Reg. 12,326 (March 2, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 List].
245. Enacted as part of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115-334, Title VIII, § 8703, 132 Stat. 4877 (Dec. 20, 2018) (codified as 25 U.S.C.
§ 3115b).
246. 25 U.S.C. § 3115a(b)(1)–(3).

108

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 44

most recent annual report of the Secretary of the Interior under the TSGA,
however, the utility of compacting as a means to tribal co-management
may be limited.247
H. Limitations of Self-Governance Compacting
As noted above, the continuing barriers to promoting tribal selfdetermination under the ISDEAA prompted repeated congressional efforts
to better implement those objectives. Agency reluctance or opposition to
tribal requests for self-determination contracts and self-governance
compacts were the primary motivator for many of these amendments,
although disputes over funding and other matters also required judicial
resolution.248 In addition to these more general conflicts over the
implementation and promotion of the self-determination policy, the use of
self-governance compacting in the context of tribal lands management
presents additional issues that further hinder its utility.
First, the TSGA distinguishes between the authority and
obligations of the Secretary of the Department of the Interior to compact
for non-BIA programs that are “otherwise available to Indian tribes or
Indians” and non-BIA programs that are not Indian focused.249 As one
commentator explains the import of this distinction:
Programs are “otherwise available,” in the Department’s
interpretation, if they would be eligible to contract under
Title I [of the ISDEAA]. This means that they must be
programs ‘for the benefit of Indians because of their status
as Indians’ under [that law]. Such programs must be
included in [TSGA] agreements upon tribal request.
Non-BIA programs that are not specifically targeted to
Indians may still be included in [TSGA] agreements under
the discretionary authority [authorized by the TSGA],
which allows inclusion of PFSAs ‘administered by the
Secretary of the Interior which are of special geographic,
historical, or cultural significance to the participating
247. 2020 List, at 12,326–27 (including two agreements with the BLM,
three with the NPS, and only one with USFWS).
248. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005).
Furthermore, with respect to the contracting authorities available to tribes under the
TFPA, there is “no specific authorization of funding or right to funding.” Strommer &
Osborne, supra note 235, at 71.
249. 25 U.S.C. § 5363(b)(1)(c).
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Indian tribe requesting a compact.’ These programs, while
benefiting a wider constituency than Indians alone, may
still be awarded on a non-competitive basis in a [TSGA]
agreement at the bureau’s discretion.250
This interpretation of the difference between mandatory and discretionary
compacting authority was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, which rejected a tribal effort to force the Bureau of
Reclamation to compact for the tribal assumption of non-BIA programs.251
The TSGA’s provisions therefore allow “non-BIA bureaus unchecked
discretion to deny tribal proposals,”252 which as one commentator has
noted in the context of public land management, allows for a myopic focus
on the objectives of public lands management without consideration of the
continuing evolution of the federal government’s policy to support tribal
self-determination.253
Similarly, the TSGA makes clear that although it expands the
window for tribes to assume previously federal authorities, it does not
authorize the Secretary to allow tribes to carry out “functions that are
inherently federal.”254 What constitutes an “inherently federal function” is,
however, a topic of uncertainty and one over which tribes and federal
agencies have and continue to debate.255 When considering the TSGA on
the floor of the Senate, the late Senator John McCain suggested a narrow
definition of such functions, particularly in light of prior agency
recalcitrance toward contracting with tribes.256 In a comprehensive
250.
251.

Strommer & Osborne, supra note 235, at 39 (citations omitted).
Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe v. Ryan, 415 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir.

2005).
252. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 235, at 40.
253. King, supra note 241, at 481.
254. 25 U.S.C. § 5363(k).
255. See, e.g., Tribal Self-Governance; Proposed Rule with Request for
Comments, 63 Fed. Reg. 7202, 7205 (Feb. 12, 1998) (explaining differing tribal and
federal views on inherently federal functions in the context of promulgating TSGA
regulations and concluding that decisions about what constitutes such a function “are
best made on a case-by-case basis during the government-to-government negotiation
process”); Monte Mills, Beyond a Zero-Sum Federal Trust Responsibility: Lessons
from Federal Indian Energy Policy, 6 AM. IND. L. J. 35, 68–69 (2017) (discussing
inherently federal functions in the context of the 2005 Energy Policy Act).
256. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, 140 CONG. REC.
S28833, S28835 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (Inherently federal functions not subject to
compacting under the TSGA are “Federal responsibilities vested by the Congress in
the Secretary which are determined by the Federal courts not to be delegable under
the constitution.”); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2021(12) (defining “inherently Federal
functions” for purposes of BIA education programs largely along administrative lines
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opinion issued in 1996, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior
reviewed the TSGA with respect to its limitations on the delegation of
certain functions to tribes and concluded that while the principles of
federal Indian law, including tribal sovereign authority and the unique
nature of the federal-tribal relationship, provide some general and helpful
guidance, the TSGA’s “inherently federal restriction can only be applied
on a case-by-case basis.”257 Nonetheless, the Solicitor noted that such
application must consider the extent of tribal sovereignty and
jurisdiction,258 the United States Supreme Court’s recognition that
delegation of federal authority to Indian tribes is not limited by the general
principles of the non-delegation doctrine,259 and that “close calls should
go in favor of inclusion [of programs for tribal control] rather than
exclusion.”260
Notwithstanding that guidance, the uncertainty and case-specific
nature of the “inherently federal function” limitation on TSGA
compacting combined with the broad discretion for non-BIA agencies to
deny tribal requests to compact can present significant barriers to the
TSGA (and its Department of Agriculture counterparts) as an effective
avenue for tribal co-management. In the context of the NPS, for example,
one commentator suggested that the agency has “narrowly construed the
TSGA [and] framed it within the NPS’s conventional tools for sharing
money and authority with non-tribal entities.”261 This reluctance to
delegate important responsibilities to a non-federal actor can best be
but also including the somewhat ambiguous “nondelegable statutory duties of the
Secretary relating to trust resources”).
257. Memorandum from John Leshy, Solicitor, DOI, to Assistant Secs. &
Bureau Heads, DOI, Inherently Federal Functions under the Tribal Self-Governance
Act, 14 (May 17, 1996) [hereinafter Leshy Memo].
258. Id. at 12.
259. Id. at 7–10, 12 (citing U.S. v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975)).
260. Id. at 13; see also Upton, supra note 241, at 94–99 (reviewing
background and development of the Leshy Memo). Recently, the Secretary of the
Interior ordered the development of more specific guidance regarding the
contractibility of programs (i.e., what functions are available and, therefore, not
inherently federal) for oil and gas development on Indian lands. Secretarial Order
3377, Contractibility of Federal Functions for Oil and Gas Development on Indian
Lands (Dec. 16, 2019). More recently, the Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Land
Management and the Offices of Self-Governance and Natural Resource Revenue
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, which includes a list of contractible and
inherently federal functions related to oil and gas development, in order to implement
and operationalize the Secretary’s order. Memorandum of Agreement Between Bureau
of Indian Affairs, Office of Self-Governance, Office of Natural Resources Revenue,
and Bureau of Land Management (Feb. 24, 2020) (on file with authors).
261. King, supra note 241, at 481.
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understood in light of the statutory mandates with which these agencies
are charged, all of which focus on the management and protection of
public lands as a national resource.262 However, a range of authorities
allow these agencies to privilege private and state interests with
management and control of the public lands estate and, from the very
beginning of that estate, the federal government has relied on its ability to
divest and capitalize on it.263
Even where federal agencies may be interested in considering
tribal proposals to assume management or other administrative functions
for lands with which they have a “special geographic, historical, or
cultural” connection, the federal agency’s failure to competently honor its
other legal obligations may frustrate that partnership.264 In the case of the
National Bison Range, for example, which was taken from the
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes (CSKT) and subsequently
managed by the USFWS as a National Wildlife Refuge,265 the agency’s
failure to conduct an adequate analysis of an agreement to delegate to the
Tribes the management of the Range resulted in the judicial invalidation
of that agreement.266 Similarly, NEPA likely requires any agency
considering such an action to obtain public input and consider alternatives
before making a final decision, procedural steps that may be viewed as
inconsistent with the federal government’s trust obligations to tribes, the
spirit of the TSGA, and may also subject the agency to further litigation.267
Finally, although the TSGA makes important strides toward tribal
self-determination, it remains a vehicle for the federal government to
delegate only limited authority to tribes, particularly in the context of
activities taking place on public lands. In other words, despite decades of
recalcitrance toward such delegations and the continuing attempts by
Congress to overcome these barriers, federal agencies remain largely in
the driver’s seat when it comes to authorizing broader tribal control over
federal activities on federal lands. This mostly unilateral framework can
severely limit the viability of self-determination contracting or selfgovernance compacting as a workable means of expanding tribal
authority.
262. See Public Lands section infra.
263. See, e.g., Ablavsky, supra note 19, at 680–82.
264. 25 U.S.C. § 5363(c) (2018).
265. See generally Upton, supra note 241.
266. Reed v. Salazar, 744 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D.D.C. 2010).
267. See, e.g., Notice: Fish and Wildlife Service and Council of
Athabascan Tribal Governments Sign Annual Funding Agreement, 69 Fed. Reg.
41,838, 41,839–44 (July 12, 2004) (addressing public comments in response to a
proposed TSGA compact).
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I. Contracting and Compacting as a Bridge to Tribal Co-Management
The ability of Indian tribes to seek, negotiate, and enter
agreements with the federal government to assume previously federal
programs, functions, services, and activities is a core component of the
current era of tribal self-determination. Through the assumption of a
variety of service programs, for example, tribes across the country have
begun serving and protecting their own communities, on their own terms,
without the disconnection and interference of federal oversight. These
contracting and compacting authorities are, therefore, critically important
avenues for building and enhancing tribal sovereignty and sovereign
capacity.
Relying on the success of self-determination contracting and selfgovernance compacting, the expansion of these concepts to federal
agencies managing public lands present important opportunities for
reshaping tribal co-management opportunities in the future. The TSGA,
TFPA, and 2018 amendments all represent steps toward these reforms and
if utilized as other self-determination and self-governance agreement
authorities have been used, could usher in broader tribal roles with a range
of federal land management agencies. Though contracting or compacting
may be more limited in scope with regard to the assumption by tribes of
off-reservation management responsibilities, the successful completion of
those tasks can help alleviate concerns over greater tribal authority over
public resources. Similarly, like their historical treaty antecedents,
contracts and compacts mark important bonds of government-togovernment agreement that secure and respect co-existing sovereign
authorities. And as with the history of self-determination contracting and
self-governance compacting, the federal government can ensure
appropriate tribal capacity, legitimacy, and oversight through those
agreements so as to avoid concerns over improper delegations of federal
authorities or the mismanagement of public resources.
The continuing evolution of contracting and compacting show the
promise of these avenues as bridges to a new era of expanded tribal comanagement; however, as demonstrated by the limited number of
agreements developed pursuant to the TSGA and TFPA, more time,
attention, and potential revisions are needed to enhance their effectiveness.
J. Recommendations for Reform & TSGA Compacting as
Implementation Mechanism for Tribal Co-Management
As with other existing approaches to tribal engagement, selfgovernance compacting could be improved through both executive and
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legislative actions aimed at encouraging greater balance between tribes
and federal public land management agencies. For example, with regard
to executive actions, broader incorporation and application of the
principles surrounding delegation of federal authorities to tribes analyzed
in the 1996 Solicitor’s Memorandum could help diminish agency concerns
over and reluctance to treat tribes as partners rather than contractors.
As described in detail below, the delegation of authority over
federal public lands from the federal government to states and even private
development interests is a well-established and long-accepted practice that
pervades nearly all aspects of public land and resources management.
While the legal basis for considering similar broad delegations to tribes is
rooted in the foundational principles of federal Indian law described earlier
and therefore entirely separate from the conflict over states’ rights and
privatization of these federal and public interests, that basis should
empower a greater recognition of the use of TSGA compacting as a means
to fulfill the federal policy to promote tribal self-determination. A
comprehensive executive branch review of these authorities, including
further clarification of what may constitute an inherently federal function
in the context of the trust relationship with Indian tribes would be an
important first step in that direction.
With regard to legislation, various recent efforts have sought
further amendments to the TSGA in order to expand tribal options for
compacting and decrease federal discretion over that process.268 An
important provision for further consideration would be the elimination of
the discretionary nature of compacting for non-BIA programs where there
exists a “special geographic, historical, or cultural” tribal connection and,
potentially, the development of additional options for tribes to pursue pilot
or demonstration projects in the management of federal public lands and
resources.269
K. The National Historic Preservation Act and Native American
Traditional Cultural Properties, Districts and Landscapes
A more purposeful and structured form of tribal consultation is
provided by the NHPA, which serves as the basic charter and method of

268. See Strommer & Osborne, supra note 235, at 61–63 (reviewing prior
proposals); Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act, S. 286, 114th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2015) https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/286/
text.
269. 25 U.S.C. § 5363(c); see, e.g., Indian Trust Asset Reform Act, Pub.
L. 114-78, 130 Stat. 432 (June 22, 2016).
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historic preservation in the United States.270 Section 106 of the NHPA
requires federal agencies with direct or indirect control over a “proposed
[f]ederal or federally assisted undertaking”271 to consider the effects of the
undertaking on historic and cultural properties and to consult with
interested parties as a way to “accommodate historic preservation concerns
with the needs of Federal undertakings.”272
A series of complicated procedural steps are required by the law
and its regulations, including a consultation process whereby agencies
consult “with any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization that
attaches religious and cultural significance” to a historic property that
would be affected by a proposed federal undertaking.273 “The goal of
consultation is to identify historic properties potentially affected by the
undertaking, assess its effects and seek ways to avoid, minimize or
mitigate any adverse effects on historic properties.”274
A unique aspect of tribal consultation per Section 106 is the role
played by the ACHP, an independent federal agency with statutorily
designated representation. The ACHP oversees the Section 106 process,
and participants within it “may seek advice, guidance and assistance from
the Council” regarding specific undertakings, including the resolution of
disagreements.275 As we return to in Part V of this article, the NHPA’s
creation of the ACHP is in itself an important development because it
divides decision-making responsibilities among more than one agency,
thus, providing a potential check or brake on those “action agencies”
proposing federal undertakings.276 As discussed below, although advisory
270. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (Oct. 15, 1966) (codified as 54
U.S.C. §§ 300301–307108 (2018)).
271. Id. § 306108.
272. 36 C.F.R. § 800.1(a) (2020).
273. 54 U.S.C. §§ 302706(b), 306108; see also 36 C.F.R. § 800.2 (Under
NHPA regulations, “[c]onsultation means the process of seeking, discussing, and
considering the views of other participants, and where feasible, seeking agreement
with them.”).
274. 36 C.F.R. § 800.1; see also 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)(1) (“An adverse
effect is found when an undertaking may alter, directly or indirectly, any of the
characteristics of a historic property that qualify the property for inclusion in the
National Register in a manner that would diminish the integrity of the property’s
location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, or association.
Consideration shall be given to all qualifying characteristics of a historic property,
including those that may have been identified subsequent to the original evaluation of
the property’s eligibility for the National Register.”).
275. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2.
276. See Michael C. Blumm & Andrea Lang, Shared Sovereignty: The
Role of Expert Agencies in Environmental Law, 42 ECOLOGY L. Q. 608 (2015)
(assessing those environmental laws that divide decision-making authority among
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in nature, the ACHP’s potential to influence agency decision making, both
substantively and procedurally, is a significant one.
The 1992 Amendments to the NHPA clarified that “traditional
cultural properties” (TCP) could be eligible for listing in the National
Register of Historic Places,277 which is an official list administered by the
NPS and intended to serve as a planning tool “to be used by [f]ederal,
[s]tate, and local governments, private groups and citizens to identify the
Nation’s cultural resources and to indicate what properties should be
considered for protection from destruction or impairment.”278 There is a
designated “Keeper” of the National Register of Historic Places—a NPS
official with the authority to officially designate properties as eligible for
inclusion in the National Register.279
A TCP is defined as a property “eligible for inclusion in the
National Register because of its association with cultural practices or
beliefs of a living community that (a) are rooted in that community’s
history, and (b) are important in maintaining the continuing cultural
identity of the community.”280 Another type of TCP covered by the NHPA
is a traditional cultural district (TCD), which constitutes a “concentration,
linkage or continuity” of properties.281 Outside of the regulatory and legal
context, these terms are often used interchangeably, but they are
essentially viewed as a way to move beyond the protection of discrete
sites, such as a National Historic Landmark,282 and towards the protection
more than one agency, such as the NEPA, NHPA, ESA, CWA and the Federal Power
Act).
277. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-575, 106 Stat. 4753, 4757 (codified as 54 U.S.C. § 302706(b)).
278. 36 C.F.R. § 60.2 (2020).
279. 30 C.F.R. § 60.3(f) (2020).
280. National Park Service, Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting
Traditional Cultural Properties 1 (1990, rev. 1992, 1998) https://www.nps.gov/
subjects/nationalregister/upload/NRB38-Completeweb.pdf (An example is “a
location where Native American religious practitioners have historically gone, and are
known or thought to go today, to perform ceremonial activities in accordance with
traditional cultural rules of practice.”) [hereinafter National Register Bulletin 38].
281. Id. at 11.
282. Section 110 of the NHPA provides more protection to National
Historic Landmarks than is provided in Section 106: “Prior to the approval of any
Federal undertaking that may directly and adversely affect any National Historic
Landmark, the head of the responsible Federal agency shall to the maximum extent
possible undertake such planning and actions as may be necessary to minimize harm
to the landmark. The head of the Federal agency shall afford the Council a reasonable
opportunity to comment with regard to the undertaking.” 54 U.S.C. § 306107; see e.g.,
Wyoming Sawmills v. U.S. Forest Serv., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Wyo. 2001), aff’d,
383 F. 3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2004) (focused on protection of the Bighorn Medicine
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of “Native American Traditional Cultural Landscapes” which are “large
scale properties . . . often comprised of multiple, linked features that form
a cohesive landscape.”283
Another 1992 Amendment to the NHPA authorized tribes, upon
meeting specified standards, to assume the responsibilities of the State
Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO), who plays an important role in
administering the NHPA.284 The Amendment established the position of a
Tribal Historic Preservation Officer (THPO) that has different duties and
authorities on and off tribal lands. If a proposed undertaking’s “area of
potential effect” (APE) is on federal public land the THPO “may serve as
the official representative designated by his/her tribe to represent its
interests as a consulting party in Section 106 consultation.”285
Of particular relevance to tribal co-management is the NHPA’s
multi-layered dispute resolution framework, which is applied at multiple
decision points, including the identification of traditional properties and
the assessment of adverse effects to those properties. In resolving the
latter, the THPO (or SHPO) can disagree with a finding of no adverse
effects and formally consult with the parties to resolve the disagreement
or to request the engagement of the ACHP.286 A more substantive form of
consultation is called for at this stage, with the requirement being that
agency officials “should seek the concurrence of any Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization that has made known to the agency official that it
attaches religious and cultural significance to a historic property subject to
the finding.”287 Here, again, the ACHP may be requested to review the
finding of no adverse effects, and the resolution of the disagreement may
happen through continuing consultation or the preparation of a
“programmatic agreement[,]” which documents “the terms and conditions
agreed upon to resolve the potential adverse effects of a Federal agency
program, complex undertaking or other situations.”288 Finally, there is a
Wheel in Wyoming’s Bighorn National Forest).
283. Native American Traditional Cultural Landscapes Action Plan,
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION (Nov. 23, 2011), https://www.achp.
gov/sites/default/files/guidance/2018-06/NativeAmericanTCLActionPlanNovember
232011.pdf (internal quotations omitted) (The Action Plan was part of a “Native
American traditional cultural landscapes initiative” began by the ACHP in 2011.).
284. 54 U.S.C. § 302702.
285. Role of the Tribal Historic Preservation Officer in the Section 106
Process, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION (Nov. 2, 2013), https://
www.achp.gov/digital-library-section-106-landing/role-tribal-historic-preservation
-officer-section-106-process.
286. 36 C.F.R. § 800.5 (2020).
287. Id. § 800.5(C).
288. Id. § 800.6; § 800.16(t).
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process regarding a failure to resolve adverse effects, leading to a
termination of consultation and engagement of the ACHP.289
L. Section 106 in Practice
What does all of this mean in practice? The NHPA is a procedural
statute affording federal agencies considerable discretion in how
rigorously it is applied to the protection of sacred places and cultural
resources on public lands. Section 106 encourages but does not mandate
preservation.290 As shown below, the consultation process required by
section 106 provides an important opportunity for tribal participation in
federal agency decision making.291 After all, forcing agencies to consider
whether their undertakings will adversely affect cultural properties and
whether the actions can be avoided, minimized and mitigated is better than
no consideration at all. For the same reasons that NEPA is so crucial to
environmental protection, the precautionary “stop, look, and listen”292
nature of the NHPA can provide important time, space and leverage to find
possible alternative courses of actions. Furthermore, in comparison to the
executive orders on tribal consultation, Section 106 provides a statutorily
based right to consultation, though circuit courts are mixed as to whether
it also provides a stand-alone and enforceable right of action against the
federal government.293
As we discuss below, there are elements of the Section 106
framework that could be used to inform, and possibly bridge, variations of
tribal co-management in the future. Several features of Section 106—the
structured and statutorily based version of tribal consultation, the principle
289. Id. § 800.7.
290. Protecting Historic Properties: A Citizen’s Guide to Section 106
Review, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, pg. 4 (2017)
https://www.achp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017-01/CitizenGuide.pdf.
291. See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee, Historic Storytelling and the Growth of
Tribal Historic Preservation Programs, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T (2002–2003) at 86,
88 (reviewing NHPA’s consultation framework as “the right to have a seat at the table,
a chance to persuade the responsible federal official to do the right thing”).
292. Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 906 (9th
Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
293. Compare San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 417 F.3d 1091
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that NHPA claims must be pursued under the APA), with
Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1017 (3d Cir. 1991) (recognizing a cause
of action under the NHPA); see also Melinda Harm Benson, Enforcing Traditional
Cultural Property Protections, 7 HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 60, 66–67 (2014); Amanda M.
Marincic, The National Historic Preservation Act: An Inadequate Attempt to Protect
the Cultural and Religious Sites of Native Nation, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1777, 1792–94
(2018).
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of concurrence in resolving disputes, the important role of THPOs in the
administration of the NHPA, and the exogenous roles played by the ACHP
and the “Keeper” of the National Register that serve as a check on action
agency discretion—could be replicated or modified in future place-based
or system-wide legislation focused on tribal co-management.
Notwithstanding the benefits and potential of section 106 process,
all too often federal agencies view those steps as a procedural obstacle to
overcome, or as a bureaucratic check-mark on the way to making decisions
that will move forward regardless of the findings and analysis required by
Section 106 consultation. Part of the problem stems from how much public
land has yet to even be inventoried for cultural resources.294 Cultural
resource and heritage programs within the BLM and USFS are also
chronically underfunded and deprioritized within the agencies, especially
when competing with revenue-generating activities like oil and gas
leasing.295
Some of the most well-known disputes regarding tribal sacred
lands and cultural resources have an associated Section 106 NHPA claim.
And with few exceptions,296 tribes were unsuccessful in using the law and
its consultation procedures as a stand-alone way to protect sacred sites and
traditional cultural properties.297 The prominent cases—Standing Rock
Sioux v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (Dakota Access
Pipeline),298 Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service (use of
wastewater for snowmaking at Arizona Snowbowl),299 Hoonah Indian
Association v. Morrison (timber sales on the Tongass National Forest),300
294. See T. Destry Jarvis, National Trust For Historic Preservation,
Cultural Resources On The Bureau Of Land Management Public Lands: An
Assessment And Needs Analysis, May 2006, at 6 (finding roughly six percent of BLM
lands surveyed for cultural resources); see also T. Destry Jarvis, National Trust For
Historic Preservation, The National Forest System: Cultural Resources At Risk: An
Assessment And Needs Analysis, May 2008 (finding 80 percent of USFS lands not
surveyed for cultural resources).
295. See T. Destry Jarvis, National Trust For Historic Preservation,
Cultural Resources On The Bureau Of Land Management Public Lands: An
Assessment And Needs Analysis, May 2006, at 6.
296. See e.g., Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 21 F.3d 895 (9th Cir.
1994); Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 755
F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
297. See generally Jess Phelps, The National Historic Preservation Act at
Fifty: Surveying the Forest Service Experience, 47 ENVTL. L. 471 (2017) (reviewing
NHPA litigation trends on NFS lands).
298. 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2016).
299. 479 F. 3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007); on reh’g en banc, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th
Cir. 2008).
300. 170 F. 3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1999).
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and Apache Survival Coalition v. United States (construction of Mount
Graham International Observatory on the Coronado National Forest)301—
make clear the discretionary and procedural nature of the law. And more
contemporary cases—such as the lack of any meaningful consultation
pertaining to oil and gas development adjacent to the Chaco Canyon region
of the Southwest,302 and the acknowledged destruction of a TCP in the Oak
Flat area on the Tonto National Forest that was exchanged with a foreignowned mining corporation303—show a continuation of this trend.
M. Case Study: The Badger-Two Medicine
The Badger-Two Medicine story demonstrates the evolution,
variability and limitations of the NHPA, but also the law’s potential to
serve as a possible bridge to co-management in the future.304 This section
301. Apache Survival Coal. v. United States, 118 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 1997)
[hereinafter Apache Survival II].
302. See, e.g., Uncited Preliminary Brief (Deferred Appendix Appeal) of
Amici Curiae All Pueblo Council of Governors and National Trust for Historic
Preservation, in Support of Appellants, Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v.
Zinke, Civ. No. 18-2089 (10th Cir. filed Sept. 7, 2018) (describing BLM NHPA
violations in failing to consult with Pueblo tribal governments when considering
applications for permits to drill and how they would potentially affect traditional
cultural properties in the area).
303. The Oak Flat area was listed on the National Register of Historic
Places as an Apache TCP in 2016. Within its boundaries include 38 archeological sites
and several additional sacred places, springs and other significant locations. Section
3003 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck” McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a mandatory land exchange and
transfer of the Oak Flat area to Resolution Copper. Though the Act limits the USFS’s
discretion over the transfer, and its ability to address Tribal concerns, an
environmental impact statement still had to be prepared. The Draft EIS makes clear
that “[c]onstruction and operation of the mine would profoundly and permanently
alter” the Oak Flat TCP, potentially including human burials. It also includes a section
on mitigation of adverse effects, including “data recovery” and curation strategies.
Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Resolution Copper Project and Land
Exchange, U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC. (Aug. 2019) https://www.resolutionmineeis.us/
documents/draft-eis.
304. See generally Kathryn Sears Ore, Form and Substance: The National
Historic Preservation Act, Badger-Two Medicine, and Meaningful Consultation, 38
PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 205, 240 (2017) (telling the story of how it “took
the Forest Service and the Blackfeet more than three decades to organically achieve a
common understanding of meaningful consultation”); Martin Nie, The Use of CoManagement and Protected Land-Use Designations to Protect Tribal Cultural
Resources and Reserved Treaty Rights on Federal Lands 48 NAT. RESOURCES J., 585
(2008) (providing an overview of the Badger-Two Medicine and how tribal comanagement and a protected land use designation could be applied in the future).
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provides a very broad and incomplete snapshot of the story with a more
technical focus on how a TCD designation for the Badger-Two Medicine
is being leveraged to find more cooperative management and substantive
protections for the area.
The Badger-Two Medicine area of western Montana is bounded
by Glacier National Park to its north, the Bob Marshall and Great Bear
Wilderness areas to its south and west, and the Blackfeet Indian
Reservation to its east. Most of the Badger-Two Medicine area is
designated roadless and it is a stronghold for several species of fish and
wildlife that are no longer found or diminished elsewhere.305 It is part of
an international landscape referenced as the “Crown of the Continent,”
with the Badger-Two Medicine found at the northern edge of the Rocky
Mountain Front, where the Great Plains meet the Rocky Mountains.
This larger geographic area was historically governed through a
succession of agreements between the Blackfeet Nation (Blackfeet) and
the federal government. Most important, for purposes here, is the
Blackfeet Agreement of 1895 (ratified in 1896), in which the Blackfeet
reserved use rights on roughly 400,000 acres of ceded lands for
$1,500,000.306 Most of this ceded land is now part of Glacier National
Park, with the remaining roughly 130,000 acres in the Helena-Lewis and
Clark National Forest. The Blackfeet have used and inhabited the BadgerTwo Medicine since time immemorial, and the area is critical to the “oral
history, creation stories, and ceremonies of the Blackfeet people, as well
as an important plant gathering, hunting, fishing and timbering site which
continues to be vital to the religious, cultural and subsistence survival of
the Blackfoot people.”307
The most significant set of threats facing the Badger-Two Medicine
stem from fifty-one oil and gas leases issued in the area and adjacent lands
305. See John Weaver, Vital Lands, Sacred Lands: Innovative
Conservation of Wildlife and Cultural Values, Badger-Two Medicine Area, Montana
(Wildlife Conservation Society, Working Paper No. 44, 2015).
306. Agreement with the Indians of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in
Montana, 29 Stat. 353, 354 (1896) (“Provided, that said Indians shall have, and do
hereby reserve to themselves, the right to go upon any portion of the lands hereby
conveyed so long as the same shall remain public lands of the United States, and to
cut and remove therefrom wood and timber for agency and school purposes, and for
their personal uses for houses, fences, and all other domestic purposes: And provided
further, That the said Indians hereby reserve and retain the right to hunt upon said
lands and to fish in the streams thereof so long as the same shall remain public lands
of the United States under and in accordance with the provisions of the game and fish
laws of the State of Montana.” (emphasis in original)).
307. Proclamation of the Blackfoot Confederacy, Badger-Two Medicine
(2004) (on file with author).
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in 1982.308 These parcels were not inventoried for cultural resources by the
USFS, and the “USFS and BLM failed to fully consider the effects of
leasing, including all phases of oil and gas activities on cultural resources,
including religious values and activities, within the Badger-Two Medicine
area.”309 No environmental analysis was conducted prior to lease issuance,
let alone consideration of how these leases would impact the Blackfeet’s
reserved rights. Nor did the USFS comply with NHPA (or the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act) tribal consultation procedures before issuing
the leases, mistakenly asserting that compliance would take place after lease
issuance and “at the time soil disturbing activities are proposed.”310
Multiple objections and protests to these controversial leases were
immediate and applications for permits to drill in the area were temporarily
suspended by the Department of the Interior.311 While this was playing
out, the USFS’s Land and Resources Management Plan (Forest Plan) in
effect at the time provided no direction or restrictions specific to the
Badger-Two Medicine. Several provisions used in the 1986 Forest Plan
are indicative of the type of post-hoc “consultation” used by federal
agencies at the time of the Forest Plan’s preparation. For example, one
provision requires the Blackfeet to be “notified” of all exploration drilling
and development proposals with its Treaty lands and that this was
sufficient to comply with the AIRFA.312 Another requires that “any
decision respecting 1895 Agreement lands will be made only after
informing the Blackfeet Tribe.”313
The USFS failed to protect the Badger-Two Medicine in the
1980s, and using its forest planning process opened the door to yet another
threat, this one posed by a lack of travel management and increasing
motorized use of the area. The Blackfeet saw “the proliferation of
motorized use . . . as an increasing trend with commensurate cumulative
effects to the cultural landscape and a threat to the continuance of
traditional practices and associated cultural lifeways.”314
308. See generally U.S. Forest Service, Environmental Assessment: Oil
and Gas Leasing, Nonwilderness Lands, 61 (1981).
309. Letter from Aden L. Seidlitz, Acting State Dir. BLM Mont. Dakotas
Office, to Solenex LLC, Letter re Cancellation of Federal Oil and Gas Lease
MTM53323 7 (Mar. 17, 2016), available as attachment in Solenex LLC v. Jewell, 156
F. Supp. 3d 83 (D.D.C. 2016) [hereinafter Interior Cancellation Letter].
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan, U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., 2–57
(1986) https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5409083.pdf
[hereinafter Forest Plan].
313. Id. at 2–60.
314. Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Rocky Mountain Ranger
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The threats posed to the Badger-Two Medicine, and the processes
used to address them, invariably placed the Blackfeet in a reactive and
defensive position, forcing the Blackfeet and their conservation allies to
expend time and resources fighting proposals that they had no role in
developing. Yet, the 1992 Amendments to the NHPA provided the
Blackfeet an important tool that could be used in a more pro-active and
synergistic fashion. As discussed above, the Amendments broadened the
type of properties possibly covered by the NHPA (to include TCP and
TCD designations), and secondly, they authorized tribes to assume
functions of state historic preservation officers.
Ethnographic, archeological, and other studies of the cultural
significance of the Badger-Two Medicine resulted in the designation of
89,376 acres as a TCD in 2002. Shortly thereafter, the Blackfeet THPO
initiated several collaborative projects to complete the ethnographic
studies of the area.315 This collective work led to the boundaries of the
Badger-Two Medicine TCD being expanded to 165,588 acres in 2014. The
“Keeper” of the National Register’s Determination again recognized “the
remote wilderness” of the Badger-Two Medicine but provided “a more
holistic and inclusive view” of the region than what was provided in 2002,
recognizing how it is seen “as an interconnected traditional landscape,” “a
place of extreme power,” and “a significant region of refuge” for many
tribal members.316
Designation of the Badger-Two Medicine TCD has proven
advantageous in several ways. First, the historic and cultural studies done
pursuant to the NHPA provided the BLM one important rationale to

District Travel Management Plan, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 98 (June 2005).
315. See Blackfeet Tribal Historic Preservation Office, Blackfeet Tribal
Business Council, Badger-Two Medicine Traditional Cultural District, Helena-Lewis
And Clark National Forest, Montana: Proposal To Establish Permanent Protections
(Dec. 5, 2017), at 26–28 (providing a detailed assessment of these studies and how
they were funded and organized to recognize tribal sovereignty) [hereinafter Proposal
To Establish Permanent Protections]. These studies include the influential
collaborations between the Blackfeet THPO John Murray, Blackfeet Community
College and research anthropologist Maria Nieves Zedeño at the University of
Arizona. See e.g., Maria Nieves Zedeño, Principal Investigator, Badger-Two Medicine
Traditional Cultural District, Montana: Boundary Adjustment Study, Final Report 89
(Mar. 10, 2006); see also Maria Nieves Zedeño, Blackfeet Landscape Knowledge and
the Badger-Two Medicine Traditional Cultural District, The SAA Archeological
Record (Mar. 2007).
316. National Park Service, Determination of Eligibility Notification:
Badger-Two Medicine Traditional Cultural District (Boundary Increase) (2014) (on
file with authors).
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reauthorize temporary suspensions of oil and gas leases in the area.317
Second, it allowed the USFS to recommend to Interior a federal mining
withdrawal that happened administratively in 2001,318 and then by
Congress in 2006.319 These moves, and others, provided the Blackfeet and
conservationists important time to find more durable solutions to the costly
leasing mistake of 1982.
These studies had an educative function as well, clearly
articulating to federal agencies and political decision makers the deep
history and webs connecting the Blackfeet to the Badger-Two Medicine.
In some respects, the law, regulations and policies governing TCD
eligibility made the federal agency’s recognition of such values more
official and legitimate; or, at least safer for bureaucrats to reference. In
combination with Blackfeet Treaty rights, these studies and the TCD
designation provided an important basis to find legislative solutions for
the area. An important moment came in 2006, with passage of a law
providing tax incentives for existing leaseholders to transfer their oil and
gas leases to the federal government or qualifying non-profit conservation
organizations.320 As a result of this legislation, twenty-nine leaseholders
relinquished their leases in the Badger-Two Medicine. The TCD, and the
ethnographic studies and NHPA Section 106 consultation process done as
part thereof, factored into the USFS’s decision in 2009 to restrict
motorized use and prohibit snowmobiles in the Badger-Two Medicine,321
a decision that withstood a legal challenge asserting that protection of the
TCD was an unconstitutional advancement of “Native American
religion.”322
The last oil and gas lease to remain in the Badger-Two Medicine
was acquired by the company Solenex in 2004, in the midst of this
administrative and legal turmoil, and two years after the initial BadgerTwo Medicine TCD designation. The NHPA Section 106 process played
a prominent role in Interior’s decision to ultimately cancel the lease in
2016, recognizing that it was improperly issued and did not comport with
“Congress’ express intent to protect this culturally significant area” and
the “Executive Branch’s long standing commitment to protect Indian
317. Interior Cancellation Letter, supra note 309, at 4.
318. Public Land Order No. 7480.
319. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, § 403, 120
Stat. 3050 (2006).
320. Id. at 3050–53.
321. Lewis and Clark National Forest, Rocky Mountain Ranger District
Travel Management Plan: Record of Decision for Badger-Two Medicine, U.S. Forest
Service, 11 (2009).
322. Fortune v. Thompson, No. CV-09-98, 2011 WL 206164 (D. Mont.
2011).
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sacred sites and ensure that adequate and meaningful consultation occurs
when federal land management decisions have significant impacts on
tribal religious and cultural practices.”323
In making this decision, Interior relied upon the ACHP’s
recommendation that the Departments of Agriculture and Interior revoke
Solenex’s suspended permit to drill, cancel the lease, and ensure that future
mineral development does not occur in the area.324 The ACHP stated, “the
Solenex exploratory well along with the reasonably foreseeable full field
development would be so damaging to the [TCD] that the Blackfeet
Tribe’s ability to practice their religious and cultural traditions in this area
as part of their community life and development would be lost.”325 The
ACHP concluded the Badger-Two Medicine is “of premier importance to
the Blackfeet Tribe in sustaining its religious and cultural traditions,” “the
TCD retains integrity and is a landscape virtually unmarred by modern
development and intrusions,” and “the public at large is overwhelmingly
in support of the preservation of the TCD.”326 For these and other reasons,
the ACHP found that “no mitigation measures would achieve an
acceptable balance between historic preservation concerns and the
undertaking.”327
The ACHP’s involvement in this case was itself a turning point,
providing a panel of council members the opportunity to visit the region
and hear the most compelling testimony of what the Badger-Two
Medicine means to Indians and non-Indians alike. The meeting began with
an unexpected powerful ceremony, a set of songs and blessing by the
Crazy Dog Society, a Blackfeet traditional group whose presence made
clear to the panel the power of this place and how far the Blackfeet will go
to defend it. The meeting was bookended by Earthjustice Attorney Tim
Preso, who has worked for years with the Tribe, telling members of the
Council:
You’ve come here to an amazing place. I know your
hearings are rare, but this one must be especially rare
323. Letter from Aden L. Seidlitz, Acting State Dir. BLM Mont. Dakotas
Office, to Solenex LLC, Letter re Cancellation of Federal Oil and Gas Lease
MTM53323 7 (Mar. 17, 2016), available as attachment in Solenex LLC v. Jewell, 156
F. Supp. 3d 83 (D.D.C. 2016).
324. Comments of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
Regarding the Release from Suspension of the Permit to Drill by Solenex LLC In Lewis
And Clark National Forest, Montana, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 7
(Sept. 21, 2015) [hereinafter ACHP Comments on Solenex].
325. Id.
326. Id. at 4–5.
327. Id. at 7.
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because you sit on the edge of one our country’s last great
undeveloped spaces; a tract of largely undeveloped public
land stretching from the Canadian border to McDonald
Pass, that contains almost all of its native fauna intact.
And, as the events we’ve already seen today demonstrate,
is the home not only to historical, but a living cultural
overlay that is extremely rare in our world today. And this
whole undeveloped space is an increasingly rare
commodity in our crowded and developed world.328
The Section 106 process provided an official and structured platform to
share these powerful stories.
The decision to cancel the lease was challenged by Solenex, and
the D.C. District Court ruled in its favor holding that the amount of time
that had elapsed between the lease’s issuance and its cancellation in 2016
violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).329 That decision was
vacated by the D.C. Circuit Court in 2020, with much of the opinion
centered on the TCD and the lack of sufficient NHPA analysis.330 Drawing
on the values and attributes so clearly described in the TCD
determinations, the D.C. Circuit Court began its opinion with a vivid
description of the Badger-Two Medicine and the meaning it holds in
Blackfeet creation before moving into the intricacies of administrative and
oil and gas law.
There is no neat and tidy way to measure the impact of the BadgerTwo Medicine TCD. The designation was most often used and leveraged
in concert with other laws and processes, and assessing the effects of
procedural-based laws, like NHPA’s Section 106 and NEPA, is
particularly difficult. Based on previous Section 106 case law, it is easy to
imagine how differently things could have gone along the way. A common
NHPA mitigation measure proposed, for example, is “data recovery,”331
curation, or to simply document the property being destroyed by the
federal agency, such as a proposal to map and photograph culturally
significant land that was being exchanged between the USFS and
Weyerhaeuser timber corporation.332 Previous mitigation measures
328. Speakers at Choteau Meeting Overwhelmingly Oppose Badger-Two
Medicine Drilling (Montana Public Radio broadcast Sept. 3, 2015).
329. Solenex LLC v. Jewell, 334 F. Supp. 3d 174, 177 (D.D.C. 2018).
330. Solenex LLC v. Bernhardt, 962 F.3d 520, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
331. For a recent example, see USDA Forest Service, Draft Environmental
Impact Statement: Resolution Copper Project and Land Exchange (2019), 638
(reviewing mitigation strategies for the Oak Flat TCP on the Tonto National Forest).
332. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 177 F. 3d 800 (9th
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offered for the Badger-Two Medicine in 1991 and 1993 included the
requirement that Fina (Solenex’s predecessor), prior to any construction
activity, provide the Blackfeet and USFS a schedule of when oil and gas
leasing work was to be performed; another provided the option of using a
gravel pad to protect a discovered archeological site.333 These, and other
mitigation scenarios, could have easily placed the Badger-Two Medicine
on a different trajectory.
But in this case, the TCD has been unmistakably impactful. With
vision and leadership by the Blackfeet THPO, the TCD—and the
ethnographic work that went into it—changed the narrative and created a
new way of thinking and talking about the Badger-Two Medicine and the
Blackfeet’s role in safeguarding it. Based on the work of the THPO, the
TCD was then successfully leveraged by the conservation allies working
with the Blackfeet to painstakingly undo the fifty-one leases, one-by-one,
over the course of nearly forty years.
The problem remaining is that the TCD and the Section 106
processes are still procedural, and thus did not provide the Badger-Two
Medicine substantive and enforceable protections, nor did it provide the
Blackfeet a more pro-active and pre-decisional role in its management.
The next section describes how public lands planning could potentially
serve as a bridge in that regard, fully integrating the TCD and tribal
consultation into the development and implementation of a national forest
plan. The focus will remain on the Badger-Two Medicine, and therefore
national forest planning, but the principles and strategy could be modified
and replicated in plans prepared by the BLM, NPS and USFWS.
N. Public Lands Planning as Bridge to Tribal Co-Management
For better or worse, planning is a core principle in federal public
land law, and most decisions and activities taking place on a piece of
public land must be consistent with the governing land use plans. Plans are
the vehicle for taking broad statutory mandates and more detailed
regulations and applying them to particular places. Planning is particularly
important on lands managed by the USFS and BLM because it is at the
plan level where their broad multiple use missions are operationalized and
given meaning on the ground.
The NFMA of 1976 requires the preparation of land and resource
management plans for every national forest and grassland in the National
Forest System (NFS). In 2012, new planning regulations (2012 Planning
Cir. 1999).
333.

ACHP Comments on Solenex, supra note 324, at 2–3.
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Rule) written pursuant to NFMA were promulgated by the Obama
Administration and dozens of national forests across the country are now
in the process of revising plans using this planning rule.334 These
regulations include tribal provisions that are premised on the USFS’s trust
responsibility, its consultation duties, the unique government-togovernment relationship between the federal government and tribes, and
the agency’s obligation to protect treaty and reserved rights.335 New to the
2012 Planning Rule are provisions related to the management of “areas of
tribal importance,”336 and the use of “native knowledge.”337 The 2012
Planning Rule also requires consultation with federally recognized tribes
and encourages them to seek “cooperating agency status.”338
The Blackfeet THPO engaged in the Forest Plan revision for the
Helena-Lewis and Clark National Forest understanding the implications
for the Badger-Two Medicine. John Murray and Kendall Edmo of the
THPO and the Bolle Center for People and Forests collaborated in drafting
and submitting to the USFS a set of recommended plan components that
would provide substantive protections for the Badger-Two Medicine
TCD, secure Blackfeet treaty rights, and advance the objective of comanagement. The revision process also provided an important opportunity
to incorporate into the new Forest Plan the significant changes and policy
developments happening since the original plan was prepared in 1986,339
including the TCD designations and executive orders pertaining to sacred
sites E.O. 13007, 1996 and consultation and coordination with tribal
governments E.O. 13175.
The focus on plan components is because of the 2012 Rule’s
consistency provision: “Every project and activity must be consistent with
the applicable plan components.”340 They are at the heart of forest
planning, and if there were to be any meaningful changes to the BadgerTwo Medicine they would be found in the plan components applied to the
area. Each revised Forest Plan must include a set of plan components
consisting of: (1) desired conditions; (2) objectives; (3) standards; (4)
334. See generally Susan Jane M. Brown & Martin Nie, Making Forest
Planning Great Again? Early Implementation of the Forest Service’s 2012 National
Forest Planning Rule, 33 NAT. RESOURCES. & ENV’T 1 (2019) (providing an overview
of the Rule and its early implementation).
335. 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(a)(2) (2020).
336. Id. § 219.10(b)(1).
337. Id. § 219.19.
338. Id. § 219.4.
339. Id. § 219.7 (as per the 2012 Planning Rule, these developments
should have informed the “Plan Assessment” and the “need to change” the existing
plan and the subsequent development of plan components.).
340. Id. § 219.15.
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guidelines; and (5) suitability of lands (required for timber production,
optional for other multiple uses or activities). When properly integrated,
these components establish the vision of a plan, set forth the strategy to
achieve it, and provide the constraints of subsequent management.
Components can be applied across a national forest or to specific
management or geographic areas designated in a plan, such as prohibiting
types of activities that are incompatible in areas of tribal importance,
protecting cultural resources and treaty-based habitat, and provisions
related to traditional access, among others.
The “desired conditions” stated in a forest plan are particularly
important to tribal co-management because they hold the potential of
federal agencies working with tribes in a more pro-active and predecisional manner—a way to break the pattern of consulting with tribes
after the die is cast. There is a problematic tendency to write desired
condition statements in a vague and discretionary fashion, though the 2012
Planning Rule and its planning directives make clear that they “must be
described in terms that are specific enough to allow progress toward their
achievement to be determined.”341
The 2020 Land Management Plan for the Helena-Lewis and Clark
National Forest provides a set of plan components for the Badger-Two
Medicine “emphasis area.” They are built on the explicit recognition of
the TCD and Blackfeet treaty rights reserved in the area. As provided in
the 2012 Planning Rule and Directives, desired conditions are to “drive
the development of the other plan components”342 and can include
“[s]ocial relationships, traditions, culture, and activities that connect
people to the plan area.”343 One of the desired conditions in the 2020 Land
Management Plan copies the language and endorses the vision provided
by the Blackfeet THPO:
[The] Badger Two Medicine is a sacred land, a cultural
touchstone, a repository of heritage, a living cultural
landscape, a refuge, a hunting ground, a critical
ecosystem, a habitat linkage between protected lands, a
wildlife sanctuary, a place of solitude, a refuge for wild
nature, and an important part of both tribal and non-tribal
community values. It is important to the people who rely

341.
342
343.

Id. § 219.7(e)(1)(i).
Forest Service Handbook 1902.12, 22.11(2015) [hereinafter FSH].
Id. at 1909.12, 12.20.
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upon it, critical to the wild nature that depends upon it,
and has an inherent value and power of its own.344
This powerful desired conditions statement is a positive development even
though the USFS could go further to integrate the values and attributes of
the TCD (as documented in the National Register Determinations and the
ethnographic studies that informed them) into specific desired conditions.
Standards in forest planning are particularly important because
they serve as “a mandatory constraint on project and activity decisionmaking”345 and are generally viewed by the courts as non-discretionary
and enforceable.346 Two standards are currently included in the HelenaLewis and Clark Plan for the Badger-Two Medicine:
(1) Management activities in the Badger Two Medicine
shall be conducted in close consultation with the
Blackfeet Nation to fulfill treaty obligations, and the
federal Indian trust responsibility. Project and activity
authorizations shall be protected and honor Blackfeet
reserved rights and sacred land. The uses of this area must
be compatible with desired conditions and compatibility
shall be determined through government to government
consultation.347
(2) Management activities shall accommodate Blackfeet
tribal member access to the Badger Two Medicine for the
exercise of reserved treaty rights, and enhance
opportunities for tribal members to practice spiritual,
ceremonial, and cultural activities.348
The second standard is not unusual and is essentially a restatement of
existing rights and access or accommodation policy. However, the first
standard is far more substantive, and will provide the Blackfeet a more
powerful role in ensuring that uses of the area are compatible with desired
conditions, and that these compatibility determinations will happen

344. U.S. Forest Service, 2020 Land Management Plan: Helena-Lewis and
Clark National Forest, 183 (May 2020) [hereinafter HLC 2020 Forest Plan].
345. Id. § 219.7(e)(1)(iii).
346. See Martin Nie & Emily Schembra, The Important Role of Standards
in National Forest Planning, Law, and Management, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 281
(2014).
347. HLC 2020 Forest Plan, supra note 344, at 183.
348. Id. at 184.
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through government-to-government consultation. Our view of this
standard is that it ties the procedural nature of tribal consultation to a more
substantive result and discrete decision point, which is determining
compatibility with the desired conditions.
One of the standards removed by the USFS between draft and final
plan was focused specifically on the TCD:
Management activities within the Badger Two Medicine
area shall not pose adverse effects to the Badger Two
Medicine Traditional Cultural District. Management
activities shall consider scientific research and
ethnographic research as they relate to Blackfeet cultural
land-use identities when analyzing project effects.349
This standard, which will hopefully be reinstated by the USFS in the near
future, similarly illustrates how innovation in forest planning could be
used to translate a procedural protection (the TCD and Section 106
process) into a substantive one (no adverse effects to the TCD).
Furthermore, as discussed in Part II(C), there is existing authority
for the USFS to contract with the Blackfeet to work in the Badger-Two
Medicine and on other NFS lands. When viewed collectively, all of these
existing mechanisms, processes and authorities—the TCD, the new
desired conditions reflecting pre-decisional tribal input and participation,
the new compatibility and consultation procedures stated as enforceable
standards, and existing contracting authorities—can be constructed into an
approach that reflects the core principles of tribal co-management.
Yet, there is so much more that could have been done in the Forest
Plan for the Badger-Two Medicine, using all of the available tools and
provisions provided in the 2012 Planning Rule. Most problematic is the
USFS’s decision to not restrict mechanized (including mountain bikes and
e-bikes) travel in the area, which the Tribal Business Council and Pikuni
Traditionalists Association specifically requested and views as an
incompatible use and an adverse effect on the TCD.350 This, once again,
illustrates the reactive and defensive position in which the Blackfeet has
found itself since ancestral lands were ceded. The Forest Plan could also
349. Draft Revised Forest Plan, Helena-Lewis and Clark National Forest,
U.S. FOREST SERV., 172 (June 2018), https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_
DOCUMENTS/fseprd575231.pdf.
350. Letter From Timothy Davis, Chairman, Blackfeet Nation, to Bill
Avey, Deputy Forest Supervisor, U.S. Forest Serv. (Feb. 20, 2020) and Letter from
Pikuni Traditionalists Association to Bill Avey, Deputy Forest Supervisor, U.S.
Forest Serv. (Feb 23, 2020) (on file with authors).
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have done more to facilitate the Blackfeet’s vision (and Tribal Business
Council’s proclamation) regarding the return of “Original Buffalo” to
“Original Homelands.” The agency could do so by taking part of the
Blackfeet’s Proclamation and turning it into a desired condition statement,
or making a “suitability” of use determination regarding bison in the
Badger-Two Medicine.351
Most importantly, the USFS could have used its authority, and
embraced its federal trust responsibilities, to formalize a more cooperative
management framework for the Badger-Two Medicine. The Proposal to
Establish Permanent Protections for the Badger-Two Medicine (Blackfeet
Proposal), submitted to the USFS by the Blackfeet THPO and Tribal
Business Council, recommends making the Badger-Two Medicine area “a
model of tribally co-managed federal public lands.”352 The proposed
management strategy shares some commonalities with the proposal
submitted to President Obama by the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition and
is based on the core principles of tribal co-management reviewed in Table
1. The Blackfeet Proposal includes the establishment of a commission,
dispute resolution mechanisms, provisions related to funding and capacity
building, a tribal consent provision related to new uses of the area, and
encouraging the use of existing contract, agreement, or memorandum-ofunderstanding (MOU) authorities, among other core principles of tribal
co-management. The management strategy also requests the integration of
traditional and historical knowledge and the special expertise of the
Blackfeet into the development and implementation of a management
plan. This too could be formalized using the 2012 Planning Rule’s new
provision related to “Native knowledge.”353

351. The 2012 Planning Rule states that “[s]pecific lands within a plan
area will be identified as suitable for various multiple uses or activities based on the
desired conditions applicable to those lands.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.7(e)(1)(v) (2020). Other
than timber suitability, the USFS has discretion in making suitability determinations
for other resources and uses.
352. Proposal to Establish Permanent Protections, supra note 315, at 2.
353. 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(a)(3) (2021) (Native knowledge defined as: “A
way of knowing or understanding the world, including traditional ecological and
social knowledge of the environment derived from multiple generations of indigenous
peoples’ interactions, observations, and experiences with their ecological systems.
Native knowledge is place-based and culture-based knowledge in which people learn
to live in and adapt to their own environment through interactions, observations, and
experiences with their ecological system. This knowledge is generally not solely
gained, developed by, or retained by individuals, but is rather accumulated over
successive generations and is expressed through oral traditions, ceremonies, stories,
dances, songs, art, and other means within a cultural context.”).
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As discussed in Part II(D)(3), the USFS’s response to this
carefully crafted proposal was to first muddle the meaning of comanagement and to then dismiss it altogether: “The Tribe has also
expressed an interest in co-management of the area. However, only
Congress has the authority to change Federal land management agency
jurisdiction.”354 Of course, the Blackfeet did not ask for a change of
jurisdiction and the USFS has existing authority to work in a more
structured and cooperative framework with the Blackfeet, an authority that
was more explicitly recognized in the 1986 Forest Plan.355
O. Recommendations
In the absence of tribal co-management legislation, the executive
actions could facilitate this type of bridge-building or cross-walking
between the NHPA and federal land planning. NHPA’s Section 106
regulations already call for consultation to be “coordinated with other
requirements of other statutes, as applicable, such as NEPA, NAGPRA,
AIRFA, ARPA, and agency specific legislation.”356 The Council on
Environmental Quality and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
provide detailed guidance on how best to integrate and coordinate Section
106 and NEPA planning, including the use of “NEPA documents to
facilitate Section 106 consultation,” and using “Section 106 to inform the
development and selection of alternatives in NEPA documents.”357
Federal public land laws require plans to be prepared in accordance with
NEPA,358 so there exists an opportunity to use land use plans in a more
pro-active and strategic fashion in the future.359
354. U.S. Forest Service, Draft Record of Decision: Helena-Lewis and
Clark National Forest 2020 Land Management Plan (2020), at 7.
355. See Lewis And Clark National Forest Plan, supra note 312, 2–60
(The 1986 Forest Plan include the following standard: “Establish a working group
with representatives of the Blackfeet Tribe and the Bureau of Indian Affairs in order
to negotiate agreements which will enable both the Forest Service and the Blackfeet
Tribe to share in the management of those resources reserved by the Blackfeet Tribe.
An Agreement under this guideline need not affect the legal status of those reserved
rights.”).
356. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2 (a)(4) (2021).
357. Council on Environmental Quality, Executive Office of The
President and Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, NEPA and NHPA: A
Handbook for Integrating NEPA And Section 106, 5 (Mar. 2013); see also 36 C.F.R.
§ 800.8(c) (NEPA process for section 106 purposes).
358. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §1 604(g)(1) (2020); 36 C.F.R. §1502.25 (2021).
359. See, e.g., USDA Office of Tribal Relations and U.S. Dep’t. of Agric.,
U.S. Forest Serv., Report to the Secretary of Agriculture: USDA Policy and
Procedures Review and Recommendations: Indian Sacred Sites (2012), at 41
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What is needed, however, is executive leadership to ensure that
public land agencies are using their available authorities to protect cultural
resources, sacred places, and treaty rights on public lands—and to do so
in a more cooperative and sovereignty-affirming way with tribes. The
President should also ensure that federal land planning regulations,
agency-specific manuals, handbooks, and policies related to cultural
resources and tribal relations, and programmatic agreements done
pursuant to the NHPA, comport with the first principles of federal Indian
law reviewed in Part I and the core principles of tribal co-management
outlined in Part III(F).
Most “first generation” plans prepared by the USFS and BLM are
now decades old and fail to provide any meaningful or enforceable
provisions at all related to tribal cultural resources, sacred lands, and
reserved treaty rights. Nor do they reflect or incorporate any of the
significant policy developments related to tribal relations, such as
Secretary Jewell’s Order 3342 on identifying opportunities for cooperative
and collaborative partnerships with tribes in the management of federal
lands and resources.360 The President can help ensure that every plan
revision prepared by federal public land agencies effectuate these orders
and the principles on which they are based.361
III.

TRIBAL CO-MANAGEMENT: HISTORY, LAW, AND POLITICS

There are legal, symbolic and normative dimensions of the term
co-management. Is the term just short-hand for “cooperative
(recommending the forest planning process as a “proactive process for evaluating
methods of protecting sacred sites”); see also Jonathan W. Long and Frank K. Lake,
Escaping Social-Ecological Traps Through Tribal Stewardship on National Forest
Lands in the Pacific Northwest, United States of America, 23(2) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y
10 (2018) (reviewing stewardship strategies and the more than 70 federally recognized
tribes having lands and ancestral territory within the boundaries of the Northwest
Forest Plan, which is at early stages of plan revision).
360. Cooperative and Collaborative Partnerships with Federally
Recognized Indian Tribes in the Management of Federal Lands and Resources,
Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3342 (2016).
361. We hope to provide more agency-specific planning modules in
subsequent phases of this project. These modules will showcase how the USFS, BLM,
NPS and USFWS could use their planning processes to provide substantive
protections for Native American traditional cultural landscapes, sacred sites and
reserved treaty rights. To be included at this stage is more strategic use of NHPAbased Programmatic Agreements. This is an important window of opportunity, with
several high-profile planning endeavors now underway, such as the revision of the
Northwest Forest Plan. It is crucial for tribes to be engaged in these processes at the
earliest possible stages of plan development.
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management” or does the use of the prefix co- (meaning: with, together,
joint, jointly) make it something different, especially when preceded by
the word tribal? This unwieldy term is often subject to inconsistent
interpretations and applications, and of course, politics.
This section provides background on tribal co-management in the
U.S. with an emphasis on law and policy. It reviews the origins, variations,
multiple definitions, and legal parameters of co-management. Reviewed
are substantive cases of shared authority and responsibility among
sovereigns that are officially labeled “cooperative management” or
something similar, and cases referred to as “co-management” that are
anything but cooperative. We therefore focus more on how comanagement is operationalized and recommend that it be built on a set of
core principles. We also review recent tensions between members of
Congress and the executive branch regarding the authority to enable tribal
co-management on public lands, including the issue of delegation-ofauthority. Though legislation, either system-wide or place-based, provides
the clearest and most durable pathway for tribal co-management, the
President has considerable powers and precedent to affirm tribal
sovereignty and effectuate the federal government’s treaty and trust
obligations through innovations in shared governance. The section
concludes by responding to some of the more frequent questions and
concerns about tribal co-management.
A. Legal Roots
The legal roots of tribal co-management of natural resources in
the U.S. can be traced to the assertion of treaty-based fishing rights in the
Pacific Northwest. As discussed above, among these reserved rights is the
“the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places.”362 The states
of Oregon and Washington took several actions to eliminate and restrict
the nature and application of these treaty rights. The intensifying conflicts
between states and tribes led to several interconnected judicial decisions
that essentially compelled a co-management approach to fisheries
management in the Northwest.
Judicial review and close court supervision was necessary in order
to ensure that the states did not continue to act in ways unfair and
discriminatory.363 In Sohappy v. Smith, Judge Belloni encouraged the state
362. See, e.g., Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court,
573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978) and Treaty with the Yakamas, art. III, June 9,
1855, 12 Stat. 951, 953 (1885).
363. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit provides
background in United States v. Washington, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978)
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of Oregon and the tribes, as sovereigns, to pursue a more “cooperative
approach.”364 Co-management between the tribes and states resulted from
the court’s continuing jurisdiction over implementation of the decree and
its call for the state to ensure that the tribes have “meaningful
participation” in the regulatory process.365 Several tribal-state comanagement plans for the Columbia River resulted from these processes
and similar patterns explain co-management of fish and wildlife in
Washington state, with the famous “Boldt decision” serving as a catalyst
in 1974.366 Co-management was also “born in the shadow of the court” in
the upper Great Lakes region,367 with decades of litigation focused on the
Ojibwe Tribes reserved rights to hunt, fish, trap and gather resources on
ceded territories in Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin.368
The co-management agreements stemming from these cases are
between tribes and states. However, federal public land is an important
factor because of the fish and wildlife habitat it provides and because
(“The record in this case and the history set forth [in related cases] make it crystal
clear that it has been [the] recalcitrance of Washington State officials (and their vocal
non-Indian commercial and sports fishing allies) which produced the denial of Indian
fishing rights requiring intervention by the District Court . . . The state’s extraordinary
machinations in resisting the [previous] decree have forced the district court to take
over a large share of the management of its decree. Except for some desegregation
cases . . . the district court has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to
frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century”).
364. 302 F. Supp. 899, 912 (D. Or. 1969).
365. Michael C. Blumm & Cari Baermann, The Belloni Decision and Its
Legacy: United States v. Oregon and Its Far-Reaching Effects After a Half Century,
50 ENVTL. L. 347, 382 (2020) (“The federal court thus became a central component in
developing co-management plans, reworking federal-state relations along the way.”).
366. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash.
1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). The decision was ultimately upheld by the
Supreme Court in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fish
Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
367. Tom Busiahn & Jonathan Gilbert, The Role of Ojibwe Tribes in the
Co-management of Natural Resources in the Upper Great Lakes Region: A Success
Story, Great Lakes Indian Fish And Wildlife Commission, 3, 4 (2009),
http://www.glifwc.org/minwaajimo/Papers/Co-management%20Paper%20Busiahn%
20%20FINAL.pdf; see also The Chippewa Intertribal Agreement Governing
Resource Management and Regulation of Off-Reservation Treaty Rights in the Ceded
Territory called for “an effective intertribal mechanism for co-management of the
resources subject to the treaty right” and assigned this responsibility to the Voigt
Intertribal Task Force.
368. See Ann McCammon-Soltis & Kekek Jason Stark, Fulfilling Ojibwe
Treaty Promises—An Overview and Compendium of Relevant Cases, Statutes and
Agreements, Great Lakes Indian Fish And Wildlife Commission (2009),
http://www.glifwc.org/minwaajimo/Papers/Legal%20Paper%20-%20DIA.pdf.
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several of the rights reserved by tribes at “usual and accustomed places”
and “open and unclaimed lands” are managed by federal land agencies.
As we discuss in Part I, off-reservation treaty rights include by
implication the protection and perpetuation of the resource.369 In some
cases, courts have enjoined activities, such as USFS timber sales, to
protect treaty resources, such as deer herds reserved by treaty for Klamath
Tribes.370 In other cases, federal agencies are more proactive and entered
into a range of formal and informal agreements to more effectively
administer off-reservation treaty rights. Examples include memoranda-ofunderstanding between the USFS and Nez Perce Tribe that exempt tribal
members from campground fees and stay limits when they are practicing
treaty rights on ceded territory,371 and an agreement between the USFS
and Yakama Tribe regarding exclusive use of an area on the Gifford
Pinchot National Forest during huckleberry season.372
A deeper formalized agreement exists between the Leech Lake
Band of Ojibwe and the Chippewa National Forest in Minnesota. The
history of this agreement is more complicated than most, due partly to the
369. See, e.g., Jason D. Sanders, Comment, Wolves, Lone and Pack:
Ojibwe Treaty Rights and the Wisconsin Wolf Hunt, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 1263 (2013)
(recommending co-management as a way for Ojibwe Tribes to protect wolves in their
ceded territory while recognizing the state of Wisconsin’s legitimate interest in wolf
depredation and management).
370. Klamath Tribes v. United States, 1996 WL 924509, *8 (D. Or. Oct.
2, 1996) (the federal government has a “substantive duty to protect ‘to the fullest
extent possible’ the Tribes’ treaty rights, and the resources on which those rights
depend”); see Nie, supra note 128, at 611 (a review of the agreement between the
Klamath Tribes and the Fremont-Winema National Forest. The Memorandum of
Agreement mandates government-to-government coordination at the regional
forester-level and quarterly meeting between Tribal program directors and forest
supervisors. It also creates a special process to be used by the USFS when considering
tribally-initiated proposals and recommendations, and calls for Tribal involvement
with USFS interdisciplinary teams.); see also Will Hatcher et al., Klamath Tribes:
Managing Their Homeland Forests in Partnership with the USDA Forest Service,
115(5) J. FORESTRY 447 (2017) (providing an update on contemporary developments,
including development of a forest plan).
371. See e.g., Robin Mark Stewart, Tribal Reserved Rights on Region One
National Forests and Grasslands (Masters Thesis, University of Montana, College of
Forestry and Conservation, 2011) (includes a collection of MOUs and Agreements
with tribes having reserved rights in Region 1 of the National Forest System) (on file
with authors).
372. The “1932 Handshake Agreement” is further formalized in the 1990
Gifford Pinchot Land and Resource Management Plan (1990). For a discussion see
Lauren Goschke, Tribes, Treaties, and the Trust Responsibility: A Call for CoManagement of the Huckleberries in the Northwest, 27 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY &
ENVTL. L. REV. 315, 341–42 (2016).
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fact that roughly ninety percent of the Leech Lake Indian Reservation is
within the Chippewa National Forest and forty-five percent of the Forest
is within the Reservation.373 The Chippewa was also the first national
forest created by statute, with the Minnesota National Forest Act of 1908,
including several provisions specifically related to the Chippewa
Indians.374 The issue of reserved treaty rights on the Chippewa “has been
a knotty and vexatious one for years.”375 To find a more cooperative path
forward, the USFS and Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe of the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe entered into a substantive MOU in 2019.376 The
agreement calls for “developing a shared decision-making model,”
“utilizing Traditional Ecological Knowledge,” and “expanding the Tribal
Forest Protection Act to give voice to the Band’s land management
objectives.”377 The MOU includes specific and mutually agreeable
protocols for communication, consultation, monitoring and dispute
resolution, among others.
A key attribute of the agreement, and a core theme emphasized in
this report, is the importance of early and meaningful tribal engagement
and coordination in USFS decision making at the project and plan level.
The MOU, for example, provides the Chippewa Tribe an opportunity to
review contemplated projects or activities that are not on the USFS’s
formal “Schedule of Proposed Actions.”378 It also provides for tribal
coordination—through NEPA’s cooperating agency provision, structured
participation at key meetings, and/or pre-decisional quarterly updates—
prior to public scoping; and a consultation framework that must precede
the release of a NEPA-based categorical exclusion, environmental
assessment, or draft environmental impact statement.379 As discussed
below, the MOU has several core attributes of a tribal co-management
model.
373. Tribal Relations, U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., U.S. FOREST SERV.,
https://www.fs.usda.gov/main/chippewa/workingtogether/tribalrelations (last visited
Aug. 27, 2020).
374. Minnesota National Forest Act, Pub. L. No. 60-137, 35 Stat. 268
(May 23, 1908).
375. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001,
1003 (D. Minn. 1971); see also United States v. Michael D. Brown, 777 F. 3d 1025
(8th Cir. 2015) (providing a history of the Forest and reserved treaty rights).
376. Memorandum of Understanding Between the USDA Forest Service,
Chippewa National Forest and the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe of the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_
DOCUMENTS/fseprd672397.pdf.
377. Id. at 1.
378. Id. at 6.
379. Id. at 7–10.
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B. Tribal Co-Management by Statute and Treaty
Congress can also authorize or compel the use of tribal comanagement and has done so most clearly with subsistence use in the State
of Alaska. The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972 was
amended in 1994 with a co-management provision now found in Section
119 of the MMPA: “The Secretary may enter into cooperative agreements
with Alaska Native organizations to conserve marine mammals and
provide co-management of subsistence use by Alaska Natives.”380 The
MMPA permits grants and agreements with statutorily-established comanagement bodies—Alaska Native Organizations—for purposes
including: “(1) collecting and analyzing data on marine mammal
populations; (2) monitoring the harvest of marine mammals for
subsistence use; (3) participating in marine mammal research conducted
by the Federal Government, States, academic institutions, and private
organizations; and (4) developing marine mammal co-management
structures with Federal and State agencies.”381
The term co-management is not defined in the statute or MMPA
regulations. As a result, two assessments of MMPA-based co-management
in Alaska, by the Marine Mammal Commission, found diverging
interpretations of the term that can lead to inconsistent applications.382 As
discussed in Part IV(A), Section 119 of the MMPA restricts the activities
that are subject to co-management, especially in contrast to the MMPA’s
provisions permitting the transfer of management authority to state
governments.
A more complicated example, including a mix of congressional
and executive powers, is the 1995 to 1996 “Canada Protocol” amending
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) of 1918.383 The Protocol creates
an exemption for “indigenous inhabitants” of Alaska and Canada to take
380. 16 U.S.C. § 1388 (2018).
381. Id.
382. Review of Co-Management Efforts In Alaska, MARINE MAMMAL
COMM’N (Feb. 6–8, 2008), https://www.mmc.gov/priority-topics/arctic/marinemammal-co-management-review/; J.C. Malek & V.R. Cornish, Co-Management of
Marine Mammals In Alaska: A Case Study-Based Review: Final Report, MARINE
MAMMAL
COMM’N
(2019),
https://www.mmc.gov/wp-content/uploads/1Co
-Management-Review-Final-Report.pdf.
383. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a
Protocol Between the U.S. and Canada Amending the 1916 Convention for the
Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the U.S., Aug. 2, 1996, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 104-28 at viii, ix (1996); 16 U.S.C. § 712 (2020) authorizes the Department
of Interior to promulgate regulations to implement the migratory bird treaties, with no
additional statutory authority being required to implement the Protocol.
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migratory birds and their eggs during the closed season and created a
management body—the Alaska Migratory Bird Co-Management
Council—to develop recommendations for the management of these
subsistence hunts. The body is “created to ensure an effective and
meaningful role for indigenous inhabitants in the conservation of
migratory birds” and includes “Native, Federal, and State of Alaska
representatives as equals.”384 The body is “intended to provide more
effective conservation of migratory birds in designated subsistence harvest
areas without diminishing the ultimate authority and responsibility of
DOI/FWS.”385
Another Alaska example, built on a mixture of statutory and
executive authorities, is the Kuskokwim River Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission (Commission) that was established in 2015 with the purpose
of rebuilding declining salmon resources “to support and preserve a way
of life that is vital for people’s nutritional, economical, and cultural
needs,” using both “indigenous knowledge systems and scientific
principles.”386 A MOU between the Commission and USFWS “formalizes
a management partnership that begins to address the long-standing desire
of Alaska Native Tribes in the Kuskokwim Drainage to engage as comanagers of fish resources.”387 Several authorities are referenced to
support the co-management approach, including the Subsistence Title of
the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), but also
multiple executive and secretarial orders focused on tribal consultation
and the department’s federal trust responsibility (as reviewed in Part I),388
once again demonstrating how existing authority can be used to fashion
variations of tribal co-management.

384. Protocol Amending the 1916 Convention for the Protection of
Migratory Birds, at Art. II (4)(2)(b)(ii), U.S. SENATE (1995), https://www.fws.gov/
le/pdf/MigBirdTreatyCanada.pdf; see also 50 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2021) (“Co-management
Council means the Alaska Migratory Bird Co-Management Council consisting of
Alaska Native, Federal, and State of Alaska representatives as equals.”).
385. Id.
386. See History & Mission, Kuskokwim River Inter-tribal Fish
Commission, https://www.kuskosalmon.org/mission-history (last visited Aug. 27,
2020).
387. Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service Alaska Region and Kuskokwim River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, 1
(2016).
388. Id. at 2.
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C. Disputed Authority to Enable Tribal Co-Management
Congress, having plenary powers over federal public lands and
Indian affairs, possesses clear authority to sanction the use of tribal comanagement. Some members of Congress have recently asserted this
power as a way to challenge executive actions that are perceived as
authorizing tribal co-management. Jason Chaffetz (R-UT), then acting as
Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
challenged Secretary of Interior Sally Jewell’s Order No. 3342 in 2016,
entitled “Identifying Opportunities for Cooperative and Collaborative
Partnerships with Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in the Management
of Federal Lands and Resources.”389 Order No. 3342 focused on existing
statutory authorities that permit “cooperative agreements” and
“collaborative partnerships” with tribes and carefully distinguished these
opportunities with co-management, which Interior defines “as a situation
where there is a specific legal basis that requires the delegation of some
aspect of Federal decision-making or that makes co-management
otherwise legally necessary,” such as the co-management of the salmon
harvest in the Pacific Northwest.390 “Despite claims to the contrary,” said
Representative Chaffetz, “co-management of public lands requires
approval by Congress,” and “[s]ome may inaccurately view your order as
establishing a co-management relationship for control and use of the land.
You do not have that authority.”391
The same assertion was made by Secretary of Interior Ryan Zinke
in his review of national monuments as ordered by President Trump.392
The Secretary’s Monument Report recommended the President “request
congressional authority to enable tribal co-management” for four existing
monuments (Bears Ears, Gold Butte, Organ Mountains-Desert Peaks, and
Rio Grande Del Norte) and for the Badger-Two Medicine area to be
considered for designation and a candidate for tribal co-management in
the future.393 Though the Secretary’s Report does not define co389. Letter from Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Sally Jewell, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Dec. 29,
2016).
390. Secretary of Interior Order No. 3342, 4 (2016).
391. Letter from Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Sally Jewell, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Dec. 29,
2016) (on file with the authors).
392. Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act, Exec. Order
13792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (Apr. 26, 2017).
393. Ryan K. Zinke, Memorandum for the President, Final Report
Summarizing Findings of the Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act, 9,
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/revised_final_report.pdf (last visited
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management, it insists that “such authority is not available to the President;
it must be granted by Congress.”394
D. Tribal Co-Management and Delegation of Authority
These challenges to the executive branch’s authority to sanction
tribal co-management are in large part based on the so-called
“subdelegation doctrine.” This doctrine limits the ability of executive
agencies to delegate the powers it was given by Congress to other actors.395
As it is most commonly understood, the subdelegation doctrine basically
forbids federal agencies from delegating final decision making authority
to another party, meaning that federal delegations of authority may be
permissible so long as the federal official retains final reviewing power.
This authority “must be a meaningful retention of control over the activity
of the private party, through oversight, veto, or otherwise” so that the
“Federal agency may ensure that the actions it takes support the national
interest, and that the Federal role is not subordinated inappropriately to
parochial interests.”396
Statutory authority is also important to understanding the limits of
subdelegation because “the relevant inquiry in any delegation challenge is
whether Congress intended to permit the delegatee to delegate the
authority conferred by Congress.”397 Absent this statutory authority to
subdelegate, the federal agency must retain final decision making
authority.398
Closely related to the subdelegation issue is the determination of
what activities are “inherently governmental activities,”399 which as a rule
cannot be delegated absent congressional authority. The Office of the
Solicitor, in the Department of Interior, offers as examples delegating the
final decision to grant or deny a permit or application and determining to
whom a parcel of federal land may be sold as violating the restriction on

Dec. 15, 2020) [hereinafter Secretary’s Report].
394. Id.
395. Stated differently, subdelegation happens when an agency
“redelegates” the authority it was delegated by Congress. Thus, the term “redelegation”
is sometimes used in this context.
396. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF SOLICITOR, PARTNERSHIP LEGAL
PRIMER, 13 (2004).
397. Nat’l Park and Conservation Ass’n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7, 18
(D.D.C. 1999).
398. Id. (“Delegations by federal agencies to private parties are, however,
valid so long as the federal agency or official retains final reviewing authority.”).
399. Partnership Legal Primer, supra note 396, at 13.
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delegations of inherently governmental activity.400 This restriction,
applied to tribal contracting, is also codified in the Tribal Self-Governance
Act (TSGA) of 1994, which authorizes Interior agencies to delegate
“functions” that are not “inherently federal” to participating tribes.401 As
discussed in Part II(C), it is within this particular statutory context that the
“inherently” governmental or federal issue has been most closely
analyzed.
We believe that the limits imposed by the subdelegation doctrine
do not preclude the executive branch from using its powers to
institutionalize variations of tribal co-management. Most of the definitions
of co-management in Table 2 do not include a delegation of authority
component or call for tribal unilateralism.402After all, a complete and
unqualified delegation to tribes, in terms of transferring ownership or
decision making authority, is best characterized as tribal management and
not co-management. The definitions and cases reviewed herein are instead
a call to end federal unilateralism in decision making; thus, the focus on
shared governance and the strategic advantages of two sovereigns working
together in a more coordinated and systematic fashion. “To share authority
and responsibility” is the most common denominator in definitions of comanagement.403
Discussed below are two variations of “co-management” using
executive authority under the Antiquities Act. Both cases successfully
navigated the subdelegation issue and we discuss in Part V other leverage
points President Biden could use to enable tribal co-management on public
lands. There, we also recommend that the Biden administration clarify
400. Id.
401. 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(k) (2006) (providing that annual agreements
cannot include programs, services, functions, or activities that are “inherently Federal
or where the statute establishing the existing program does not authorize the type of
participation sought by the tribe”); see also Memorandum of Agreement Between
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Self-Governance, Office of Natural Resources
Revenue, and Bureau of Land Management (Feb. 24, 2020) (providing examples of
inherently and contractible functions for oil and gas development on Indian
reservations) (on file with authors).
402. Interestingly, one of the few conservation laws officially enabling
tribal co-management, and administered by Interior—the Canada Protocol amending
the MBTA—makes clear that co-management is intended to provide more effective
conservation and subsistence management “without diminishing the ultimate authority
and responsibility of DOI/FWS” Protocol Amending the 1916 Convention for the
Protection of Migratory Birds, at Art. II (4)(2)(b)(ii), U.S. SENATE (1995),
https://www.fws.gov/le/pdf/MigBirdTreatyCanada.pdf.
403. See, e.g., the collective work of Fikret Berkes, including Evolution of
Co-Management: Role of Knowledge Generation, Bridging Organizations and Social
Learning, 90 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1692 (2009) (emphasis added).
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how the subdelegation doctrine and “inherently governmental/federal”
limitation applies more specifically to Native Nations in light of recent
case law and developments in tribal co-management, such as the case of
Bears Ears discussed below.
We believe that a reframing of this issue is in order, to distinguish
what are more properly considered “sovereignty-affirming
subdelegations” that “affirm tribal sovereignty by intermingling federal
and tribal power.”404 We further advise a reconsideration of the term
“delegation”—which can be defined as giving powers and duties to
another, who is often less senior—when it comes to the management of
rights that were reserved by Tribes. Furthermore, as we discuss below, the
subdelegation issue must also be considered in the larger realm of political
accountability,405 including the ability to seek legal redress, and we believe
co-management frameworks can be constructed to hold tribes and federal
agencies accountable.
E. Co-Management and Executive Authority
One national monument not reviewed by Secretary Zinke is
Kasha-Katuwe Tent Rocks in New Mexico, established by President
Clinton in 2001. The President Clinton’s Proclamation (Clinton’s
Proclamation) emphasized the indigenous history of this area and made
clear that the BLM shall manage the Monument “in close cooperation with
the Pueblo de Cochiti.”406 An assistance agreement is used to fulfill this
mandate, and applies to a range of management responsibilities of the
Pueblo, from trail maintenance and visitor services to coordinating law
enforcement with the BLM. Though the term co-management is not used
in Clinton’s Proclamation, Kasha Katuwe is widely regarded as an
important early case study of co-management407 or what the Department
of Interior labels “joint management.”408
404. Samuel
Lazerwitz,
Sovereignty-Affirming
Subdelegations:
Recognizing the Executive’s Ability to Delegate Authority and Affirm Inherent Tribal
Powers, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2020) (proposing a presumption that
“sovereignty-affirming subdelegations” are permissible unless Congress has expressly
indicated otherwise).
405. See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F. 3d 554 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (reviewing subdelegation and its relationship to political accountability).
406. Proclamation No. 7394, 66 Fed. Reg. 7343 (Jan. 22, 2001).
407. Sandra Lee Pinel & Jacob Pecos, Generating Co-Management at
Kasha Katuwe Tent Rocks National Monument, New Mexico, 49 J. ENVTL MGMT. 593
(2012).
408. Native American Sacred Places: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 18 (1st Sess. 2003) (statement of William D. Bettenberg,
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The case of Kasha Katuwe demonstrates why there is no bright
line that clearly distinguishes congressional and executive powers to
authorize, compel or encourage tribal co-management. In this case,
Clinton’s Proclamation built on previous actions by the Pueblo and BLM
to share power and responsibility as permitted by law,409 and the agency
uses assistance agreements that are already authorized by statute.410 Final
decision-making power is retained by the BLM, but because there is a
government-to-government partnership between the BLM and the Pueblo
Tribal Council, the latter was able to participate early and substantively in
shaping the area’s management plan and range of acceptable uses prior to
public comment—not as another stakeholder, but as a sovereign
government.411
President Obama’s establishment of Bears Ears National
Monument (Obama’s Proclamation) provides another example of
executive authority to lawfully sanction and shape co-management.412 As
in the case of Kasha Katuwe, the term co-management is not used in
Obama’s proclamation, but Bears Ears nonetheless provides a truly
collaborative and innovative framework of governance413—all within the
authority provided by the Antiquities Act, and comporting with the
subdelegation principles reviewed above. On a deeper level, this triballyled proposal shows how “public land laws can become vehicles for
equality and justice, even if they initially served the interests of the
politically and economically powerful.”414
Obama’s Proclamation ensures tribal consultation, and that in
developing and implementing the area’s management plan “the Secretaries
shall maximize opportunities, pursuant to applicable legal authorities, for
shared resources, operational efficiency, and cooperation.”415 Most
significant, however, is the creation of a tribally-based “Bears Ears
Commission:”

Director, Office of Policy Analysis, Department of Interior), at 46.
409. Pinel & Pecos, supra note 407, at 598.
410. Section 307(b) of FLPMA provides that “the Secretary may enter into
contracts and cooperative agreements involving the management, protection,
development, and sale of public lands.” 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b) (2018).
411. Pinel & Pecos, supra note 407, at 599.
412. Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139 (Dec. 28, 2016).
413. See Charles Wilkinson, “At Bears Ears We Can Hear the Voices of
Our Ancestors in Every Canyon and on Every Mesa Top”: The Creation of the First
Native National Monument, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 317, 331 (2018).
414. Krakoff, supra note 7, at 216.
415. Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1144 (Dec. 28, 2016).
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In recognition of the importance of tribal participation to
the care and management of the objects identified above,
and to ensure that the management decisions affecting the
monument reflect tribal expertise and traditional and
historical knowledge, a Bears Ears Commission is hereby
established to provide guidance and recommendations on
the development and implementation of management
plans and on management of the monument.416
As for delegation of authority, Obama’s Proclamation differs from the
proposal submitted to the him by the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition.
The Coalition carefully dissected the issue of what constitutes a lawful
delegation of authority to tribes and premised its proposal on the basis that
a delegation of authority is permissible insofar as it is not total, and
remains subject to the final decision-making authority of the Secretaries
of Agriculture and Interior.417 Instead of delegating complete authority,
“the Tribes and agency officials will be working together as equals to
make joint decisions.”418
Though a modification of the Coalition’s proposal, Obama’s
Proclamation establishes a substantive framework for collaborative
management of the Monument:
The Secretaries shall meaningfully engage the
Commission or, should the Commission no longer exist,
the tribal governments through some other entity
composed of elected tribal government officers
(comparable entity), in the development of the
management plan and to inform subsequent management
of the monument. To that end, in developing or revising
the management plan, the Secretaries shall carefully and
fully consider integrating the traditional and historical
knowledge and special expertise of the Commission or
comparable entity. If the Secretaries decide not to
incorporate specific recommendations submitted to them
in writing by the Commission or comparable entity, they

416. Id.
417. Proposal to President Barack Obama for the Creation of Bears Ears
National Monument, BEARS EARS INTER-TRIBAL COALITION, 27 (2015), https://
www.bearsearscoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Bears-Ears-Inter-Tribal
-Coalition-Proposal-10-15-15.pdf.
418. Id. at 26.
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will provide the Commission or comparable entity with a
written explanation of their reasoning.419
Events happening after Obama’s Proclamation demonstrate how the term
co-management can be politically appropriated and purposefully misused.
One of the concerns expressed by Secretary Zinke in his review of national
monuments, and most clearly articulated in the context of Bears Ears
Monument, was the purported lack of executive authority to enable tribal
co-management.420 Shortly after the revocation of Bears Ears Monument
by President Trump, the Shásh Jaa’ and Indian Creek National Monument
Act was introduced;421 it was partially framed as Congress authorizing
tribal co-management of the two units, and was supported as such by the
Department of Interior.422
The problem, however, is that the bill did no such thing as it
basically relegates sovereign tribes to stakeholder status and was
developed without any tribal consultation. For these and other reasons, the
Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition “adamantly opposes” the bill and views
it as violating “basic tenets of federal Indian law and the United States’
treaty, trust and government-to-government relationship with Indian
tribes.”423
F. Core Principles and Attributes of Tribal Co-Management
The Bears Ears Monument story advises that we carefully
scrutinize conceptions of co-management and pay more attention to how
it is operationalized. Though definitions are important, especially for the
purpose of creating mutual understanding and common expectations, what
matters most are the core principles or attributes of a co-management
approach, regardless of whether the term is used or substituted for

419. Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1144 (Dec. 28, 2016).
420. Secretary’s Report, supra note 393, at 10.
421. Shásh Jaa’ National Monument and Indian Creek National
Monument Act, H.R. 4532, 6–7 (Jan. 30, 2018).
422. Statement of Casey Hammond, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Land
and Minerals Management, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Before the Natural Resources
Committee, Subcommittee on Federal Lands, U.S. House of Representatives on H.R.
4532 Shásh Jaa’ National Monument and Indian Creek National Monument Act, Jan.
30, 2018, at 6–7.
423. Testimony of the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition, Before the U.S.
House of Representatives, Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on
Federal Lands, Legislative Hearing on H.R. 4532 the Shásh Jaa’ National Monument
and Indian Creek National Monument Act, Jan. 9, 2018.
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“cooperative management,” “collaborative management,” “joint
management,” or some variation thereof.
Thinking in terms of core principles may also lead to more
consistent and less defensive uses of the term co-management by federal
agencies. The current situation causes unnecessary conflict and confusion.
Consider, for example, Secretary Jewell’s Order 3342 which distinguishes
“cooperative and collaborative opportunities” with tribes from “comanagement.”424 One of the exemplary “partnerships” referenced in the
Order is the Kuskokwim River Intertribal Fisheries Commission, which
the Order says “functions in an advisory capacity.”425 But as discussed
above, the MOU specifically sets up Alaska Native Tribes as co-managers
of fish resources. Why? Because “[t]he people of the Kuskokwim River
are no longer satisfied with serving in an advisory role to state and fishery
managers.”426
How the term is conceived by the USFS provides another
example. The agency’s traditional line is that it has no co-management
authority whatsoever because of the subdelegation principles reviewed
above. For example, USFS responded to the Blackfeet Tribe’s interest in
co-management of the Badger-Two Medicine by stating that “only
Congress has the authority to change Federal land management agency
jurisdiction.”427 Of course, the Blackfeet never requested a change in
administrative jurisdiction, just a more meaningful and pro-active role in
the management of their sacred lands and reserved rights. By contrast, the
agency appears much more comfortable with the term co-management
when Indian tribes are not the focus. For example, a very collaborativebased forest plan in Puerto Rico “takes partnerships a step further” by
embracing a “co-management approach” on the El Yunque National
Forest.428 And, as discussed in Part IV(C), the USFS embraces the concept
424. Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3342 (2016).
425. Id. at 6.
426. See History & Mission, Kuskokwim River Inter-tribal Fish
Commission, https://www.kuskosalmon.org/mission-history (last visited Aug. 27,
2020).
427. U.S. Forest Service, Draft Record of Decision: Helena-Lewis and
Clark National Forest 2020 Land Management Plan, 6 (2020).
428. El Yunque National Forest Revised Land and Resource Management
Plan Draft, U.S. FOREST SERV., at 9 (2016), https://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/
nepa/99076_FSPLT3_3892484.pdf (The Plan provides a very thoughtful and deliberate
definition of co-management and makes clear that planners and the public clearly
understood that it does not mean the agency had delegated its authority. Instead, “Comanagement is the strategic and site-specific engagement of FS and active partners
working together in general forest operations, conservation and restoration activities
with a practical sense of shared responsibilities to achieve the Mission [and] it goes one
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as a way to “co-manage” fire risk when working with state governments
in an atmosphere of “shared stewardship.”429
We believe that much of this confusion and inconsistency can be
alleviated with a clearer focus on the core principles of tribal comanagement. Here, we build on the insightful and groundbreaking work
of attorney Ed Goodman who breaks co-management down into a set of
fundamental principles. If applied, says Goodman, the principles could
“clarify a process of shared management and decision making authority
that fully incorporates the input and expertise of both parties into a mutual
and participatory framework.”430 Though Goodman’s work focuses on
reserved hunting and fishing rights, we believe that these principles can
also be applied more broadly to tribal co-management on public lands. In
Table 1, we describe Goodman’s principles while also providing our own
observations from the cases reviewed in this Report.
Table 1. Fundamental Principles of a Tribal Co-Management Approach
1. Recognition of
Tribes as Sovereign
Governments

-

Tribal co-management regime developed
in recognition of the tribes’ status as
sovereigns

Examples:
- Indian Self-Determination Act, NAGPRA,
Treatment-as-State provisions of the Clean
Air and Clean Water Act
- Shared sovereignty as the legal basis of
treaty fishing cases in Pacific Northwest
and Upper Great Lakes States
- Canada Protocol’s (MBTA) creation of comanagement body: “Native, Federal, and
State of Alaska representatives as equals”

step beyond partnering by increasing capacity based actions.”).
429. U.S. Forest Service, Toward Shared Stewardship Across Landscapes:
An Outcome-Based Investment Strategy, 3 (Washington, D.C.: USDA, August 2018).
430. Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitat for Off-Reservation Tribal Hunting
and Fishing Rights: Tribal Comanagement as a Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL. L. 279,
343 (2000).
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A substantive and procedural obligation to
ensure that tribes are an integral part of
decision making process; to include tribal
institution and capacity building (and
sufficient funding) to ensure that tribal
participation as co-managers is effective

Examples:
- Kuskokwim River MOU authorization
based on the FWS’s “government-togovernment relationship and trust
responsibility” and the Department’s
commitment to “programs that further
tribal self-determination”
3. Legitimation
Structures for Tribal
Involvement

-

-

Federal agencies and tribes must make
community education regarding tribal
role in decision making an integral part
of co-management approach
Ensuring that institutional arrangements
are structured in a manner to address nonIndian concerns

Examples:
- Creation of co-management bodies such
as the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission, the Alaska Migratory Bird
Co-Management Council, and the Bears
Ears Commission

4. Integration of
Tribes Early in the
Decision-Making
Process

-

Bears Ears’ establishment of a
stakeholder-based advisory committee to
advise development of management plan
and management of the Monument, as
one way to address non-Indian concerns

-

Meaningful tribal participation includes
integration of tribes at earliest phases of
planning and decision making, to ensure
that tribes can shape the direction of
management and not just reactively
comment on projects and decisions
already developed by agencies
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Examples:
- BLM’s early substantive engagement, via
NEPA, with Pueblo de Cochiti in shaping
Resource Management Plan for KashaKatuwe National Monument
- Memorandum of Understanding (2019)
between the Chippewa National Forest
and Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe
- USFS’s Forest Plan for Badger-Two
Medicine reflecting some of the
Blackfeet Nation’s proposed desired
conditions and standards for area

5. Recognition and
Incorporation of
Tribal Expertise

-

Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act’s
provision related to consideration of
tribal management proposals

-

Incorporating tribal expertise and/or
traditional ecological knowledge into
federal decision making; including a
significant degree of deference by
federal agencies and the courts in
matters concerning management
of reserved tribal rights

Examples:
- Creation of Bears Ears Commission
“to ensure that management decisions
affecting the monument reflect tribal
expertise and traditional and historical
knowledge”
6. Dispute
Resolution
Mechanisms

-

Including mechanisms for resolving
disputes among co-managers, as means to
further legitimize approach and avoid
situations of unilateralism and the use of
veto power
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Examples:
- Multiple dispute resolution clauses
provided in the State/Tribal Protocols and
Court Orders focused on off-reservation
rights in Upper Great Lakes Region
- Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act’s
interconnected use of management plan
for area, tribal coordination provision,
consent of new uses provision, public
involvement, and establishment of
Badger-Two Medicine Advisory Council
Our most substantive addition to Goodman’s set of core
principles is recognition of the co-management institutions or decisionmaking bodies that emerged as a result of court orders, legislation, or
executive actions. These institutions, as we view them, are legitimation
structures, and provide a means of incorporating tribal expertise and
resolving disputes. They can be traced back to the treaty fishing cases of
the Northwest and Great Lakes and the formation of organizations such
as the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission and the Great Lakes
Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission. Statutory-based co-management
bodies include the “Alaska Native Organizations,” created by the
MMPA, and the Alaska Migratory Bird Co-Management Council,
created by the amendment to the MBTA. And finally, the proposed Bears
Ears Commission provides an example of a co-management-like body
created by the Executive.
G. Common Questions and Concerns about Tribal Co-Management
There are several common questions and concerns about tribal comanagement, especially if practiced on federal public lands. On one ugly
level are the racist beliefs, bigotry, and animosity often displayed towards
Indians and tribes, especially when they assert their sovereign powers and
reserved treaty rights.431 But setting those aside, there are reasonable
concerns about co-management and it is important to address them in a
more candid and constructive fashion.
431. See, e.g., Responses of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
to Public Comments on the Tribes’ Draft “National Bison Range Transfer and
Restoration Act of 2016,” at 6, https://bisonrange.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
Public-Comment-Responses-July-2016.pdf (responding to various sentiments
towards Indians and Indian Tribes).
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Precedent, and what it means for federal public lands, is one of the
most common concerns about tribal co-management. Hundreds of treaties,
many with off-reservation use rights, precede the creation of public lands,
and these systems are essentially based on aboriginal territory. Given this,
the question asked is what piece of public land might not be subject to this
approach in the future? Similar concerns are often raised in opposing
efforts to protect native sacred sites on public lands, with some interests
fearing a sort of tribal land-grab432 or “religious servitude” on public lands
as a result.433 And the apprehension is most palpable when debating those
rare instances when public lands are restored into tribal or trust ownership
and this explains why so many of those transfer statutes included a debate
over the precedent established.434
Our response to the precedent concern is to recommend that comanagement is done right, so that it establishes a positive precedent that
all parties want replicated and modified to fit unique situations and
particular places. Learn from the failures, practice innovation, and make
improvements over time. From a conservation standpoint, co-management
builds on the measurable successes of indigenous-led conservation in the
United States and internationally.435
432. Former Acting Director of the BLM, William Perry Pendley, made
this argument frequently when he served as president of the Mountain States Legal
Foundation; see William Perry Pendley, The Establishment Clause and the Closure of
“Sacred” Public and Private Lands, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023 (2006). He viewed the
protection of “purportedly sacred federal land” as a cover for land protection and
restricting use and says that as long as “pantheism” is the law, “[M]illions of acres of
federal land and goodness know how much private land could be declared sacred and
off-limits to the public and the people who own it.” Id. at 1031, 1038.
433. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 904
(2006).
434. See Nie, supra note 128, at 638–40.
435. The literature is vast, but see the following for references to the
science of indigenous-led conservation: Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Summary for Policymakers of the Global
Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (2019),
https://www.ipbes.net/sites/default/files/202002/ipbes_global_assessment_report_
summary_for_policymakers_en.pdf; The Nature Conservancy, Strong Voices, Active
Chocies: TNC’s Practitioner Framework to Strengthen Outcomes for People and
Nature, (June 11, 2018), https://www.nature.org/en-us/what-we-do/our-insights/
perspectives/strong-voices-active-choices/. Comparison studies in the United States
context are rarer, but see Donald M. Waller & Nicholas J. Reo, First Stewards:
Ecological Outcomes of Forest and Wildlife Stewardship by Indigenous Peoples of
Wisconsin, USA, 23(1) ECOLOGY & SOCIETY 45 (2018) (“Lessons from tribal
forestlands could help improve the sustainable management of nontribal public
forestlands.”).
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Closely related to this concern are significant trends in the
devolution and privatization of public lands, trends that have become only
more acute since the land seizure movement was revived in 2012. A
selective application of (red) states’ rights, coupled with environmental
deregulation, was the defining feature of the Trump Administration’s
approach to public lands and wildlife conservation.436 When viewed
collectively, these executive actions make federal law subservient to more
narrow state, local, and economic interests; and they threaten the integrity
of the federal public lands system and the national interest that serves as
its unifying principle.
One of the most unfortunate consequences of pushing this version
of states’ rights and decentralization so aggressively is that even some
moderate political interests rightfully question any effort, even if built on
a different set of historical facts and legal principles, to surrender any
federal authority in the future. We believe this concern can be most fairly
addressed in the context of federalism and we do that in the next Part.
There, we show that federal land laws generally fail to recognize tribal
rights and interests, and they extend to state governments authorities and
opportunities that are not provided to tribes to the same degree. That
problem must be rectified, and it can be done in a way that carefully
balances tribal rights and interests and the national interest in public lands.
A third prevalent concern is based on the assumption that tribal
co-management is by nature an open-ended and discretionary framework.
Among conservation groups, Public Employees for Environmental
Responsibility (PEER) is perhaps most vocal in its criticism of tribal comanagement, much of it stemming from its opposition to the tribal
contracting arrangements on the National Bison Range. According to
PEER: “New proposals to jointly manage federal lands with local Indian
tribes do not address the major practical difficulties of dealing with
disputes that inevitably arise [. . .] [n]or do they specify tribal powers to
limit public access, harvest resources, or veto federal decisions on federal
lands they would co-manage.”437 “Two sovereigns under one roof is a
house divided,” states PEER’s Executive Director Jeff Ruch, and “[i]f it is
true co-management, then any disagreement could lead to utter

436. Martin Nie, Reclaiming The National Interest In Federal Public
Lands And Wildlife Conservation, BOLLE CTR. FOR PEOPLE & FORESTS (Jan. 2020).
437. Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, Co-Managing
Federal Lands with Tribes No Walk in the Park (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.peer.org/
co-managing-federal-lands-with-tribes-no-walk-in-the-park/.
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impasse.”438 “Co-management sounds good but ignoring the details can
lead to devilish complications,” he says.439
PEER raises the important issue of accountability, which we agree
should be a fundamental concern in any co-management regime. But the
examples of co-management reviewed above, and those elsewhere, show
why it is wrong to assume that co-management must be a discretionary,
open-ended, and ill-defined mandate.
The root precedent for co-management—reserved fishing rights
in the Pacific Northwest—provide a case-in-point. The management
agreements negotiated by states and tribes specify performance measures,
commitments and assurances by both co-managers.440 Accountability and
enforcement mechanisms are also provided in the dozens of agreements
signed between Ojibwe Tribes and the states of Minnesota, Michigan and
Wisconsin—building on years of successful co-management.441 Comanagement of marine mammals and migratory birds in Alaska, as
governed by the MMPA and MBTA, provide other examples, as both laws
significantly limit the scope and purposes of co-management. Even the
national monument examples challenge this claim. The Bears Ears
Proclamation, for example, is among the most detailed designations made
pursuant to the Antiquities Act. It requires various management activities
to be consistent “with the care and management of the objects identified”
in the Proclamation’s poetic description of the landscape.442
We return to the issue of accountability, in the context of our
recommendations for tribal co-management legislation in Part V.

438. Id.
439. Id.
440. See, e.g., 2008–2017 United States v. Oregon Management Agreement,
Part F (May 2008), https://www.critfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/US-v-OR
-Agreement.pdf; see also Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, Regional and
International Salmon Agreements, https://plan.critfc.org/2013/spirit-of-the-salmon
-plan/about-spirit-of-the-salmon/the-accords-pacific-salmon-treaty-and-u-s-v-oregonagreements/ (covering the Columbia Basin Fish Accords, the Pacific Salmon Treaty, and
United States v. Oregon Agreements).
441. The “1854 Treaty Authority,” for example, provides an inter-tribal
program that manages the off-reservation hunting, fishing and gathering rights of the
Grand Portage and Bois Forte bands of the Lake Superior Chippewa in the territory
ceded under the Treaty of 1854. It includes an “1854 Conservation Code” that is
enforced by an “1854 Treaty Authority Conservation Court.” See 1854 Treaty Authority,
https://www.1854treatyauthority.org/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
442. Establishment of the Bears Ears National Monument, Proclamation
No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139 (Dec. 28, 2016).
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Table 2. Selected Definitions & Interpretations of Tribal Co-Management
Definitions & Interpretations
“The purpose of this Management
Agreement is to provide a framework
within which the Parties may exercise
their sovereign powers in a coordinated
and systematic manner in order to
protect, rebuild, and enhance upper
Columbia River fish runs while
providing harvests for both treaty
Indian and non-treaty fisheries.”
“Two or more entities, each having
legally established management
responsibility, working together to
actively protect, conserve, enhance, or
restore fish and wildlife resources.”
“A partnership based on trust and
respect, established between an Alaska
Native Organization, as defined by the
MMPA, and either NMFS or FWS,
with shared responsibilities for the
conservation of marine mammals and
their sustainable subsistence use by
Alaska Natives.”
“Management bodies will be created to
ensure an effective and meaningful role
for indigenous inhabitants in the
conservation of migratory birds. These
management bodies will include

Source/Authority & Notes
2008–2017, United States
v. Oregon Management
Agreement (May 2008)
Court-approved successor
to the 1988 Columbia River
Fish Management Plan,
stemming from Sohappy v.
Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D.
Or. 1969)
Marine Mammal
Commission, 2008443

Marine Mammal
Commission, 2019444
Reviewing implementation
of co-management authority
provided in § 119 of the
Marine Mammal Protection
Act (co-management not
defined in Act or
regulations)
Canada Protocol, amending
the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act (1996)445

443. Report of the Marine Mammal Commission, Review of CoManagement Efforts in Alaska (Feb. 6-8, 2008), at 39.
444. J.C. Malek & V.R. Cornish, Co-Management Of Marine Mammals
In Alaska: A Case Study-Based Review: Final Report (2019), at 12 (providing a
“working definition” of co-management).
445. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a
Protocol Between the U.S. and Canada Amending the 1916 Convention for the
Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the U.S., Aug. 2, 1996, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 104-28 at viii, ix (1996).
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Native, Federal, and State of Alaska
representatives as equals, and will
develop recommendations for, among
other things: seasons and bag limits;
law enforcement policies, population
and harvest monitoring; education
programs; research and use of
traditional knowledge; and habitat
protection…Creation of these
management bodies is intended to
provide more effective conservation of
migratory birds in designated
subsistence harvest areas without
diminishing the ultimate authority and
responsibility of DOI/FWS.”
“This Order focuses on developing
cooperative and collaborative
opportunities with tribes and does not
address ‘co-management’ which the
Department defines as a situation where
there is a specific legal basis that
requires the delegation of some aspect
of Federal decision-making or that
makes co-management otherwise
legally necessary. For example, in some
instances, such as management of the
salmon harvest in the Pacific
Northwest, co-management has been
established by law.”
“Co-management—two or more
entities, each having legally established
management responsibilities, working
collaboratively to achieve mutually
agreed upon, compatible objectives to
protect, conserve, use, enhance, or
restore natural and cultural resources.”

446.
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Leads to creation of the
Alaska Migratory Bird
Co-Management Council

Secretary of Interior, Order
No. 3342: Identifying
Opportunities for
Cooperative and
Collaborative Partnerships
with Federally Recognized
Indian Tribes in the
Management of Federal
Lands and Resources
(2016)

U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service, Tribal Consultation
Handbook (2018)446

Tribal Consultation Handbook, 52 (U.S. FWS 2018).
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Other
“Comanagement embodies the concept
and practice of two (or more)
sovereigns working together to address
and solve matters of critical concern to
each. [It] is not a demand for a tribal
veto power over federal projects, but
rather a call for an end to federal
unilateralism in decision making
affecting tribal rights and resources. It
is a call for a process that would
incorporate, in a constructive manner,
the policy and technical expertise of
each sovereign in a mutual,
participatory framework.”
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Ed Goodman, Protecting
Habitat for Off-Reservation
Tribal Hunting and Fishing
Rights: Tribal
Comanagement as a
Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL.
LAW 279, 284–85 (2000)

IV. TRIBAL CO-MANAGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT
OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
This Part places tribal co-management in the context of federalism
and intergovernmental relations and shows the different ways that
Congress has reconciled federal and state interests in public lands
management. Doing so helps reframe our thinking about tribal comanagement and makes clear the disadvantaged position of Indian tribes
when contrasted to the often-privileged role provided to state governments
in federal public lands and wildlife law. We conclude the Report by
discussing how some of the most common mechanisms used in federalism
could inform future tribal co-management legislation and rulemaking.
A. The Privileged Position of States and Disadvantaged
Position of Tribes in Federal Public Land Laws
In 1970, the Public Land and Law Review Commission provided
to Congress and the President its comprehensive review of federal public
lands law and management.447 It was the last time such a commission was
used and its work laid the foundation for the Federal Lands and Policy
Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976. The Commission’s report begins
with a chapter entitled, “To Whom the Public Lands Are Important,” and
answers the question with a review of the national public, regional public,
447. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 3.
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federal government (as sovereign and proprietor), state and local
governments, and users of public lands.448 Entirely missing from this
answer is any reference to Indian tribes and their rights and interests on
federal public lands.
Most federal public land statutes enacted in the 1960s and 1970s
similarly treat Indian tribes as invisible. Several of these laws include
“savings clauses” that disclaim a federal intention to completely displace
state laws related to water, wildlife, or other resources so long as the state
law does not conflict or undermine federal prerogatives. At their core, they
are about accommodating state interests—or Congress instead punting on
controversial issues pitting federal versus state authority. Yet, most of
these laws are entirely void of provisions related to Indian tribes.
In other cases, these laws extend to state and private actors
authorities and opportunities not provided to tribes, some with great
potential consequence to the cultural resources found on federal lands.
FLPMA, for example, authorizes the sale of “a tract of the public lands”
to states, local governments, adjoining landowners, individuals, and “any
other person.”449 But the law, which is similar to other land conveyance
statutes, fails “to afford Indian tribal governments the same process to
restore federal lands of legal and cultural importance to Indian
Country.”450 Fifty years later, it is time to correct this deficiency and
address the intergovernmental dimensions of public lands management—
this time, by including sovereign tribal governments.
Before turning to the particulars of federalism, it is important to
recognize the complicated mosaic of different interests, both public and
private, operating on public lands.451 The current situation is one where
even private interests have rights that are not provided to sovereign tribal
governments. Consider the extent of private interests operating on public
lands: grazing lessees, timber contractors, commercial guides and
outfitters, national park concessioners, and hardrock mining claimants that
essentially determine what unwithdrawn public lands will be explored and
possibly developed.

448. Id. at 33–38.
449. 43 U.S.C. § 1713 (2018).
450. National Congress of American Indians, Resolution #DEN-18-035,
Supporting Legislation to Improve Protections and Authorize the Restoration of
Native Sacred Places on Federal Lands (2018), https://www.ncai.org/attachments/
Resolution_PYCnwKpRbfWPiYzlKHPLmgHJMNoHiIZVffWZqBIifEouNkSdFeS_
DEN-18-035%20Final.pdf.
451. See, e.g., Sally Fairfax et al., The Federal Forests Are Not What They
Seem: Formal and Informal Claims to Federal Lands, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 630 (1999).
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An irony in many contemporary threats facing tribal cultural
resources on public lands is that they stem from private interests operating
with federal governmental license. Thus, while some interests question the
legality and purported dangers of asserting tribal rights and interests, little
is said about the nature of private rights on public lands. Nowhere is the
corporate footprint bigger than in the context of oil and gas leasing, with
more than 22 million acres currently leased across the western United
States.452 Private companies drive this process, starting with the power
granted to them by Congress to nominate public lands to be leased for
drilling through an “expression of interest.”453 Several of these leases
threaten tribal rights and cultural resources, with Chaco Canyon being one
prominent example. Our point here is to expose the inequity of the status
quo and to make clear that there is already a sharing of management on
public lands. However, it has not yet been extended to tribes to the same
degree as states and private interests.
B. Cooperative Federalism and Tribes-as-States
in Federal Pollution Control Laws
“Federalism” refers to the distribution of power between national
and state and tribal governments. Congress’s plenary power over federal
lands means that “states have legal authority to manage federal lands
within their borders to the extent that Congress has chosen to give them
such authority.”454 “Cooperative federalism” characterizes several federal
public land and wildlife laws. This means that while federal laws promote
a national interest and provide mandates regarding the management of
public lands and wildlife, they also carve out a role for state governments
to play in effectuating the purposes of these laws or in informing their
implementation.
Cooperative federalism is most well-known in the area of federal
pollution control law, such as the Clean Air and Clean Water acts, whereby
states participate in the implementation of standards established by federal
law. Federal monies are provided to states but they are contingent on the
452. See The Wilderness Society and Center for Western Priorities,
America’s Public Lands Giveaway (Apr. 2020), https://storymaps.arcgis.com/
stories/36d517f10bb0424493e88e3d22199bb3 (providing data on oil and gas leasing
on public lands).
453. See Bureau of Land Management, Expression of Interest (EOI),
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/leasing/parcel
-nominations (last visited Apr. 2021).
454. Carol Hardy Vincent & Alexandra M. Wyatt, State Management of
Federal Lands: Frequently Asked Questions, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 5
(2016).
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development of state regulations that meet federal requirements. These
laws preempt less stringent state and local requirements, referred to as
“floor preemption,” but do not prohibit the states from adopting
requirements that are more stringent and protective than the federal
government’s program (a presumption against “ceiling preemption”).
Although tribes were not initially considered or included in this
structure of cooperative federalism, amendments to those foundational
environmental laws in the late 1980s and early 1990s authorized a tribal
role similar to that of states.455 Pursuant to those amendments, tribes—like
states—may petition the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to assume the primary role for environmental regulation within
their reservation boundaries and, therefore, the provisions authorize their
“treatment as [a] state” or “tribes as states” (TAS).456 With that authority,
tribes could adopt their own water quality standards pursuant to the Clean
Water Act, to be enforced on their own or by the EPA, to regulate and
control drinking water quality, and to assume primacy under the Clean Air
Act in the same ways that those original environmental laws have
empowered states.457 As a result, tribes may set their own environmental
regulatory standards and if seek and recieve the EPA’s approval, enforce
those standards, potentially even beyond the reservation’s boundaries.458
In interpreting these provisions, the EPA has recognized a distinction
between inherent tribal sovereign power to exercise environmental
regulatory authority and the exercise of such authority pursuant to a
delegation of federal authority by the EPA to tribes.459 Most recently, the
EPA revised its interpretation of the Clean Water Act to be consistent with
the Clean Air Act, both of which the agency now views as authorizing the
455. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (2018); Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(a) (2018); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7601(d)(2)(B)
(2020); see also Hillary M. Hoffmann, Congressional Plenary Power and Indigenous
Environmental Stewardship: The Limits of Environmental Federalism, 97 OR. L. REV.
354, 383 (2019).
456. See Tribal Assumption of Federal Laws: Treatment as a State (TAS),
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/tribal/tribal-assumption-federal-laws
-treatment-state-tas (last visited July 12, 2020).
457. Hoffmann, supra note 455, at 383.
458. See id. at 389; City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 424
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding that upstream, non-tribal municipal wastewater facility had
to comply with water quality standards adopted by downstream Pueblo of Isleta).
459. See, e.g., Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal Provision,
81 Fed. Reg. 30,183 (May 16, 2016) (announcing EPA’s revised interpretation of the
Clean Water Act tribal provisions to include an “express delegation of authority by
Congress to Indian tribes to administer regulatory programs over their entire
reservations” provided tribes meet relevant eligibility criteria).
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express delegation of federal authority to eligible tribes to regulate their
entire reservations without regard to land-status-based jurisdictional
limitations imposed upon their inherent authority by the United States
Supreme Court.460
C. Cooperative Federalism in Public Lands and Wildlife Law
This type of cooperative regulatory scheme found in federal
pollution control laws is not as prevalent in federal public lands law
because the Property Clause of the United States Constitution provides for
more exclusive federal authority over federal lands and resources.
Nonetheless, Congress has provided multiple ways for states to participate
in public lands and resources management. These are best viewed on a
continuum, from laws providing no required state involvement461 to those
providing more substantive opportunities.462 An example of the latter is
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (1968), which provides protection of rivers
through a process of congressional designation or by state nomination to
the Secretary of Interior. The latter pathway requires a river to first be
designated as wild or scenic by a state legislature, the state proposal is then
reviewed and possibly approved by the Secretary of Interior, and then the
designated river is administered by a state agency.463 Though less than ten
percent of river designations go the state proposal route, the law provides
states an opportunity to play a substantive role in the designation and
management of wild and scenic rivers.464
“Coordination areas” managed by the USFWS provide “the most
extreme example of [Fish and Wildlife] Service deference to state wildlife
programs.”465 In contrast to National Wildlife Refuges, these areas are
460. Id. at 30,190 (noting that “such a territorial approach that treats Indian
reservations uniformly promotes rational, sound management of environmental
resources that might be subjected to mobile pollutants that disperse over wide areas
without regard to land ownership”); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
461. The Antiquities Act, 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2018), for example, does
not mention the role that states should play in the presidential designation of national
monuments, as the purpose of this law was to provide Presidents an expedited way to
protect by proclamation “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and
other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated on land owned or
controlled by the Federal Government to be national monuments.”
462. For a more nuanced view, see Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative
Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 179 (2005).
463. 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a) (2018).
464. Sandra L. Johnson & Laura B. Comay, The National Wild and Scenic
Rivers System: A Brief Overview, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 4 (2015).
465. ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES:
COORDINATING A CONSERVATION SYSTEM THROUGH LAW 88 (2003).
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federally-owned lands but are managed, with nearly full jurisdiction, by
states under cooperative agreements or long-term leases from the
USFWS.466 Most of these areas were established during the 1950s when
there was no legal mechanism for the USFWS to enter into cooperative
agreements with states.467 Though part of the National Wildlife Refuge
System, coordination areas are excluded from provisions of the 1997
National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, from planning
requirements to the statute’s compatibility determination framework.468
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) provides another
example. As discussed in Part III(B), Section 119 of the Act authorizes comanagement between the federal government and Alaska Native
Organizations for a relatively narrow set of purposes, such as collecting
and analyzing data and monitoring the harvest of marine mammals for
subsistence use. In contrast, Section 109 of the MMPA authorizes the
federal government to transfer management authority to the States, for
broadly defined species “conservation and management,” if certain criteria
are met.469 The arrangement, in short, is “much more demanding of the
receiving state, but also provides a much greater breadth of authority” than
the Act’s co-management provision.470 As is the case with other federalism
provisions in environmental law, this does not mean states get to use their
transfer authorities to undermine the purposes of the statute in question, as
the transfer authority must be “consistent with the purposes, policies, and
goals of [the Act] and with international treaty obligations.”471 But it does
provide for significant power-sharing with the states, including
authorizing the Secretary to delegate to a state the “administration and
enforcement” of the MMPA.472
Several federal public land and wildlife laws provide states with
an opportunity to “cooperate” in management and “coordinate” with states
466. 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(5) (2020). The term “coordination area” means “a
wildlife management area that is made available to a State—(A) by cooperative
agreement between the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and a State agency
having control over wildlife resources pursuant to section 664 of this title; or (B) by
long-term leases or agreements pursuant to title III of the Bankhead-Jones Farm
Tenant Act” (50 Stat. 525; 7 U.S.C. § 1010, et seq. (2020)).
467. National Wildlife Refuge System, Coordination Areas, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERVICE, https://www.fws.gov/refuges/about/coordareas.html (last visited
Aug. 27, 2020).
468. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(3); 50 C.F.R. § 25.12(a)) (2020).
469. 16 U.S.C. § 1379(b)(1).
470. Julie Lurman Joly, Tribal Management Under the MMPA: A Way
Forward for Local Control, 4 AM. IND. L. J. 200, 207 (2016).
471. 16 U.S.C. § 1379(b)(1)(A).
472. Id. § 1379(k).

2021

BRIDGES TO A NEW ERA

163

in federal planning processes. For example, the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) provides that federal agencies “shall cooperate to the maximum
extent practicable with the States.”473 Under ESA Section 6, federal
agencies may also enter into cooperative agreements with any state that
establishes and maintains an “adequate and active” program for the
conservation of listed species.474
USFS and BLM management provide two additional examples.
The Forest Service’s Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA) of 1960
is typical of the public land statutes of that era that fail to recognize any
tribal rights and interests. In effectuating the multiple use mandate, the
MUSYA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture “to cooperate with
interested State and local governmental agencies and others in the
development and management of the national forests.”475
The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) also provides for
the development of forest plans “coordinated with the land and resource
management planning processes of State and local governments and other
Federal agencies.”476 The provisions are limited insofar as they pertain to
state engagement in forest and rangeland planning processes and they do
not extend to USFS management across the board. A similar provision
requires the Secretary of Agriculture to “coordinate land use plans for
lands in the National Forest System with the land use planning and
management programs of and for Indian tribes by, among other things,
considering the policies of approved tribal land resource management
programs.”477
The Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) includes a
similar provision encouraging the coordination and consistency of federal
and state land use plans:
[T]o the extent consistent with the laws governing the
administration of the public lands, coordinate the land use
inventory, planning, and management activities of or for
such lands with the land use planning and management
programs of other Federal departments and agencies and
of the States and local governments within which the
lands are located . . .478

473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.

Id. § 1535(a).
Id. § 1535(c)(1).
Id. § 530.
Id. § 1604(a); 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(b)(1) (2021).
43 U.S.C. § 1712(b) (2018).
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (2020).
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The section goes on to explain that “[l]and use plans of the Secretary under
this section shall be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum
extent he finds consistent with Federal law and the purposes of this Act.”479
These provisions provide state governors the opportunity to advise BLM
of their positions on draft land use plans. BLM must consider this advice
in so-called “consistency reviews.”480
FLPMA’s coordination and consistency provision recognizes
tribal coordination but not to the same degree as provided to state and local
governments. The Secretary “shall, to the extent practical, keep apprised
of State, local, and tribal land use plans . . . [and] assist in resolving, to the
extent practical, inconsistencies between Federal and non-Federal
Government plans . . .”481 The section then provides “meaningful public
involvement of State and local government officials,” with Indian tribes
once again not included.482
479. Id.
480. See, e.g., New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
565 F.3d 683, 721 (10th Cir. 2009) (“A meaningful opportunity to comment is all the
regulation requires.”). This case focused on the mineral development of Otero Mesa
in New Mexico, with the Governor using FLPMA’s consistency review provision. 43
C.F.R. § 1610.3-2(e) (2020). Though the court found that a “meaningful opportunity
to comment is all the regulation requires,” New Mexico, 565 F.3d at 721, it is
nonetheless an opportunity not provided to the tribes in the area.
481. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9).
482. Id. (The section in its entirety: [T]o the extent consistent with the laws
governing the administration of the public lands, coordinate the land use inventory,
planning, and management activities of or for such lands with the land use planning
and management programs of other Federal departments and agencies and of the
States and local governments within which the lands are located, including, but not
limited to, the statewide outdoor recreation plans developed under chapter 2003 of
title 54, and of or for Indian tribes by, among other things, considering the policies of
approved State and tribal land resource management programs. In implementing this
directive, the Secretary shall, to the extent he finds practical, keep apprised of State,
local, and tribal land use plans; assure that consideration is given to those State, local,
and tribal plans that are germane in the development of land use plans for public lands;
assist in resolving, to the extent practical, inconsistencies between Federal and nonFederal Government plans, and shall provide for meaningful public involvement of
State and local government officials, both elected and appointed, in the development
of land use programs, land use regulations, and land use decisions for public lands,
including early public notice of proposed decisions which may have a significant
impact on non-Federal lands. Such officials in each State are authorized to furnish
advice to the Secretary with respect to the development and revision of land use plans,
land use guidelines, land use rules, and land use regulations for the public lands within
such State and with respect to such other land use matters as may be referred to them
by him. Land use plans of the Secretary under this section shall be consistent with
State and local plans to the maximum extent he finds consistent with Federal law and
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Another common approach in cooperative federalism is
authorizing non-federal actors to enter into cooperative agreements and
contracts with federal land agencies. The MUSYA, for example, allows
the Secretary of Agriculture “to negotiate and enter into cooperative
agreements with public or private agencies, organizations, institutions, or
persons’” for various purposes, including pollution control and forest
protection, “when he determines that the public interest will be benefited
and that there exists a mutual interest other than monetary
considerations.”483 FLPMA’s provision is more open-ended, allowing the
Secretary to “enter into contracts and cooperative agreements involving
the management, protection, development, and sale of public lands.”484
“Each agency has its own vocabulary for describing how these
arrangements work on the ground, but several types of contracts,
cooperative agreements, assistance agreements, and memorandums-ofunderstanding (MOU) are used to share some management, and even
financial, responsibilities.”485 In some cases, such as with Kasha-Katuwe
in New Mexico, assistance agreements are used for implementing the
purposes of joint management of the monument.
In recent years, state governments have received even greater
authority to “share stewardship” and “co-manage fire risk” on public lands
with the USFS and BLM.486 “Good neighbor authority,” for example,
permits the USFS and BLM to partner with states—via cooperative
agreements with a state governor or county—to performing a wide range
of forest, rangeland, and watershed restoration services, including
activities to treat insect- and disease-infected trees, reduce hazardous fuels,
and “any other activities to restore or improve forest, rangeland, and
watershed health, including fish and wildlife habitat.”487 This includes
permitting states to administer timber sales on federal land and for federal
agencies to use the value of wood products to purchase restoration services
from state agencies.488
The Tribal Forest Protection Act (TFPA) of 2004 provides an
example of how agreements and contracting authority could be reshaped
to facilitate tribal, as opposed to state, co-management in the future. Tribes
the purposes of this Act.).
483. 16 U.S.C. § 565a-1 (2018).
484. 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b).
485. For a review with examples, see Nie, supra note 128, at 610–12.
486. Toward Shared Stewardship Across Landscapes: An Outcome-Based
Investement Strategy, No. FS–118 (USFS 2018).
487. 16 U.S.C. § 2113a.
488. See Tyson Bertone-Riggs et al., Understanding Good Neighbor
Authority: Case Studies from Across the West, RURAL VOICES FOR CONSERVATION
COAL., Sept. 2018.
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and the USFS share roughly 2,675 miles of common boundary.489 The
TFPA is designed to protect tribal forest assets by authorizing tribes to
propose work and enter into agreements and contracts with the USFS and
BLM to reduce threats posed by fire on federal land. The statute
establishes a framework in which tribes can “propose projects that would
protect their rights, lands, and resources by reducing threats from wildlife,
insects, and disease.”490 Among other restrictions, the TFPA requires tribal
proposals to focus on USFS land that (1) is adjacent to federal land, (2)
poses a fire, disease, or other threat to Indian trust land or community or
is in need of restoration, and (3) involves a “feature of circumstance unique
to that Indian tribe (including treaty rights or biological, archeological,
historical, or cultural circumstances).”491 When evaluating tribal
proposals, the Act allows the USFS to use a “best value basis” and give
specific consideration to tribally-related factors, such as the cultural,
traditional, and historical affiliation of the tribe with the land, reserved
treaty rights, and the indigenous knowledge of tribal members, among
other factors.492
Relatively few TFPA proposals have been accepted and
implemented by the USFS.493 However, as we discuss in Part V, the design
of this law is instructive to tribal co-management because it “sends a
strong message that tribes need not wait for the federal agency to develop
and consult on national forest projects,” but instead “supports tribes taking
the lead in developing project proposals and requesting an agency
response.”494
D. Tribal Co-Management as Next Step in Cooperative Federalism
The principles and strategies employed in cooperative federalism
should be extended to Indian tribes and modified to affirm tribal
489. Fulfilling the Promise of The Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004,
Vol. I: An Analysis by the Intertribal Timber Council in Collaboration with USDA
Forest Service and Bureau of Indian Affairs, 2 (Apr. 2013) [hereinafter Intertribal
Timber Council Report].
490. Id. at 1.
491. § 2(c), Pub. L. No. 108-278, 118 Stat. 868 (July 22, 2004).
492. Id. at § 2(e).
493. The Intertribal Timber Council Report, supra note 489, at 2–3
(identifying 11 projects accepted by the USFS, with six being successfully
implemented). It is clear, the Council found, that “the TFPA authority has been
scarcely used.”
494. Stephanie A. Lucero & Sonia Tamez, Working Together to
Implement the Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004: Partnerships for Today and
Tomorrow, 115(5) J. FORESTRY 468, 469 (2017).
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sovereignty and safeguard the cultural resources and reserved treaty rights
found on federal public lands. Though more contemporary statutes include
tribal participation in provisions related to federalism and collaboration,
there remains a bias and privileging of state and local governments in
federal public land law. This is especially problematic when we consider
that tribal, and not state governments, are the sovereigns with treaty rights,
property interests and a trust relationship on federal lands.
That so many federal public land laws fail to adequately recognize
tribal rights and interests provides an opening for administrative rule and
policymaking. The history of TAS authority is instructive. As discussed
above, Congress amended a number of environmental statutes authorizing
Indian tribes to apply for TAS authority. In those cases where, because of
judicial divestiture,495 tribal inherent authority might not fulfill the broad
congressional purposes of comprehensive environmental regulation, the
EPA has lawfully used its rulemaking powers to interpret those statutes as
delegating federal power—even over non-tribally owned lands—to tribes
to do so.496
The ESA provides another example. Outside of the taking of listed
species by Alaska Natives for subsistence purposes, the law is silent on its
applicability to Indian tribes and treaty rights. In 1997, under President
Clinton, the secretaries of Interior and Commerce negotiated and drafted
with tribal representatives—on a government-to-government basis—the
Joint Secretarial Order on “American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal
Trust Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act.”497 Order 3206
attempts to harmonize “the [f]ederal trust responsibility to tribes, tribal
sovereignty, and statutory missions of the [d]epartments, and strives to
ensure that Indian tribes do not bear a disproportionate burden for the
conservation of listed species, so as to avoid or minimize the potential for
conflict and confrontation.”498 Several principles are stated in the Order
encouraging “cooperative assistance,” “consultation,” “the sharing of
information,” the “creation of government-to-government partnerships to
promote healthy ecosystems,” and use of the “intergovernmental
agreements.”499
495. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 4.02(3)(a).
496. See, e.g., Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal Provision,
supra note 459.
497. American
Indian
Tribal
Rights,
Federal-Tribal
Trust
Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act, Secretarial Order No. 3206 (June
5, 1997).
498. Id.
499. Id. § 4 (“The Departments shall, when appropriate and at the request
of an Indian tribe, pursue intergovernmental agreements to formalize arrangements
involving sensitive species (including candidate, proposed, and listed species) such as,
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Order 3206 demonstrates the type of leadership that can be
asserted by the next President. From a tribal and endangered species
standpoint, the Order is far from perfect.500 But it did result from the
Secretary of Interior initiating the process and making its bilateral
negotiation a priority. As captured by law professor Charles F. Wilkinson,
who participated in the process:
The Order is no dramatic breakthrough, no Olympian
moment in federal Indian policy. It is just a sensible, fair
approach to a thorny area of policy developed by people
who took the time to listen, negotiate, open up their
minds, and take some chances. But, in a complicated
world, this is exactly where progress is often made—in
measured, collaborative approaches to particular
problems. And the worth of the process stands out in sharp
relief because it was set against the long and mostly
dreary canvas of federal-tribal relations. The pageantry in
the Indian Treaty Room did not commemorate some epic
event, but it did rightly celebrate a solid accomplishment
that holds out promise for those who believe that an
honest, open, and hardworking mutuality ought to serve
as the foundation for Indian policy.501
This type of mutuality can also be combined with more traditional
statutory and regulatory frameworks employed in cooperative federalism
in crafting new tribal co-management legislation. The most important
principle perhaps is to recognize the parameters and criteria provided by
Congress when transferring or sharing management authority with nonfederal actors. States are not delegated carte blanche discretion in these
statutes, but must rather meet certain standards and criteria upon receiving
federal funding and assuming management responsibilities. As discussed
in Part III, the tribal co-management regimes now in place are similarly
but not limited to, land and resource management, multi-jurisdictional partnerships,
cooperative law enforcement, and guidelines to accommodate Indian access to, and
traditional uses of, natural products.”); id. § 6 (“Such agreements shall strive to
establish partnerships that harmonize the Departments’ missions under the Act with
the Indian tribes own ecosystem management objectives.”).
500. See, e.g., Drew Kraniak, Conserving Endangered Species in Indian
Country: The Success and Struggles of Joint Secretarial Order 3206 Nineteen Years
On, 26 COLO. NAT. RES. ENERGY & ENVTL L. REV. 321 (2015).
501. See Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the
Federal-Tribal Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial
Order, 72 U. WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1088 (1997).
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circumscribed and used to achieve the purposes set forth in judicial
decrees, statutes, and presidential proclamations.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING TRIBAL
CO-MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS

The history, context, and framework of federal public land law is
predicated on the removal and marginalization of tribal claims to and
interests in those lands. While various approaches and strategies have been
developed to re-engage tribes and their historical connections to public
lands and resources, none of those options has yet resulted in an equitable
balance of tribal and federal management or responsibilities. To reach that
objective, federal land management agencies must be compelled to more
effectively work with tribes on a co-management basis, much like they are
compelled to fulfill their other obligations and priorities in managing and
protecting the lands for which they are responsible.
A. Executive Actions
A future presidential administration should use its authority to
affirm tribal sovereignty and effectuate the federal government’s treaty
and trust obligations through innovations in tribal co-management and
shared governance on federal public lands. Without new tribal comanagement legislation, the clearest path for doing so is by building and
strengthening those bridges to tribal co-management examined in this
Report. Importantly, because the foundations for those bridges are already
in place, progress can be made even without the additional actions
recommended here. However, the proactive measures described below
would not only reinvigorate the traditional tools of tribal engagement and
implementation, but more strategically link them together as a way to
harmonize federal Indian and public lands law and management. That our
public land laws are generally silent about tribal rights and interests should
be viewed not as an obstacle but as an opening for presidential leadership.
1. To Issue a New Executive Order or Joint Secretarial
Order on Tribal Co-Management
Such leadership can start with an executive order or jointly issued
order by the secretaries of Interior and Agriculture on tribal comanagement on federal public lands. The Order should pick up where
SecretaryJewell’s Order 3342 left off. Order 3342, focused on “Identifying
Opportunities for Cooperative and Collaborative Partnerships with
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Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in the Management of Federal Lands
and Resources,” provides a limited review of existing legal authorities for
tribal cooperation and directs Interior bureaus to “identify opportunities
for cooperative management arrangements and collaborative partnerships
with tribes and undertake efforts, where appropriate, to prepare their
respective bureau staffs to partner with tribes in the management of the
natural and cultural resources over which the bureaus maintain jurisdiction
and responsibility.”502 As we discuss in Part III(C), Jewell’s Order makes
a distinction between co-management and “cooperative and collaborative
partnerships” with tribes, emphasizing the limitations imposed by the
delegation doctrine and the “inherently federal function” threshold. In this
context, the Order calls for the development of a working group in the
Office of Solicitor to advise bureaus on the relevant legal issues.
As we explain in Part III(D), we believe the Solicitor should
update their advice on these matters, with a clearer focus on their
application to sovereign Indian tribes in contrast to state and private actors
operating on federal lands. Distinguishing between what constitutes an
unlawful delegation of authority and what are instead “sovereigntyaffirming subdelegations” that “affirm tribal sovereignty by intermingling
federal and tribal power”503 would help clarify matters and give agencies
in both departments more confidence in utilizing their existing authorities.
With such clarification, agencies could then be charged to negotiate and
enter a certain number of such agreements each year—a more proactive
accountability measure than the annual reporting of available functions
and agreements currently in place.504 The Office of the Solicitor may also
wish to consider the findings in this Report, including the fact that most
definitions and applications of tribal co-management do not include a total
delegation of authority or call for tribal unilateralism. Solicitors should
assist in identifying additional, legally-sufficient co-management options
that are short of a total delegation of authority.
Secretary Jewell’s Order provides an incomplete list of legal
authorities on which to base collaborative partnerships with tribes,
focusing on the use of “cooperative agreement” clauses in federal land
laws. It also provides a list of exemplary collaborative partnerships
502. Identifying Opportunities for Cooperative and Collaborative
Partnerships with Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in the Management of Federal
Lands and Resources, Secretarial Order No. 3206, § 5 (2016).
503. See Lazerwitz, supra note 404, at 1046.
504. See List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Funding Agreements
Negotiated with Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other than the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and Fiscal Year 2020 Programmatic Targets, 85 Fed. Reg. 12,326 (Mar.
2, 2020) (2020 List).
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between Interior bureaus and Indian tribes. Needed next is an order going
deeper, drawing from first principles of federal Indian law and more recent
cases of innovation to explain how existing authorities and processes can
serve as a bridge to tribal co-management. We have provided examples of
how those bridges could be constructed in the future, such as strategically
linking consultation, compacting, or contracting; NHPA designations and
processes; and public lands planning. Federal land agencies can help
identify additional bridges and opportunities in this regard.
Tribal co-management can be further prioritized and rewarded
through specific performance measures for agency leadership and by
evaluating a public land manager’s engagement with tribes and efforts in
co-management in annual performance reviews. Such changes, coming
from agency headquarters and regional offices, will help ensure that this
new era of tribal relations will be institutionalized and incentivized.
2. To Provide Oversight and Ensure that Federal Land Use
Plans Adequately Account for Tribal Rights and Interests
and that Early and Meaningful Tribal Engagement is
Used to Inform the Desired Conditions, Objectives, and
Legal Constraints of Federal Lands Management
The opportunities presented by federal lands planning should be
part of the joint order on tribal co-management. As we recommend in Part
II(D)(3), the President should ensure that federal land planning regulations
and agency-specific manuals, handbooks, and policies related to cultural
resources and tribal relations comport with the first principles of federal
Indian law and the core principles of tribal co-management. The process
for doing so must include early and substantive tribal engagement and,
potentially, inter-agency consultation with the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
The USFS and BLM are in the process of revising plans throughout the
country, many of which are now decades old and fail to adequately account
for tribal rights and interests on federal lands. Guidance from the highest
levels of the executive branch can help ensure that every plan revision is
viewed as an opportunity to do things differently, to better integrate the
National Historic Preservation Act, and to effectuate the purposes of the
joint order.
3. To Connect the Tribal Consultation Responsibilities of Federal
Agencies to the Public Lands Missions of those Agencies
Similarly, whether part of the proposed joint secretarial order or
through additional executive orders, further guidance and mandates for
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agencies to improve their approach to tribal consultation are necessary to
better fulfill the promising potential for tribal co-management. These
additional directives could draw on the 2017 interagency report regarding
consultation on infrastructure projects (described above) but should focus
specifically on linking agency consultation obligations to the public lands
management missions of those agencies. The long history of separation
between public land law and the federal government’s trust obligations to
Indian tribes has resulted in agency practices that often prioritize the
former while the latter is viewed as external to those priorities. Thus, tribal
consultation must be implemented as a federal objective on equal standing
with existing federal land management priorities focused on multiple-use,
wilderness, refuge, or other goals. In other words, executive actions should
be taken to integrate tribal consultation as a fundamental objective of
federal public land management agencies that promotes long-term,
ongoing, and co-equal federal-tribal relations.
In conjunction with this integration, additional accountability
measures should also be developed in order to ensure their workability and
success. Incorporating consultation mandates into personnel evaluations,
especially for agency leaders, will help incentivize and ensure
accountability at the institutional and employee level. In addition,
however, procedural accountability measures, such as basing decisions
upon mutual concurrence with interested tribes or requiring written
explanations of agency decisions that respond to tribal input during the
consultation process, would help support improvements to consultation
relationships and ensure more robust, timely, and meaningful federaltribal relationships.
4. To Develop Protocols for Tribal Involvement in
Monument Designations under the Antiquities Act
Consistent with executive actions to advance tribal comanagement, improve public lands planning, and enhance the
effectiveness of tribal consultation, further executive action could be taken
to build on the promise of the Antiquities Act shown by the Bears Ears
Intertribal Coalition and its work to propose and support the designation
of the Bears Ears National Monument. As described above, that proposal
was the first of its kind in that it represented and was developed by tribal
voices and suggested using the executive authority allowed by the
Antiquities Act to protect an area for its continuing tribal cultural values
and connections. In addition, the Coalition’s proposal included a
framework for tribal co-management that, while not ultimately included in
the proclamation, offered a new opportunity for enhancing that concept.
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While the Antiquities Act gives the President broad discretion to
designate new national monuments, future exercises of that discretion
should rely on the Bears Ears example to ensure that tribes with historical,
cultural, or other connections to areas being considered for designation as
a national monument are involved in the review and designation process.
While the Bears Ears Intertribal Coalition took it upon itself to develop
and pursue a national monument proposal, future uses of the Antiquities
Act should work to ensure that similar consideration is given to the
protection of tribal uses and connections to national monuments and,
where appropriate, that newly proclaimed national monuments include
provisions calling for a tribal role in management of those monuments.
5. To Hold Agencies Accountable for Supporting, Implementing,
and Enhancing Tribal Contracting and Compacting Authorities
to Assume Responsibilities for Public Lands Management
As described above, since the passage of the Tribal Self
Government Act (TSGA) in 1994, the Secretary of the Interior has been
obligated to annually review and report on the success of agencies within
Interior in compacting with tribes to transfer previously federal
obligations.505 Review of these annual reports demonstrates the lackluster
success of agencies in doing so, particularly regarding the transfer of
meaningful public land management responsibilities to tribes.506 In
conjunction with other executive actions promoting meaningful tribal comanagement opportunities, the secretaries of Interior and Agriculture
should also issue additional directives to the public land management
agencies within their purview that will serve to reinvigorate the purposes
and intent of the TSGA as envisioned by Congress in 1994.
Rather than simply reporting on available programs and existing
compacts, the secretaries should demand and publicly report on the
number of compacts entered into by their agencies, seek tribal and agency
input on barriers to successful compacting for broader co-management
authority, and, consistent with those findings, direct additional technical
assistance, accountability, or other resources toward expanding the use
and effectiveness of the TSGA (and its TFPA and 2018 Farm Bill
505. 25 U.S.C. § 5365(c) (2018).
506. Compare, e.g., the 2020 List, 85 Fed. Reg. 12,326 (Mar. 2, 2020)
(listing six total compacts between the three Interior agencies—BLM, NPS, USFWS)
with List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Funding
Agreements to be Negotiated With Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other
than the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,032 (Mar. 8, 1999) (describing two
compacts entered into by the NPS).
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counterparts for the USFS) as a bridge to tribal co-management. As with
improving accountability for consultation, performance metrics for agency
leaders and staff could incorporate contracting and compacting to
incentivize improvement of those practices.
B. Congressional Actions
The most effective and efficient way to enable tribal comanagement is through congressional lawmaking. We sketch out two
potential pathways in this regard: (1) tribal co-management through placebased legislation, and (2) tribal co-management through system-wide
legislation.
Another pathway not explored herein is by amending the suite of
federal public land statutes referenced throughout the Report. Most of
these statutes fail to reference, never mind protect, tribal treaty rights,
sacred places, or cultural resources. Each could be amended to reconcile
the past and adequately account for tribal rights and interests on public
lands. If our federal public land statutes were ever to be systematically
reviewed again, by a commission or comparable entity, this approach
would be feasible and warranted. However, we are aware of the political
dangers posed by opening these statutes and believe that there are more
efficient legislative approaches that can be taken.
Accountability mechanisms can be built into both legislative
approaches. Laws that provide for tribal co-management will confront the
fundamental questions and tensions that are baked into public lands
lawmaking writ large, including: (1) how to balance the need for
prescription, accountability, and enforceability with administrative
discretion, (2) how best to hold governments—including federal and
tribal—accountable, including through appropriate dispute resolution
procedures; and (3) what are the purposes and constraints of tribal comanagement. The place-based and system-wide options are premised on
the same vision. Each would shift the reactionary tribal consultation
paradigm to a more pro-active and affirmative model in which Indian
tribes can submit their own proposals and plans and “expressions of
interest” for re-envisioning management of treaty rights, sacred places,
and cultural resources on public lands. The cases reviewed in this report
make clear that the core principles of co-management can be configured
into creative and accountable ways of governing that fit unique historical
and legal contexts, political realities, and landscapes.
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1. Place-based Legislation
Place-based legislation could be used to codify forms of tribal comanagement that are specific to a particular unit in the federal public land
system. Establishment or site-specific enabling legislation specifies how
one particular place or unit of public lands is managed. This individualized
approach is most common in the National Park and National Wildlife
Refuge systems, but is also applied to lands managed by the USFS and
BLM.507 Congress has used all types of “conservation overlays” in the
past, such as “protected area” designations with special provisions,
“special management areas,” “conservation areas,” “recreation areas,” or
whatever names Congress deems fit.
There is a history of using the place-based approach to protect
tribal treaty rights, sacred areas, and cultural resources on public lands.508
In 1987, for example, Congress used three land use designations—a
national monument, national conservation area, and wilderness areas— to
protect the el malpais (“badlands” in Spanish) region of New Mexico, a
place of historical, religious, and cultural importance to the Acoma and
Zuni Pueblos and other tribes.509 The T’uf Shur Bien Preservation Trust
Area Act (2003) provides another example. The law created the T’uf Shur
Bien Preservation Trust Area within the Cibola National Forest and Sandia
Mountain Wilderness “to preserve in perpetuity the national forest and
wilderness character of the Area”510 and provides the Pueblo of Sandia
special authorities regarding how the area will be managed. To guarantee
“perpetual preservation” of the area, “the Act provides the Pueblo the right
to consent or withhold consent—veto power—over any new use of the
area that might be proposed by the U.S. Forest Service in the future.”511
A more recent example is provided by proposed legislation to
protect the Greater Chaco region in the Southwest from increased oil and
gas development adjacent to the Chaco Culture National Historical Park.
The Chaco Cultural Heritage Area Protection Act, introduced by all five
members of New Mexico’s congressional delegation, would prevent
507. See Martin Nie & Michael Fiebig, Managing the National Forests
through Place-Based Legislation, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (2010) (providing a history and
review of the approach, from the Bull Run Watershed Management Unit in the Mount
Hood National Forest to the Valles Caldera National Preserve and Trust).
508. See Nie, supra note 128, at 626–38.
509. An Act to Establish the El Malpais National Monument and the El
Malpais National Conservation Area in the State of New Mexico, to Authorize the
Masau Trail, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 100-225, 101 Stat. 1539 (Dec. 31,
1987); 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-21 (2006).
510. Id. § 404(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11 (Feb. 20, 2003).
511. See Nie, supra note 128, at 629–30.
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leasing and development on federal lands within a ten-mile radius of the
Park, which serves as a proposed Chaco protection zone.512 This placebased bill and its proposed mineral withdrawal is mostly defensive in
nature and stems in large part from the BLM’s inadequate NHPA
consultation and protection of sacred lands and traditional cultural
properties in the area.513
The proposed “Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act,” introduced
by Senator Jon Tester (D-MT) in July 2020, provides a more precedentsetting example that not only provides permanent protection for a sacred
area but also a model for future governance.514 Like the Intertribal Bears
Ears Proposal discussed in Part III(E), the proposal demonstrates a form
of carefully-crafted, innovative shared governance that could enable tribal
co-management in the future. And like Bears Ears, the Badger-Two
Medicine Protection Act emanates from Blackfeet values and vision for
the area, most recently articulated in a 2017 Proposal to Establish
Permanent Protections by the Blackfeet Tribal Historic Preservation
Office and the Tribal Business Council.
The legislative proposal strategically builds on the existing
designations and protections already afforded to the Badger-Two
Medicine, from the National Forest and travel management plans for the
area to the TCD designation.515 In many respects, the latter is the linchpin
of the proposal because it is designed to “permanently protect the cultural
values, attributes, and integrity of the Badger-Two Medicine Traditional
Cultural District.”516 It also provides the purpose of the bill’s tribal
coordination provision, essentially linking a procedural consultation
requirement to the substantive determination of “whether management is
compatible with the values and attributes of the Badger-Two Medicine
[TCD].”517
512 H.R. 2181, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 1079, 116th Cong. (2019).
513. See, e.g., Uncited Preliminary Brief (Deferred Appendix Appeal) of
Amici Curiae All Pueblo Council of Governors and National Trust for Historic
Preservation, in Support of Appellants,” Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t, et
al. v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 831 (10th Cir. 2019) (describing BLM NHPA violations in
failing to consult with Pueblo tribal governments when considering applications for
permits to drill and how they would potentially affect traditional cultural properties in
the area).
514. Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act, S. 4288, 116th Cong. (as
introduced July 22, 2020).
515. See Martin Nie, Selected Law and Policy Provisions of Relevance to
Permanent Protection and Management of the Badger-Two Medicine, BOLLE CENTER
FOR PEOPLE AND FORESTS (2019) (on file with authors).
516. Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act, supra note 514, § 4(2).
517. Id. § 6(a)(1).
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Though the term “co-management” is not found in the bill, it
reflects the fundamental principles of a tribal co-management approach.
The bill also showcases how to provide for political and legal
accountability and how to reconcile the values and uses of the area by
tribal and non-tribal people. It begins with a clearly defined set of
management purposes, permitted uses, and prohibitions, all helping to
define the objectives and legal constraints of co-management. Provisions
related to roadbuilding, motorized and mechanized use, vegetation
management, grazing, wildfire, water resources, and Native American
cultural and religious use, among others, are addressed in the bill.
Not all potential problems and uses can be anticipated in
legislation, so the bill creates a new mechanism for the Blackfeet Tribe to
grant or deny consent for new proposed uses and authorizes the Tribe to
perform management functions using self-determination contracting
authorities. Representation of non-tribal values and interests are
incorporated into the bill, with opportunities provided through an advisory
council focused on preparation and implementation of a management plan
and via existing accountability mechanisms provided by NEPA and APAbased judicial review.
In short, the Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act demonstrates
one way that co-management can be purposed, structured, and constrained
in place-based legislation.
2. System-wide Legislation
Tribal co-management on federal public lands can also be enabled
through new legislation creating a structured framework that provides
tribes an opportunity to submit their own proposed co-management plans
for consideration by the secretaries of Interior and Agriculture. This
legislative approach is used within federal Indian and public lands law and
various features of these statutes could be modified to enable and prioritize
tribal co-management. The law’s findings would be based on and reaffirm
the first principles of federal Indian law, including the unique relationship
between the federal government and the governments of Indian tribes, the
federal trust responsibility, and the fiduciary responsibilities of the United
States as found in the specific commitments made in treaties and
agreements.
The law could establish a demonstration program in which tribal
co-management applications and proposed plans would be submitted by
governing bodies of Indian tribes and vetted through some type of review
process that would hue to the specified requirements provided in the
umbrella statute. The Indian Trust Asset Reform Act (ITARA) of 2016
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provides an example of how a new co-management statute might be
structured in this regard.518 Although that law applies only to trust
resources already owned by the federal government for the benefit of
Indian tribes or tribally owned lands,519 it authorizes a tribe to develop a
trust asset management plan that, subject to approval by the Secretary of
the Interior, would guide tribal management of those resources.520 The law
specifies what contents must be included in proposed Indian trust asset
management plans, with technical assistance and information provided by
the Secretary of Interior on receipt of a written request from an Indian
tribe.521
Three crux issues in negotiating and drafting this legislation will
be determining: (1) the process for approval and disapproval of proposed
plans; (2) determining the scope and content requirements of submitted
co-management proposals, and (3) securing long-term funding
commitments. We discuss each in turn.
The system-wide co-management approach would encourage and
facilitate tribes submitting their own proposals for co-management, which
may or may not be prepared in collaboration with other interests and
partners. Accountability will be a primary concern that must cut in both
directions: to ensure that those implementing tribal co-management
proposals are accountable for protecting public lands and to ensure that the
secretaries of Interior and Agriculture are held accountable for their
decisions to approve and disapprove of proposed plans.
As we discuss in Part II(C), an important limitation on TSGA
compacting and contracting is the broad discretion provided to non-BIA
bureaus to deny tribal proposals without justification and methods of
remedy. The Tribal Forest Protection Act (TFPA), discussed in Part IV(C),
provides another example of a program not reaching its potential, in part
because of the discretionary nature of the selection process. If a tribal
request is denied under the Act:
[T]he Secretary may issue a notice of denial to the Indian
tribe, which (1) identifies the specific factors that caused,
and explains the reasons that support, the denial; (2)
identifies potential courses of action for overcoming
specific issues that led to the denial; and (3) proposes a
schedule of consultation with the Indian tribe for the
purpose of developing a strategy for protecting the Indian
518.
519.
520.
521.

25 U.S.C. §§ 5601 et seq. (2018).
25 U.S.C. §§ 5613, 5614(a).
Id.
Id. § 5613(a)(2)–(3).
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forest land or rangeland of the Indian tribe and interests
of the Indian tribe in Federal land.522
Introduced in 2016, the Tribal Forestry Participation and Protection Act
would amend the TFPA to ensure more prompt consideration of tribal
requests with mandated timelines for secretarial responses and completion
of relevant environmental reviews.523
ITARA provides a stronger mechanism to ensure tribal proposals
are duly considered by the Secretary, with a presumption of approval
unless specific requirements are not met in proposed plans by tribes.524 A
process for resubmission is also provided along with a judicial review
provision, based in the APA, once the “Indian tribe has exhausted all other
administrative remedies.”525
Determining the scope and content requirements of submitted
tribal co-management plans will be another key factor in this legislative
approach. The purposes of the legislation must be stated broadly enough
to cover the full array of tribal rights and interests on federal public lands
and not be unduly limited and too narrowly defined.526 At the same time,
however, the law must provide some sideboards for tribal co-management,
for the purpose of securing both tribal self-determination and the
conservation of public lands.
The point is to avoid a situation where tribal co-management is
viewed in a strict dichotomous fashion—as only a tool for conservation
and protection or resource use and management. While some tribal comanagement proposals may be strictly focused on conserving the integrity
of sacred lands, cultural resources or protecting the habitat important to
reserved treaty rights, other proposals may include some degree of
resource management and use, such as the case with co-management of
522. Id. § 3115a(d).
523. S. 3014, 114th Cong. (2016).
524. 25 U.S.C. § 5613(b).
525. Id. § 5613(b)(4).
526. For reference, Identifying Opportunities for Cooperative and
Collaborative Partnerships with Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in the
Management of Federal Lands and Resources, Secretarial Order No. 3206, § 5 (2016)
is relatively broad in stating the scope of activities subject to tribal cooperation and
collaboration: “(1) Delivery of specific programs and services; (2) Management of
fish and wildlife resources; (3) Identification, protection, preservation, and
management of culturally significant sites, landscapes, and resources; (4)
Management of plant resources, including collection of plant material; (5)
Management and implementation of maintenance activities; (6) Management of
information related to tribal, cultural, and/or educational materials related to bureau
units.”
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salmon in the Northwest and subsistence use in Alaska. Tribal
representation will be crucial in negotiating and drafting this legislation,
and can help prevent a situation where tribal co-management is
appropriated and co-opted by a particular set of interests.
We hope to return to the particulars of this legislative approach in
subsequent phases of the project. At that point, it will be important to
address the co-management law’s intersection with NEPA and the
layering of tribal co-management plans with federal public land use plans.
Funding tribal co-management must also be addressed. The most
sure-fire way to doom tribal co-management, or any effective management
of public lands for that matter, is through inadequate funding. One lesson
from similarly structured demonstration programs in operation on public
lands, such as the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program
(CFLRP) is the necessity of a long-term funding commitment.527 The Act
creating this program allocates funding through a competitive process and
establishes a dedicated “Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration
Fund.”528
Another possibility in this regard is to consider the types of
revenue-sharing that are common in cooperative federalism and public
lands law, such as the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 529
and the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937.530 While
the latter provides an important stream of wildlife funding for state
governments, tribal governments have been ineligible to receive
Pittman-Robertson funds for conservation on tribal lands. Federal
inducements, incentives, and revenue-sharing mechanisms are common
methods used to promote cooperative federalism, even though state and
county governments are most often the beneficiaries. 531 Lawmakers
could use a similar approach as a way to fund and incentivize tribal comanagement.
The design of CFLRP is instructive in other ways as well,
including the establishment of an advisory panel that evaluates and
provides recommendations on submitted landscape restoration
proposals.532 In addition to using an advisory panel to screen and select
527. See Courtney A. Schultz et al., Strategies for Success Under Forest
Service Restoration Initiatives, ECOSYSTEM WORKFORCE PROGRAM (2017).
528. Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11,
123 Stat. 991.
529. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601 et seq. (2018).
530. Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 669a–i (2018).
531. See Nie, supra note 436, at 40.
532. See generally Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program,
U.S. Forest Service, https://www.fs.fed.us/restoration/CFLRP/ (last visited Aug. 27,
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submitted co-management proposals, the system-wide co-management
law could also incorporate methods of external accountability and review,
such as the use of a Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) committee
or third-party evaluation of some type. The external role played by the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, as discussed in Part II(D),
demonstrates how such a body could be used to help ensure the new law
is effectively implemented. There are several possible ways to design such
a statute, but the goal in this regard is to ensure that ill-conceived proposals
for tribal co-management do not advance and the good ones do not
languish in the halls of federal bureaucracy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1970, the last Public Land Law Review Commission drew a
stark line between federal public lands and Indian law. The Commission
viewed these bodies of law as “wholly separate,” and thus the
Commission’s report makes no reference to the historical underpinning of
federal lands or to the tribal rights and interests that are tied to them.533
The federal public land and wildlife laws enacted before, during, and since
the Commission’s report similarly disregard the connections between
many Native Nations and public lands. The cases and examples used in
this Report demonstrate the ramifications of doing so and the lost potential
of a more holistic and inclusive approach to public lands management. As
other cases have shown, especially those resulting from the treaty-based
collaborative management of fisheries in the Pacific Northwest and Great
Lakes, a meaningful tribal role in resource management results in the
benefit of generations of applied knowledge and, through the harmonizing
of tribal self-determination and public lands management and
conservation, the potential for reckoning with—and reconciliation of—the
“dark side of our conservation history.”534
From those successes, tribal efforts to expand the avenues
through which those benefits can flow have only increased. As Professor
Sarah Krakoff describes in relating the history of the Bears Ears National
Monument, the coalition of tribes moving that effort forward “made
public land laws bend toward equality and justice, and that legacy

2020).
533. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note
3, at 158 n.5.
534. Krakoff, supra note 7, at 215.
AND TO THE
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endures even if the current Bears Ears boundaries do not.” 535 Therein
remains, in Krakoff’s words, the “enduring promise of public lands”:
For decades, public land laws, whether through policies
of disposition or conservation, had similar effects on
American Indian Tribes. Disposition policies, which
distributed public domain lands to homesteaders, miners,
railroads, and states, eroded the tribal land base and had
devasting effects on tribal culture and self-governance.
Conservation policies . . . also displaced Tribes and
severed their connections to cultural practices, with
enduring negative impacts. But disposition policies
privatized indigenous lands, and removed them
permanently (barring tribal reacquisition) from tribal
access. Public lands—whether National Parks,
Wilderness, National Monuments, or otherwise—
remained open for contests over their use. Public lands,
by remaining public, left open the space for Tribes to
renegotiate their rights to their aboriginal lands, and
thereby to nudge conservation policies toward justice. As
long as the federal government retains one third of the
Nation’s lands, there will be terrain (literally) for similar
efforts.536
Fifty years after President Nixon’s Special Message to Congress on Indian
Affairs and the Public Land Law Review Commission’s influential report,
the time has come for a broader movement in support of reckoning,
reconciliation, and justice. Concurrent with the broader national dialogue
on these issues, enhancing tribal co-management of federal public lands
presents an opportunity to make real progress toward fulfilling those
ideals. The next presidential administration can do so by expeditiously
building on previous actions, such as Interior Secretary Jewell’s Order No.
3342 and strategically linking existing authorities and strategies that
would build bridges to a new era in tribal relations and public lands
management. By enacting system-wide and/or place-based tribal comanagement legislation, Congress can also affirm tribal sovereignty and
effectuate the federal government’s treaty and trust obligations through
innovations in cooperative governance.

535.
536.

Id. at 217.
Id. at 257.
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This report provides a framework for putting tribal comanagement in its historical and legal context. All the divergent
definitions, interpretations, and applications of tribal co-management have
caused a fair deal of confusion about what it means in practice and the
implications for public lands and conservation more generally. A more
constructive approach is to focus on the core principles of co-management;
those key attributes that can be configured into different types of
governing arrangements fitting particular places and connections.
For those cautious or leery of the co-management approach, we
recommend it be considered in the context of more familiar questions and
themes of federal public lands and wildlife law. First is the issue of
accountability. Our report makes clear that co-management is not by
nature an open-ended, discretionary, and unenforceable framework that
fails to hold governments—federal, state, and tribal—accountable for their
actions. Finding the right balance between the level of prescription and
discretion is a core tension in public lands law writ large and proposals for
tribal co-management will be debated in a similar fashion. Similarly, these
debates will be bounded by the framework of public land law, from the
more protection-oriented statutes governing the national parks and wildlife
refuges to the more discretionary multiple use systems of the USFS and
BLM. But this framework must no longer be divorced from and exclude
tribes and tribal interests; instead, within this statutory space exists
sufficient room to work more creatively and substantively with Native
Nations and to incorporate the core principles of tribal co-management
into the next chapter of public lands.
Situating tribal co-management in the context of federalism and
intergovernmental relations also helps reframe the debate by placing it
in more familiar terrain. We should first acknowledge the disadvantaged
position of Indian tribes when contrasted to the often-privileged role
provided to state governments in federal public lands and wildlife law.
In some cases, private interests even have more influence and
opportunities to operate on federal lands than do sovereign tribal nations
with legal rights, interests, and cultural ties to those lands. To be sure,
there is already a sharing of management on public lands, but the
opportunities have not yet been extended to tribes like those offered to
states and private interests.
Bridging into a new era of tribal relations does not entail
surrendering the national interest in public lands and, instead, portends a
future of increased engagement and enhanced protection for those
resources. Prominent cases referenced in this report, such as the BadgerTwo Medicine and Bears Ears, more deeply support those interests by
reframing their history and reshaping a new, more collaborative way to
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better protect places that are valued by Indians and non-Indians alike. They
are innovative and constructive efforts at harmonizing sometimes
divergent values and interests and more effectively draw upon the longstanding tribal connections to, and knowledge of, those places.537 These
and the many other efforts toward tribal co-management of federal public
lands demonstrate the potential for tribes to engage with the federal
government in new ways while enmeshing tribal values and connections
into the law and management of public lands.
Ultimately, enhancing opportunities for tribal co-management of
federal public lands is about justice, reconciliation, healing, and sharing.538
Thus, beyond the direct benefits to the public lands, tribal co-management
also offers a path to a more equitable future in which those core values are
promoted and sustained for all Americans. Rather than continue the long
history of division between tribes and public lands, the time has come to
build bridges to that path and to a new and brighter future.

537. The Proclamation designating Bears Ears National Monument, for
example, celebrates the cultural, ecological and recreational values of the region and
makes clear that “it is in the public interest to preserve the objects of scientific and
historic interest on the Bears Ears lands.” Establishment of the Bears Ears National
Monument, Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1143 (Dec. 28, 2016). The
Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act similarly celebrates the far-ranging values of
the area, values that are cherished by tribal and non-tribal people: “[T]he Badger-Two
Medicine is sacred land, a living cultural landscape, a hunting ground, a refuge, a
wildlife sanctuary, a place of refuge for wild nature, and an important part of both
tribal and non-tribal community values.” Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act, supra
note 514, § 3(1).
538. See Tim Davis (Chair, Blackfeet Tribal Business Council), John
Murray (Blackfeet Tribal Historic Preservation Officer), Terry Tatsey (Blackfeet Tribal
Business Council member), Tyson Running Wolf (member of Pikuni Traditionalists
Association), Darrell Hall Blackfeet Brave Dog Society), Badger-Two Medicine Needs
Permanent Protection from Development, MISSOULIAN (July 5, 2020),
https://missoulian.com/opinion/columnists/badger-two-medicine-needs-permanent
-protection-from-development/article_bc90325b-afeb-573c-9033-63c1f282958f.html
(“The Badger-Two Medicine is, above all else, a place of healing, and our world needs
it as much as it needs us.”).

